Block, Aymeric ; Université de Liège - ULiège > HEC Liège Research > HEC Liège Research: Financial Management for the Future
Language :
English
Title :
Beyond Ownership Voting Power and Firm Value
Publication date :
09 September 2026
Event name :
Corporate Finance Days Benelux UGENT
Event organizer :
UGENT
Event place :
Ghent, Belgium
Event date :
09/09/2026
Event number :
23
By request :
Yes
Audience :
International
References of the abstract :
We measure effective shareholder control in S&P 500 firms over 2018–2022 using game-theoretic
power indices and define the combinatorial wedge as the component of pivotal voting power that is
not explained by ownership. We focus on one-share–one-vote firms, in which voting and cash-flow
rights coincide, so that any divergence between ownership and control arises from the configuration of
the other shareholders rather than from dual-class structures. Conditional on ownership concentration,
firms whose voting power is more concentrated than their ownership structure predicts have higher
Tobin’s Q, with diminishing returns. The result survives controls for the mass and the dispersion
of block ownership. For managerial insiders, pivotality in excess of that implied by their stake is
positively associated with firm value at typical ownership levels, and this association weakens as
managerial ownership increases. Economic exposure and effective control are distinct governance
margins: the value of a stake depends on whether it confers a pivotal position in the shareholder voting
game.
