No privatisation in the service of fair competition? Article 345 TFEU and the market-state balance after Essent

Van Cleynenbreugel, Pieter

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No privatisation in the service of fair competition? Article 345 TFEU and the market-state balance after Essent

Van Cleynenbreugel, Pieter

2014 • In European Law Review, 39, p. 264-275

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Abstract :

[en] This article analyses, from the vantage point of Article 345 TFEU, the Essent judgment, in which justifications for a restriction on the free movement of capital were to be found in relation to a prohibition on privatising utilities distribution networks. It uses the case as a starting point for a more general reflection on the role of public authorities and public ownership in a changing market environment imposed by EU law.

Disciplines :

European & international law

Author, co-author :

Van Cleynenbreugel, Pieter ; Université de Liège > Département de droit > Droit matériel européen

Language :

English

Title :

No privatisation in the service of fair competition? Article 345 TFEU and the market-state balance after Essent

Publication date :

2014

Journal title :

European Law Review

ISSN :

0307-5400

eISSN :

2754-1800

Publisher :

Sweet & Maxwell

Volume :

Pages :

264-275

Peer reviewed :

Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi

Available on ORBi :

since 08 September 2016

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Bibliography

See most explicitly, J. Snell, "Who's got the Power? Free Movement and Allocation of Competences in EC Law" (2003) 22 Y. E. L. 323.
See for an overview, C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms, 4th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 33-629.
On the difficult and incoherent "scope" of EU free movement law in that image, see recently N. Nic Shuibhne, The Coherence of EU Free Movement Law: Constitutional Responsibility and the Court of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 189-256.
For that conceptualisation, see M. Poiares Maduro, We the Court: The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution: a Critical Reading of Article 30 of the EC Treaty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998), p. 143.
Among others, see W. Devroe, "Privatizations and Community Law: Neutrality versus Policy?" (1997) 34 C. M. L. Rev. 267, 271;
B. Akkermans and E. Ramaekers, "Article 345 TFEU (ex Article 295 EC): its Meanings and Interpretations" (2010) 16 E. L. J. 292, 293.
Staat der Nederlanden v Essent NV (C-105/12), Essent Nederland BV (C-105/12), Eneco Holding NV (C-106/12), Delta NV (C-107/12) October 22, 2013.
Essent (C-105/12) October 22, 2013 at [30];
B. Akkermans and E. Ramaekers, "Article 345 TFEU (ex Article 295 EC) " (2010) 16 E. L. J. 293, 298.
See also F. Losada, T. Juutilainen, K. Havu and J. Vesala, "Property and European Integration: Dimensions of Article 345 TFEU" (2012) 148 Tidskrift utgiven av Juridiska Föreningen i Finland 203, 209.
See for that perspective, R. Kovar, "Nationalisations-privatisations et droit communautaire" in J. Schwarze (ed.), Discretionary Powers of the Member States in the Field of Economic Policies and their Limits under the EEC Treaty: Contributions to an International Colloquium of the European University Institute held in Florence on 14-15 May 1987 (Nomos, 1988), pp. 97-119.
For a critique on the concept and meaning of prejudice-which goes beyond this comment-see Losada et al., "Property and European Integration" (2012) 148 Tidskrift utgiven av Juridiska Föreningen i Finland 203, 208-209 and references included therein.
For the clearest development of that distinction so far, see the Opinion of A. G. Jääskinen in Essent (C-105/12) October 22, 2013 at [41]-[43] and references therein.
See Commission v Greece (C-244/11) [2013] 1 C. M. L. R. 46 at [15].
On the existence versus exercise of property rights and its relevance to EU law, see Devroe, "Privatizations and Community Law" (1997) 34 C. M. L. Rev. 267, 270;
and Akkermans and Ramaekers, "Article 345 TFEU (ex Article 295 EC) " (2010) 16 E. L. J. 293, 311.
See, for that approach already, the Opinion of A. G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Commission v Portugal (C-367/98), Commission v France (C-483/99) and Commission v Belgium (C-503/99) [2002] E. C. R. I-4731;
[2002] C. M. L. R. 48 at [54].
For a similar assessment, see Akkermans and Ramaekers, "Article 345 TFEU (ex Article 295 EC) " (2010) 16 E. L. J. 293, 303-304.
Opinion of A. G. Jääskinen in Essent (C-105/12) October 22, 2013 at [42].
See, for that understanding already, Fearon v Irish Land Commission (182/83) [1984] E. C. R. 3677;
[1985] 2 C. M. L. R. 228 at [7];
Commission v Italy (C-235/89) [1992] E. C. R. I-777;
[1992] 2 C. M. L. R. 709 at [14];
and Commission v United Kingdom (C-30/90) [1992] E. C. R. I-829;
[1992] 2 C. M. L. R. 709 at [18];
Konle v Austria (C-302/97) [1999] E. C. R. I-3099;
[2000] 2 C. M. L. R. 963 at [38];
Ospelt and Schlössle Weissenberg v Unabhangiger Verwaltungssenat des Landes Vorarlberg (C-452/01) [2003] E. C. R. I-9743;
[2005] 3 C. M. L. R. 40 at [24];
(C-171/08) Commission v Portugal (C-171/08) [2010] E. C. R. I-6817;
[2011] 1 C. M. L. R. 10 at [64];
Commission v Poland (C-271/09) [2012] 2 C. M. L. R. 11 at [44];
Commission v Greece (C-244/11) [2013] 1 C. M. L. R. 46 at [16];
Essent (C-105/12) October 22, 2013 at [36].
A mere reduction in tax revenue would be purely economic; see CIBA v APEH (C-96/08) [2010] E. C. R. I-2911;
[2010] 3 C. M. L. R. 21 at [48].
See, in the realm of energy, M. Albers, "Competition Law Issues arising from the Liberalization Process" in D. Geradin (ed.), The Liberalization of Electricity and Natural Gas in the European Union (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 4
Directive 2003/54 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92 [2003] OJ L176/37 art.20;
For a concise overview, see C. Jones, "Introduction" in C. Jones (ed.), EU Energy Law: Volume 1. The Internal Energy Market: The Third Liberalization Package (Brussels: Claeys & Casteels, 2010), pp. 3-8.
See for a concise overview in that regard http://www2.eurelectric.org/Content/Default.asp?PageID=820. [Accessed February 19, 2014]. 2
Essent (C-105/12) October 22, 2013 at [19].
Essent (C-105/12) at [20].
Essent (C-105/12) at [18].
Essent (C-105/12) at [24].
Essent (C-105/12) at [26].
Opinion of A. G. Jääskinen in Essent (C-105/12) October 22, 2013 at [45].
Essent (C-105/12) at [36].
Essent (C-105/12) at [37].
Essent (C-105/12) at [38];
see for background, J. Snell, "Free Movement of Capital: Evolution as a Non-linear Process" in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 547-574.
Essent (C-105/12) at [40].
Essent (C-105/12) at [43].
Essent (C-105/12) at [45].
Essent (C-105/12) at [46].
Essent (C-105/12) at [50].
Essent (C-105/12) at [53].
Essent (C-105/12) at [55].
Essent (C-105/12) at [58].
Essent (C-105/12) at [59].
Essent (C-105/12) at [62].
Essent (C-105/12) at [67].
Essent (C-105/12) at [66].
Essent (C-105/12) at [53].
see also Commission v United Kingdom (C-30/90) [1992] E. C. R. I-829 at [18];
Spain v Council (C-350/92) [1995] E. C. R. I-1985;
[1996] 1 C. M. L. R. 415 at [22].
Centrafarm v Winthrop (16/74) [1974] E. C. R. 1183;
[1974] 2 C. M. L. R. 480 at [6].
See in that regard, among others, Consten and Grundig v Commission (56 and 58/64) [1966] E. C. R. 299;
[1966] C. M. L. R. 418;
and Italy v Council and Commission (32/65) [1966] E. C. R. 389;
[1969] C. M. L. R. 39.
For a comprehensive overview of those cases, see C. Gerner-Beuerle, "Shareholders between the Market and the State: The VW Law and other Interventions in the Market Economy" (2012) 49 C. M. L. Rev. 97.
Essent (C-105/12) at [54].
Essent (C-105/12) at [54].
See for an overview of that debate, V. Vanberg, "Market and State: the Perspective of Constitutional Political Economy", Freiburg Discussion papers on Constitutional Economics 04/10, http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/4342/1/04-10bw.pdf [Accessed February 19, 2014].
See for an overview, W. Sauter and H. Schepel, State and Market in European Union Law: The Public and Private Spheres of the Internal Market before the EU Courts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 29-30.
See for that perspective also F. de Cecco, State Aid and the European Economic Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), p. 168.
E. Szyszczak, The Regulation of the State in Competitive Markets in the EU (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), pp. 4-5.
Essent (C-105/12) October 22, 2013 at [58].
See to that extent e.g. GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v European Commission (C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P) [2009] E. C. R. I-9291;
[2010] 4 C. M. L. R. 2 at [63].
See cases such as Commission v Italy (C-260/04) [2007] E. C. R. I-7083;
[2007] 3 C. M. L. R. 50 at [27];
Commission v Austria (C-393/05) [2007] E. C. R. I-10195;
[2008] 1 C. M. L. R. 42 at [52];
and Commission v Portugal (C-458/08) [2010] E. C. R. I-11599 at [89]
referred to in Essent (C-105/12) October 22, 2013 at [58].
See also Océano Grupo Editorial SA v Quintero (C-243/98) [2000] E. C. R. I-4941;
[2002] 1 C. M. L. R. 43 at [30];
and Mostaza Claro v Centro Móvil Milenium SL (C-168/05) [2006] E. C. R. I-10421;
[2007] 1 C. M. L. R. 22 at [27]
Essent (C-105/12) October 22, 2013 at [66]
Arguing in favour of EU procedural balancing supporting such experimentation, C. Semmelmann, "The European Union's Economic Constitution under the Lisbon Treaty: Soul-searching among Laywers shifts the Focus to Procedure" (2010) 35 E. L. Rev. 516, 534-535.
See for similar evolutions in an administrative context, C. Sabel and J. Zeitlin, "Learning from Difference: the New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU" (2008) 14 E. L. J. 271.
On experimental oversight triggered by the Courts, see J. Scott and S. Sturm, "Courts as Catalysts: Re-thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance" (2007) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 565.
On the open-ended nature of the European Union's economic constitution, see W. Devroe and P. van Cleynenbreugel, "Observations on Economic Governance and the Search for a European Economic Constitution" in D. Schiek, U. Liebert and H. Schneider (eds), Economic and Social Constitutionalism after the Treaty of Lisbon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 113.