Abstract :
[en] We study the design of a fair family policy in an economy where parenthood is regarded either as desirable or as undesirable, and where there is imperfect fertility control, leading to involuntary childlessness/parenthood. Using an equivalent con- sumption approach in the consumption-fertility space, we show that the identifica- tion of the worst-off individuals depends on how the social evaluator fixes the refer- ence fertility level. Adopting the ex post egalitarian criterion (giving priority to the worst off in realized terms), we study the compensation for involuntary childless- ness/parenthood. Unlike real-world family policies, the fair family policy does not always involve positive family allowances, and may also include positive childless- ness allowances. Our results are robust to assuming asymmetric information and to introducing Assisted Reproductive Technologies.
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