Husserl, Marty, and the (Psycho)logical A Priori

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Abstract: This paper aims to discuss some aspects of the Marty–Husserl debate about grammar. My suggestion is that the debate is first of all an epistemological debate, that is, a debate about what a priori knowledge is and how it is acquired. The key opposition is between Marty’s Brentanian notion of ‘analytic intuition’ and Husserl’s Bolzanian notion of ideation. As I will argue, the underlying issue is the possibility of a psychological a priori. On the one hand, analytic intuition provides the psychologist with a priori knowledge about empirical facts. On the other hand, ideation provides the logician with entities that are disconnected from empirical facts—entities which are ‘purely logical’. I conclude with some brief remarks on the Brentanian background of both conceptions.

Kant bequeathed to his successors the bizarre idea that there are two different kinds of a priori knowledge, corresponding to the two higher faculties of the mind, sensibility and reason. Some a priori rules are regarded as being of a ‘logical’ nature, while others are not. The first category includes the rules ‘a proposition composed of connectives alone is impossible’ and ‘necessarily all propositions of the form “p and non-p” are false’. The second category includes phenomenological or psychological rules such as ‘green is between blue and yellow’ and ‘a belief with no content is impossible’. But why should there be different kinds of a priori rules? It seems odd to place such a peculiar thing as a priori knowledge into completely different categories. It would be more satisfying if both kinds of a priori rules could somehow be described either as logical rules, as in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, or as phenomenological or psychological rules. This problem is at the center of the dispute between Marty and Husserl on the nature of general grammar.

The present paper offers a discussion of some aspects of this dispute. The focus will be on the 4th Logical Investigation, on Marty’s response in his Investigations on the Foundations of
General Grammar and Philosophy of Language of 1908, and on Husserl’s counter-response in the second edition of the Logical Investigations. First, I will suggest that the debate is above all an epistemological debate, namely a debate about what a priori knowledge is and how it is acquired. The key opposition is between Husserl’s Bolzano-inspired notion of ideation and the Brentanian notion of ‘analytic intuition’ taken up by Marty. As I will argue, the underlying issue is about the possibility of a psychological a priori. I will conclude with some brief remarks on the Brentanian background of both conceptions.

1. Preliminary questions

The primary target of Husserl’s critique in the 4th Investigation is Marty’s view that general grammar should be part of, or borrow its method from, descriptive psychology (Marty 1950, p. 30). Husserl, by contrast, characterises his grammar as purely logical.

This already raises some questions. Consider what Husserl tells us about logic. Logic, he says, is a theory of meaning, that is, a theory which has as its objects propositions, systems of propositions or theories, and parts of propositions such as concepts and dependent and proper meanings. Now, what kind of object is a meaning? The essence of meaning, Husserl claims in the 4th Investigation, ‘consists in a certain intention’ (Intention) (Husserl, LU2, 4, A304; Engl. transl. p. 60).² Likewise, according to the 5th Investigation, meaning or ‘sense’ is the ‘intentional matter’ of a mental act—its property of being about this or that (Husserl, LU2, 5, A390; Engl. transl. p. 121–122). So what is the disagreement about? Isn’t intentionality a psychological matter? Supposing that intentionality is the essence of meaning, why should the morphology of meaning be distinct from psychology?

One might be tempted to say that Husserl rejects Marty’s claim that meanings are accessible only through psychological reflection. But this reading would be wrong. In the 1st Logical Investigation, § 34, Husserl explicitly holds that the logician’s objectification of meanings is a ‘reflective act of thought’ (reflektiver Denkakt), that is, a mental act whose object is another mental act (Husserl, LU2, 1, A103; Engl. transl. p. 232). The difference between normal and ‘logical thinking’, for Husserl, lies not in the fact that the latter has as its objects Platonic entities called ‘meanings’, but in the fact that it requires a process of ‘logical reflection’ by which not external objects, but judgements are objectified and subjected to formalizing ideation.
Thus, there seems to be a sense in which Husserl’s logic, like Marty’s semasiology, has to do with psychology. But what about logical psychologism (in Husserl’s sense)? For Husserl, Marty’s views on grammar reflect a ‘psychologistic misinterpretation of the core concept of the theory of meaning’ (Husserl, Hua 22, p. 263). By contrast, Marty himself explicitly saw his position as fundamentally opposed to logical psychologism, and since Herman Parret (1976) practically all commentators have agreed with his assessment. An argument often put forward is that Marty’s judgement-contents, although accessible only through reflection, are not subjective or mind-dependent entities (Smith and Rojszczak 2003, p. 246). Another argument is that for Husserl logical psychologism entails relativism, and that relativism is strongly rejected and warned against by Marty as well as Brentano (Rollinger 2014, p. 5). I will mention a third argument below.

There are some similarities between Martian judgement-contents and Bolzarian truths in themselves. Nonetheless, as commentators have rightly emphasised, the two notions are different in crucial respects. First, Bolzano’s propositions—like Meinong’s objectives—are truth-bearers, while Marty’s judgement-contents are better seen as truth-makers (Smith 1994, p. 106; Smith and Rojszczak 2003; Simons 2006, p. 167). Second, Martian judgement-contents, unlike Bolzarian propositions, ‘are not ideal or extra-temporal’; ‘they exist in time’, that is, ‘now, or not at all’ (Smith 1994, p. 106; cf. Rollinger 2010, p. 95; Rojszczak 2005, p. 52; Antonelli 2011, LXII). Finally, according to Marty’s interpretation in the *Investigations on Grammar*, Bolzano as well as Husserl defended the view that propositions in themselves have some ‘being’ of their own that is neither reality nor existence (Marty 1908, p. 321; cf. Rollinger 2010, p. 95–96). In Marty’s view, by contrast, the distinction between being and existence, or between several modes of being, is incorrect and misleading. Meanings are not real objects (Platonic or otherwise) to which expressions relate. Talk of an expression’s ‘having a meaning’ is a way of talking about the fact that it has a ‘meaning function’ (Mulligan 1990, p. 14 ff.).

It is unclear to what extent these differences are relevant to our problem. Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* also contain a theory of states of affairs—which are truth-makers. Husserl and Marty explicitly identify the latter’s judgement-contents with *Sachverhalte* (Morscher 1990, p. 187; Simons 2006, p. 166; Husserl, Hua 26, p. 200). Moreover, Barry Smith (1989) defended the view that, in contrast to his pupil Adolf Reinach, Husserl was a Platonist only about propositions, not about states of affairs, which he conceived of as individual entities—as Marty did with judgement-contents.

However, none of these differences is central in the 4th *Logical Investigation*, which suggests that the heart of the controversy may be somewhere else. Thus far, the issue is ontological. The question is, for example, whether judgement-contents are individual
psychological entities or ideal entities to be studied independently of their mental realizations. Now, it is clear that Husserl’s objections in the 4th Investigation are mainly of an epistemological order.

In the first edition of the Logical Investigations, logic is defined as an ‘ideal science’; as opposed to psychology, which deals only with real mental acts. Logical laws such as the principle of non-contradiction are ideal, a priori laws, while psychological laws are just inductive or ‘real’ laws—not laws in the strict sense of the term. This idea is at the basis of Husserl’s critique of logical psychologism: since it is impossible to infer ideal from inductive laws, logic can in no way be derived from psychology. This may suggest that Husserl’s critique of Marty is just a special case of his critique of logical psychologism: just as logical psychologists in general wrongly think it possible to derive logical laws from the inductive laws of empirical psychology, so Marty wrongly thinks it possible to build up his general grammar on the basis of linguistic psychology.

One common objection to this reading of Husserl, or to Husserl’s reading of Marty, is that neither Marty nor Brentano deny the empirical psychologist as such the ability to formulate apodictic laws of the kind required in logic (Parret 1976; Taieb 2014; Antonelli 2011, XXI–XXII). According to the first edition of the Logical Investigations, empirical psychology as such cannot ground logic because it is unable to formulate a priori laws. Of course, this is not the view endorsed by Marty.

Given this, there are at least three ways to defend Marty against Husserl. The first is to say that Husserl’s intention in the 4th Investigation is to apply his anti-psychologist objection to Marty’s general grammar, thus rejecting Marty’s claim that general grammar should be both a priori and psychology-based. In this case, a defender of Marty would have to advocate the Brentanian view that the empirical psychologist is entitled to formulate a priori laws. She could, for example, follow Moritz Schlick’s suggestion that the converse argument is equally plausible: logic deals with apodictic laws and it has something to do with psychology, therefore the psychologist must be able to formulate apodictic laws (Schlick 1910, p. 409 ff.).

Another line of defense would be the following: Husserl wants to apply his anti-psychologist objection to Marty’s general grammar but his reading is unfair, so his criticism is, at least in part, unjustified. On a third and final interpretation, Husserl’s actual intention is not to apply his anti-psychologist objection to Marty’s general grammar, and the reasons for his rejection of it must be found elsewhere.

In my view, the first two interpretations contain a kernel of truth. My reason for thinking so is that, in the first edition of the Logical Investigations, Husserl oddly ignores the Brentanian view of a priori knowledge—a view that is strongly endorsed by Marty in his
project of a linguistic psychology. The result is that his critique of Marty’s psychological approach to logical issues is both unfair and susceptible to counter-arguments. I will give some hints about this further below.

2. Analytic intuition

Suppose a universal grammatical law to the effect that by combining only syncategoremata, for example connectives, you never obtain an expression with a unitary meaning, or to the effect that a unitary meaning is never composed of dependent meanings alone. The question is: Is this law logical or psychological, or both logical and psychological? To this question, Husserl answers that the law is logical and hence not psychological. Marty’s answer, by contrast, is that it is logical and hence psychological.

Let us now look at the reasons advanced in support of each of these two answers.

To begin with, both philosophers are centrally concerned with how logical truths are experienced. Logical truths are somehow given and the whole debate revolves around the nature of that logical experiencing, which Husserl calls ‘ideation’ and Marty ‘analytic intuition’ (analytische Einsicht). Additionally, both authors’ arguments are distinctively Brentanian.

In Marty’s *Investigations* of 1908, logical truths are assumed to be given in ‘analytic intuitions’. For example, you may have an intuition of the impossibility of a given judgement’s being neither positive nor negative. This intuition will give you evidence that making a judgement about a content S–P necessarily involves accepting or rejecting that content, with the consequence that all judgements about S–P must necessarily be of the form ‘S is P’ or ‘S is not P’—which is one possible version of the logical law of the excluded middle (cf. Marty 1908, p. 66). Now, the object of your analytic intuition is a mental act. Therefore, the intuition must belong to psychology, or more precisely to that branch of psychology which deals with expressive acts, namely linguistic psychology.

To illustrate this latter point, Marty draws an analogy with sensory qualities—for you can presumably have a priori intuitions about colours and sounds as well. For example, hearing a C chord played on a piano, you may have the analytic intuition that the chord has such-and-such sounds as its parts. This intuition will provide you with a priori knowledge such as can be found in the theory of harmony. And arguably the same applies in the case of colours. In some sense, it is an a priori law that green is between blue and yellow.
The analogy runs as follows: just as colours and sounds supply us with analytic
intuitions that ground the a priori laws of the theory of colours and the theory of harmony, so
the act of judging supplies us with analytic intuitions which ground the a priori laws of logic.

One may ask why this should constitute an argument at all. After all, what do sounds
and colours have to do with psychology? Should the theory of colours and the theory of
harmony be taught in psychology departments? Why should it be otherwise with logic? In
fact, Marty does accept the idea that the theory of colours and the theory of harmony are
branches of psychology. Unlike others, for example Stumpf, he follows Brentano on this
point. On Brentano’s view, colours and sounds are physical phenomena, which as such appear
only in other phenomena, namely in mental phenomena. What you actually experience and
have analytic intuitions about when you see a coloured thing is yourself as a colour-presenter,
namely a mental act along with a physical phenomenon contained in it. If you are concerned
with phenomenal properties, as you certainly are when talking of tonal consonance or
relations among colours, you study sounds and colours as a psychologist. In this connection,
Marty writes a little further on: ‘It is not colours and sounds that are empirically given to us,
but only something that represents colours or sounds (ein Farben- resp. Töne-vorstellendes)’
(Marty 1908, p. 66). For example, having the intuition of the C chord’s being composed of
such-and-such sounds means having ‘the experience that the subject that hears the chord hears
the partial sounds’ (Marty 1908, p. 66).

The analogy above is much clearer with this in mind. Colours and sounds are contents of
perceptual acts and thus objects of psychological reflection. Consequently, our analytic
intuitions about colours and sounds are psychological, as are the theory of colours and the
theory of harmony. Likewise, meanings of the form S–P are contents of acts of judging;
meanings in general are contents of expressive acts. As such, meanings are objects of
psychological reflection. Consequently, our analytic intuitions about meanings and hence the
a priori theory of meaning must be psychological.
3. Ideation

According to the Brentanian model endorsed by Marty, the whole state expressed by intentional sentences of the form ‘X judges that S is P’ is an object of psychological reflection, thus including both the judging and its content S–P. Grammar is likely to be about the content, but as we have seen in the case of the law of the excluded middle, logic may be about the act, or about both the act and its content.

Husserl’s position is very different. In the *Logical Investigations*, he maintains, like Bolzano and Frege, that logic and hence pure grammar are limited to the logical content—a thesis he will later supplement with the further claim that psychology deals only with the act, as opposed to its ‘noema’. It is important to keep in mind here that this further claim is not endorsed in the first edition. In 1901, the fact that logic deals only with judgement-contents does not entail that psychology does not deal with judgement-contents. In this respect, there is some agreement between Husserl and the other Brentanians, including Marty. For Husserl as well as Marty, judgement-contents should, in some sense, be studied in both logic and psychology.5

What is important here is that the difference between logic and psychology as conceived in the first edition of the *Logical Investigations* is not, at least primarily, an ontological difference. In my view, the Marty–Husserl debate is basically epistemological. It would be a mistake to think that Husserl, against Marty, separates logical from psychological entities. What he actually aims to do is to separate logic from psychology—which is quite a different thing. The aim is to create a new division of labour using the Bolzano-inspired notion of ideation.6

Husserl’s pure grammar, as a morphology of meanings, deals only with intentional contents. In his view, the predicative structure belongs to the intentional matter or content of the mental act. Some acts, which he calls ‘propositional acts’, are such that their intentional content is of the form ‘S is P’. But on the other hand, intentional matter is a psychological feature of individual mental acts. By means of direct or indirect introspection, the psychologist observes that such-and-such act of remembering has the property of being about the Jewish Ghetto of Rome, that such-and-such belief has the property of being a belief that the Jewish Ghetto is located north of the Trastevere quarter. What allows one to ascend from the content as a psychological property of the act to the content as an object of logical knowledge is ideation. While the psychologist is concerned with the content as mentally realised, the logician studies the content ‘in itself’, that is, in abstraction from its mental
realization. And both must somehow refer to one and the same content—otherwise Husserl’s project of a ‘phenomenological grounding of logic’ would make no sense.

It is precisely this new division of labour that Husserl raises in opposition to Marty in the Logical Investigations. In the second edition, he advances an interesting argument about formal mathematics—mathematics in exclusion of material disciplines like Euclidian geometry. Husserl holds that the epistemology of formal mathematics is very similar to that of pure logic. Furthermore, according to the Prolegomena, there is a relation of equivalence between formal-ontological and purely logical laws and categories. This suggests that, if mathematics must be epistemologically independent of psychology, then logic must be epistemologically independent of it as well.

The argument runs as follows: if logic were to be part of psychology, as Marty thinks it should be, then formal mathematics, too, should be part of psychology; but the consequent is obviously false; therefore, logic cannot be part of psychology. The mathematician, unlike the philosopher, need not be concerned with the intuitive sources of her axioms and theorems. And what is more, the progress of her science requires her to confine herself to purely symbolic thinking and to bracket the question of how her axioms and theorems may be fulfilled by experience. Here is the text:

To me Marty’s conception is basically mistaken. On it, we should ultimately have to class arithmetic, as well as all formal disciplines in mathematics in—psychology, if not in linguistic psychology. For pure logic in the narrower sense, i.e. the doctrine of the validity of meanings, and the connected pure theory of meaning-forms, is, I hold, essentially one with these disciplines (cf. the final chapter of the Prolegomena). In the essential unity of a mathesis universalis all these sciences must be treated, and certainly be kept quite apart from all empirical sciences, whether styled “physics” or “psychology”. Mathematicians in fact do this, even if in naïvely dogmatic fashion, turning their back on specifically philosophical problems, and not worrying about philosophical objections—to the great profit, in my view, of their science. (Husserl, LU2, 4, B340–341; Engl. transl. p. 75)

Marty is right in saying that Husserl’s strategy has the effect of ‘discrediting the important discipline of descriptive psychology in large domains’ (Marty 1908, p. 66). In effect, it boils down to denying the psychologist and perhaps even the philosopher the right to build up logical theories. The philosopher’s job consists in philosophy of logic rather than philosophical logic, in philosophical ‘clarification’ rather than the ‘explanation’ of logical laws. In other words, Husserl seems to assume that logic, just like mathematics, is a purely ‘symbolic’ discipline, while the philosopher’s task instead lies in intuitive fulfilment.
4. A priori categories—or judgements?

All of the above suggests that there is an enormous difference between Husserl’s ideation and Marty’s ‘analytic intuition’. The former corresponds, for example, to the Bolzanian logician’s objectification of the proposition ‘the Roman Ghetto is located north of Trastevere’. The latter corresponds to the psychologist’s observation that it is impossible to judge that the Roman Ghetto is located here or there without having a presentation of the Roman Ghetto.

In the *Investigations on Grammar*, Marty gives some examples of what he has in mind when he speaks of a priori knowledge in linguistic psychology. He mentions the following four laws (Marty 1908, p. 57):

(1) ‘There is no linguistic device (*Sprachmittel*) that reveals an act of judging without implicitly expressing something judged which is presented at the same time.’

(2) ‘There is no linguistic device for a phenomenon of interest that does not implicitly express something that is the object of interest.’

(3) ‘There can be no name that names one term of a correlation without arousing the presentation of one or more other terms of the correlation, at least generally conceived.’

(4) ‘All expression of a simple judgement contains a sign of either acceptance or rejection.’

Of course, most of us would be reluctant to count any one of these propositions as a logical truth. Marty upholds the Brentanian view, also criticised in the 4th *Logical Investigation*, that logic is first of all about acts of judging. ‘All great philosophers from Aristotle through Mill’, he argues, ‘have conceived “logic” as a method for correct judging’ (Marty 1908, p. 63–64). However, the disagreement may be more fundamental, and this leads us to one of the most interesting objections to Husserl in Marty’s *Investigations on Grammar*.

As we saw above, Husserl’s ideation is for example that process by which the logician objectifies the proposition ‘the Ghetto is located north of Trastevere’ in itself, that is, regardless of its realization in experience. By contrast, Marty’s analytic intuition allows one to know that it is impossible for that judgement to occur in the absence of any presentation of
the Roman Ghetto. Ideation presents the ideal objects to which purely logical categories correspond, for example concepts or propositions; analytic intuition justifies a priori judgements about empirical facts. In short: ideal objects, categories, and judgements on the one side, and a priori judgements alone on the other side.

Interestingly, Marty states against Husserl that the two aspects are not logically dependent on one another. Following Hume and Kant, he claims that a priori judgements need not be about a priori objects, and that the existence of a priori judgements does not entail that of a priori objects or concepts (Marty 1908, p. 57). Rather, the idea is that the psychologist has empirical concepts which lend themselves to a priori judgements, in the same way that the empirical concept of colour lends itself to the a priori judgement that it is impossible for a colour to be unextended.

This view involves two distinct claims. First, the psychologist’s analytic judgements are about concepts. As Marty puts it, they are analytic in the sense that they are obtained through reflective analysis of representations. Second, the concepts that the judgements are about need not be a priori themselves. The fact that there are a priori logical laws does not imply that logic must be a ‘pure’, non-empirical science. Thus, the fact that there are a priori grammatical laws does not imply that general grammar must be a ‘pure’ grammar in Husserl’s sense of the term.

From the fact that general grammar contains a priori judgements, it does not follow that, as Husserl claims, it should be ‘pure’, that is, free from empirical contamination and referring only to ideal objects. But Marty goes further still. It is not only that he rejects the view equating a priori judgements with ‘pure’ knowledge. He also holds that general grammar actually requires empirical observations even where it generates a priori judgements (Marty 1908, p. 58). We are taught, for example, that there are phenomena of interest in addition to presentations and judgements; that we have correlative concepts; that judgements are different not only in quality—depending on whether they are positive or negative—, but also in degree of blindness and self-evidence, or depending on whether they are assertoric or apodictic, etc. All this, Marty argues, is empirical knowledge, namely empirical facts discovered through observation.

As mentioned above, Husserl’s counter-argument in the second edition of the *Investigations* is that the epistemology of logic is not fundamentally different from that of formal mathematics. This, however, is just one half of his response. The other half is a concession to Marty. Husserl concedes that there may exist a grammatical a priori that is not properly logical. Consequently, he proposes to replace the term ‘pure grammar’ with ‘logical pure grammar’, thus opening the possibility of a priori grammatical laws which are not about
meanings in themselves, as are logical laws, but about, for example, ‘relations of mutual understanding among minded persons’ (Husserl, LU2, 4, B340; Engl. transl. p. 75).

This concession is far from a minor detail. It is crucial in order to understand the development of Husserl’s philosophy after the *Logical Investigations*. For the idea of a psychological a priori was clearly rejected in the first edition of the *Investigations*. In 1901, the key argument against logical psychologism was that the laws of descriptive psychology are inductive or ‘real’ laws. In other words, they are not laws in the same strict sense in which the ‘ideal’ laws of logic and mathematics are called ‘laws’. The fallacy of logical psychologism consists in the false belief that ideal laws can be derived from real laws. As I suggested earlier, referring to Schlick, the whole argument collapses if you accept the possibility of a psychological a priori, as Husserl does in 1913 in accordance with Marty’s account. Along with others like Adolf Reinach and of course Brentano, Marty’s objections may thus have played a role in the move towards the eidetic phenomenology of the *Ideas I*—which is like a kind of a priori psychology.

5. Concluding remarks

The question now before us is: Why couldn’t Marty accept Husserl’s idea of an epistemological autonomy of the a priori theory of meaning? This question is less obvious than it may seem. For both authors agree that meanings are subject to apodictic truths, and that they are entities dependent on mental acts.

One might be tempted to explain the disagreement through the underlying Brentanian framework of Marty’s psychology. In Brentano’s view, the intentional content, too, insofar as it always appears in a mental phenomenon, is an object of psychology. This idea is most clearly expressed in the *Psychology* of 1874:

> With respect to the definition of psychology, it might first seem as if the concept of mental phenomena would have to be broadened rather than narrowed (*erweitern eher als verengern*), both because the physical phenomena of imagination fall within its scope at least as much as mental phenomena as previously defined, and because the phenomena which occur in sensation cannot be disregarded in the theory of sensation. It is obvious, however, that they are taken into account only as the content of mental phenomena when we describe the specific characteristics of the latter. (Brentano 1973, p. 140; Engl. transl., p. 100)

Yet this conclusion would be misleading. My suggestion is that, despite appearances, the two philosophers are equally Brentanian, although in different ways.
Let us go back to the analogy with colours. Both colours and meanings are amenable to a priori knowledge. The colour theorist states that green is between blue and yellow; the logician states that by combining only connectives you never obtain an expression with a unitary meaning. Marty maintains that both statements are psychological. Would Brentano agree with Marty?

Brentano’s conception of logic is not very different from Marty’s. Both authors conceive of logic not as a theory of meaning, but as a practical method for correct judging (Marty 1918, p. 301 ff.). However, this fact is of secondary interest. The real question is whether (logic defined as) an a priori theory of meaning should be separated from psychology. Now, on this latter question, there is a sense in which Brentano’s approach to the question at stake may seem closer to Husserl than to Marty. Brentano does not claim, as does Marty, that colours are merely properties to be studied in psychology. What he actually says in the text just quoted is that the psychologist is concerned with physical phenomena insofar as they are taken as contents of mental acts. Where this is not the case, colours are objects of physics. Now, Brentano does not say that physics is part of psychology or that talk of physical properties is misleading or illusory. Rather, the Psychology of 1874 defines physics as the ‘science of physical phenomena’. Brentano’s claim is that the physicist is right in speaking of objective properties, although physical phenomena do not really exist and she thereby refers only to mental phenomena. As he puts it in his later work, the physicist talks of objective properties in a non-referential, ‘oblique’ mode. What physical theories are about, what they are intentionally directed towards, is not what they actually refer to. What physical theories actually refer to, what make them true, are parts of mental phenomena. In other words: in the referential use of language, in modo recto, physical entities must actually be included in the intentional context; they are mere appearances, thus something that, like all appearances according to Brentano, occur in the mind.8

It is possible that Marty did agree with this. In any case, the view that colours are objects of psychology is something he explicitly advocates in his critique of Husserl in the Investigations on Grammar. ‘In my view’, he declares, ‘psychology is the only right place where to treat what is a priori self-evident about sensory qualities’ (Marty 1908, p. 66).

There is, so to speak, a structural resemblance between Brentano’s conception of physics and the division of labour presented in the first edition of the Logical Investigations. Like physics for Brentano, logic for Husserl is about non-mental entities. Just as Brentano claims that the objects studied in physics are actually no more than contents of mental acts, so Husserl claims that the objects studied in Bolzarian logic are no more than contents of judgement. In consequence, it is the phenomenologist or descriptive psychologist’s task to reveal the intuitive sources at the basis of logical knowledge.9
To sum up: If one accepts Brentano’s conception of logic as a theory of correct judging, as opposed to Bolzano’s conception of logic as an objective science, then logic can plausibly be viewed as a (practical) branch of psychology—and Marty is right. But on the other hand, if one accepts both Brentano’s epistemology of objective sciences and the view that pure logic is an objective science, like physics, then one obtains the epistemology of logic promoted in the first edition of the *Logical Investigations*. Both Marty and Husserl are Brentanian in their conception of logic, although in opposing ways.

**References**


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Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* are referenced as *LU* followed by volume number, Investigation number, page number in the first (A) or second (B) edition, and page number in the English translation. References to other texts by Husserl are to the Husserliana edition (abridged as *Hua*).

This is literally how Husserl puts the point in the first edition of the *Logical Investigations*, where no mention is made of a priori or “ideal” laws of a psychological nature. It is true that, for Husserl, logical psychologism is false because it aims to causally explain logical laws, while psychology can only “clarify” them by disclosing their intuitive sources. It is also true that this antagonism echoes Brentano’s distinction between genetic and descriptive psychology. However, it would be wrong to conclude that, since Brentano views descriptive psychology as an a priori science, Husserl’s descriptive psychology in the first edition of the *Investigations* must be an a priori science. Instead, my hypothesis is that Husserl, in the first edition, acknowledges only one type of a priori, namely the logical or formal–ontological a priori. This hypothesis will be detailed below.

Whether this leads to a form of logical psychologism in Husserl’s sense is a different question altogether.

Another interesting consequence of this conception is that there seems to be no place for modal logic in the *Logical Investigations*. The same is true of Husserl’s later works. It is true that in the *Ideas I* modalities are integrated into the noema, but Husserl explicitly affirms that pure logic is concerned only with the sense (*Sinn*), that is, with the non-modal part of the noema.

The issue is not whether judgement contents should be considered as having a distinct kind of being, but rather whether logical truths require a distinct mode of access. Marty rejects the idea that the difference between logical and psychological truths calls for a distinction between modes of access (and with it between disciplines), while Husserl accepts it.

The question of Marty’s relationship to logical psychologism is arguably equivalent to that of Brentano’s relationship to logical psychologism. Unfortunately, the second question is obscure and rarely addressed in the literature. A notable exception is (Moran 2000).

For more detail on Brentano’s phenomenalism, see (Seron 2014) and (Seron, forthcoming). This reading is, in some ways, close to those of Bell (2008, p. 3–28), Chisholm (1981; 1990), Potrč (2013), and Siewert (2015). The distinction between intentionality and reference plays an essential role in some recent interpretations of Brentano’s theory of intentionality (Sauer 2006; Fréchette 2012).

For reasons of space, it is impossible to go into further details here. This interpretation of Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* is developed in detail in (Seron 2012) and (Seron 2015).