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• D. W. Smith, Phenomenology, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), url = .
• See also D. Zahavi (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Contemporary Phenomenology, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 2012.
• A. L. Thomasson, Phenomenology and the Development of Analytic Philosophy, «Southern Journal of Philosophy», xl (supplement), pp.115-142
• S. Kelly, The Relevance of Phenomenology to the Philosophy of Language and Mind, New York, Routledge, 2000
• A. L. Thomasson, Conceptual Analysis in Phenomenology and Ordinary Language Philosophy, in M. Beaney (ed.), The Analytic Turn: Analysis in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology, London, Routledge, 2007, p.270-284.
• D. W. Smith, A. L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 1.
• K. Ameriks, From Kant to Frank: the Ineliminable Subject, in K. Ameriks, D. Sturma (eds.), The Modern Subject: Conceptions of the Self in Classical German Philosophy, New York, suny, 1995, pp. 55-72.
• P. Geach, Mental Acts, Their Content and Their Objects, London, Routledge, 1954
• R. W. Taylor, The Stream of Thoughts versus Mental Acts, «Philosophical Quarterly», 13 (October), 1963, pp. 311-321.
• The general scheme in which I insert the phenomenological theory of mental acts as a distinct approach from the representational theory of mind is close to a medieval theory of cognition, in particular that of Ockham, followed by Brentano (see F. Boccaccini, Brentano and the Primacy of Mental Act, in M. Antonelli, F. Boccaccini (eds), Franz Brentano Critical Assessment, Vol. ii, Intentionality and Philosophy of Mind, London, Routledge, forthcoming), according to which we do not need such things as intentional species, or any other kind of intermediary like representation to explain our cognition. The mind is composed of simple and complex mental acts.
• S. Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, New York, Cornell University Press, 1963
• Self-Reference and Self-Awareness, «Journal of Philosophy», 65(19), 1968, pp. 555-567
• reprinted in Q. Cassam, Self-Knowledge, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 80-93
• R. Moran, Authority and Estrangement - An Essay on Self-Knowledge, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001.
• H-N. Castañeda, "He": A Study in the Logic of Self-consciousness, «Ratio», 8, 1966, pp. 130-157
• reprinted in H-N. Castañeda, The Phenomeno-Logic of the I. Essays on Self-consciousness, edited by J. G. Hart and T. Kapitan, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1999, pp. 35-60
• On Phenomeno-Logic of the i, in Proceedings of the xiv International Congress of Philosophy 3, 1968, pp. 260-266
• reprinted in H-N. Castañeda, The Phenomeno-Logic of the I. Essays on Self-consciousness, op. cit., pp. 89-95
• G. E. M. Anscombe, The First Person, in S. Guttenplan, (ed.), Mind and Language, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975, pp. 45-65
• R. Chisholm, Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study, Chicago-la Salle, Open Court, 1976
• The First Person, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1981
• C. McGinn, The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983.
• T. Nagel, What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, «The Philosophical Review»., 83, 4, 1974, pp. 435-450.
• G. Strawson, The Self, «Journal of Consciousness Studies», 4, 1997, pp. 405-428
• (ed.) The Self?, Oxford, Blackwell, 2005.
• T. Nagel, The View from Nowhere, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986
• J. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, ma, mit Press, 1992.
• D. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996.
• C. McGinn, The Problem of Consciuosness: Essays Towards a Resolution, Oxford, Blackwell, 1993
• Q. Cassam, Self and World, Owford, Oxford University Press, 1996
• W. Lycan, Consciousness and Experience. Cambridge, ma, mit Press, 1996
• J. L. Bermudez, The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass: mit Press, 1998
• P. Carruthers, Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005.
• H-N. Castañeda, Indexicality: The Trasparent Subjective Mechanism for Encountering a World, «Noûs», 5, 24, 1990, pp. 735-49
• The Phenomeno-Logic of the I. Essays on Self-consciousness, op. cit.
• R. Gennaro, Consciousness and Self-Consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness, Philadelphia, John Benjamins, 1996.
• T. Nagel, What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, op. cit., p. 437.
• D. Rosenthal, Two Concepts of Consciousness, «Philosophical Studies», 49, 1986, pp. 329-359
• 1993, Thinking that One Thinks, in M. Davies and G. Humphreys, (eds.) Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Oxford, Blackwell, 1993.
• G. E. Moore, The Refutation of Idealism, «Mind», 12, 1903, p. 446: «[⋯] when we refer to introspection and try to discover what the sensation of blue is, it is very easy to suppose that we have before us only a single term. The term "blue" is easy enough to distinguish, but the other element which I have called "consciousness" - that which a sensation of blue has in common with a sensation of green - is extremely difficult to fix. [⋯] And in general, that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact seems to escape us; it seems, if I may use a metaphor, to be transparent - we look through it and see nothing but the blue; we may be convinced that there is something, but what it is no philosopher, I think, has yet clearly recognized».
• M. Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA, Bradford Books/mit Press, 1995.
• S. Shoemaker, Qualities and Qualia: What's in the Mind?, «Philosophy and Phenomenological Research», 50 (Supplement), 1990, pp. 109-131.
• M. Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness, op. cit.
• F. Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, MA, Bradford Books /mit Press, 1995.
• W. Lycan, A Simple Argument for a Higher-Order Representation Theory of Consciousness, «Analysis», 61, 2001, pp. 3-4.
• P. Carruthers, Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .
• R. Gennaro, Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness, Philadelphia, John Benjamins, 2004
• P. Carruthers, Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective, op. cit.
• In 2011 Ned Block announced the end of this approach to consciousness (N. Block, The Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness is Defunct, «Analysis», 71, pp. 419-431).
• T. Kapitan, The Ubiquity of Self-Awareness, «Grazer Philosophischen Studien», 57, 1999, pp. 17-43.
• D. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London, Routledge 1968
• W. Lycan, Consciousness and Experience, op. cit.
• R. Moran, Authority and Estrangement - An Essay on Self-Knowledge, op. cit.
• D. Henrich, Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1967
• Selbstverhältnisse. Gedanken und Auslegungen zu den Grundlagen der klassischen deutschen Philosophie, Stuttgart 1982
• Denken und Selbstsein. Vorlesungen über Subjektivität, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 2007.
• M. Frank, Selbstbewusstsein und Selbsterkenntnis: Essays zur analytischen Philosophie der Subjektivität, Stuttgart, Reclam, 1991
• (ed.), Selbstbewußtseinstheorien von Fichte bis Sartre, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1991.
• D. Zahavi, Back to Brentano?, «Journal of Consciousness Studies», 11, No. 10-11, 2004, pp. 66-87.
• S. Gallagher, D. Zahavi, Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
• C. Siewert, The Significance of Consciousness, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998.
• On this novel understanding of consciousness, see also A. L. Thomasson, Two Puzzles For a New Theory of Consciousness, in Symposium on Charles Siewert's The Significance of Consciousness, «Psyché» (e-journal), Volume 8 (February 2002): http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v8/psyche-8-03-
• C. Siewert, In Favor of (plain) Phenomenology, «Phenomenology and Cognitive Science», 6, 2007, pp. 201-220; pp. 202-203.
• U. Kriegel, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 2.
• A. L. Thomasson, After Brentano: A One-Level Theory of Consciousness, «European Journal of Philosophy», 8, 2, 2000, pp. 190-209.
• U. Kriegel, Consciousness as Intransitive Self-consciousness: Two View and an Argument, «Canadian Journal of Philosophy», 33, 1, 2003, 103-132; p. 105, emphasis added.
• U. Kriegel, Brentano's Most Striking Thesis: No Representation without Self-representation, in D. Fisette, G. Frèchette, Themes from Brentano, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2013, p. 24.
• F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, transl. by A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell, and L. McAlister, London, Routledge, 19731, intr. by Peter Simons, 19952, p. 98.
• [Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte. Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene, T. Binder/A. Chrudzimski (eds.) (Sämtliche veröffentlichte Schriften, Bd. i), Frankfurt a.M., Ontos-Verlag, 2008].
• Brentano, as Locke did, proposed in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint a special mental power called inner perception (innere Wahrnehmung) that enables us to perceive our own thoughts. The difference between inner sense and inner perception is that inner sense means introspection in the Lockian tradition, whereas Brentano does not endorse this practice in psychology. According to Brentano, introspection is a wrong and useless method. This is because introspection (innere Beobachtung) is not self-evident (see F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, op. cit., p. 29).
• See F. Brentano, Descriptive Psychology, transl. by Benito Müller, London, Routledge, 1995, p. 3
• [Deskriptive Psychologie, ed. by R. Chisholm and W. Baumgartner, Hamburg, Meiner, 1982].
• F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, op. cit., pp. 78-79.
• See E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Teil. Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. Text der 1. und der 2. Auflage [Logical Investigations: first part. Prolegomena to Pure Logic. Text of the first and second edition.] Halle, 1900, rev. ed. 1913, Hue xviii. Edited by Elmar Holenstein, The Hague, Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff, 1975, pp.79-80.
• Consciousness in Husserl is an arduous problem. According to Farber, Husserl discuss three concepts of consciousness: «(1) consciousness as the total immanent (reelle) phenomenological existence (Bestand) of the empirical ego, as an interweaving of psychical experiences in the unity of the stream of experience; (2) consciousness as an inner becoming aware of one's own psychical experiences; (3) consciousness as a comprehensive designation for all kinds of "psychical acts" or "intentional experience"» (M. Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology, Cambridge, ma, Harvard University Press, 1943, p. 334).
• J. P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trad. Hazel E. Barnes, New York, Philosophical Library, 1948, p. 222.
• S. Gallagher, D. Zagavi, Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness, op. cit.
• D. Zahavi, Husserl's Phenomenology, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2003, p. 11.
• F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, op. cit., p. 88.
• S. Gallagher, D. Zahavi, Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness, op. cit.
• F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, op. cit., pp. 79-80, emphasis added.