Reference : Marty, Husserl, and the (psycho)logical a priori
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Marty, Husserl, and the (psycho)logical a priori
Seron, Denis mailto [Université de Liège > Département de philosophie > Phénoménologies >]
Mind and Language - On the Philosophy of Anton Marty
Fréchette, Guillaume
Taieb, Hamid
De Gruyter
Phenomenology & Mind, 19
Berlin Boston
[en] Marty ; Brentano ; logic
[fr] Marty ; Brentano ; logique
[en] This paper aims to discuss some aspects of the Marty–Husserl debate about grammar. My suggestion is that the debate is first of all an epistemological debate, that is, a debate about what a priori knowledge is and how it is acquired. The key opposition is between Marty’s Brentanian notion of ‘analytic intuition’ and Husserl’s Bolzanian notion of ideation. As I will argue, the underlying issue is the possibility of a psychological a priori. On the one hand, analytic intuition provides the psychologist with a priori knowledge about empirical facts. On the other hand, ideation provides the logician with entities that are disconnected from empirical facts—entities which are ‘purely logical’. I conclude with some brief remarks on the Brentanian background of both conceptions.

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