Principal-agent theory; Public expenditure management; Pacific island countries
Abstract :
[en] The paper discusses how the principal-agent theory of economics may provide a suitable analytical framework and interesting lessons for the targeting of public expenditure management reforms in Pacific island economies
Disciplines :
Economic systems & public economics General management, entrepreneurship & organizational theory
Author, co-author :
Paul, Elisabeth ; Université de Liège - ULiège > Institut des sciences humaines et sociales > Sociologie du développement
Language :
English
Title :
Lessons from Principal-Agent Theory for Public Expenditure Management in Pacific Island Countries
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