[en] This paper focuses on the model of sense-perception constructed in the works of the fifth-century Neoplatonic philosopher Proclus. It attempts to provide a satisfactory explanation of Proclus' claim that sense-perception is actually a derivative of opinion, which is a rational, incorporeal activity. Proclus denies that sense-perception can suffice to provide any knowledge of the outside world, as it is particular, external, and receptive only to
change. The process of sensitive cognition operates through four distinct levels of sense-perception, of decreasing passivity and division. They all still require the guiding influence of opinion, which articulates its own kind of logoi. These allow the soul to recognize forms in the world of becoming; a task sense-perception is unable to complete on its own. Such a conception has pedagogical consequences, as learning must happen despite the entropic tendencies of sense-perception, which can also be used to pass on enlightening opinions on an infra-rational level.
