Le management des filiales d'ONG internationales : entre volonté de la maison-mère et réalité locale

Our research is part of the need to understand the context for effective local management of subsidiaries of international organizations operating in Africa. In fact, contextual accommodation imperatively affects the managerial policy within these organizations. Indeed, their managers are often faced with a dilemma of choice between adaptation or control. This is particularly the case for the subsidiaries of international organizations carrying out their work in a hostile and uncertain context. In this context, which is that of several international NGOs working in Africa, several factors come into play in this managerial dilemma centered on the choice between an adaptation model and a control model. Our research constitutes a critique and a challenge to the success of the universalist approach and aims to diagnose other possible management options by suggesting a management model that seems more appropriate for subsidiaries of international organizations operating in an uncertain context. To get there, we try to answer the following central question:
"How are the will and the managerial policies of the parent companies translated into subsidiaries operating in an African context? "
In our theoretical argument, we essentially mobilize the theories universalist, culturalist and institutionalist as well as the theory of configurations.
Our research is done according to a qualitative methodology and is empirical. It is part of an interpretative approach through a case study. Our research focuses on three subsidiaries of international NGOs located in Burundi. Data collection combines three techniques (executive interviews, direct field observation and documentary sources). The analysis is based on the contextualist model and the theory of social regulation.
Our observation is that the management model based on control leads the subsidiary in a logic of submission or circumvention of the rule and practices developed by the parent company. So he quickly runs into resistance from certain groups of actors who feel their interests are threatened. Our study shows that, even if the exclusive managerial choice between control and adaptation seems necessary for some managers, it is not essential because the combination of the two models is also possible. Thus, the management model that we propose privileges a process of appropriation of the will of the house dominated by the joint social regulation as advocated by Raynaud, thus a balanced combination between the regulation of control and the autonomous regulation. This combination has a great advantage because it can open the field to innovation and eradicate conflicts stemming from the domination of a model exclusively focused on control or adaptation. To achieve this, the managers of the subsidiaries will have to perpetually seek an ideal balance which is very dynamic and unstable because it varies according to the distribution of power within the NGO and stakeholder interests.