Reference : Optimal enforcement of competition policy: the commitments procedure under uncertainty
Scientific journals : Article
Business & economic sciences : Multidisciplinary, general & others
http://hdl.handle.net/2268/180742
Optimal enforcement of competition policy: the commitments procedure under uncertainty
English
Gautier, Axel mailto [Université de Liège > HEC-Ecole de gestion : UER > Economie industrielle >]
Petit, Nicolas mailto [Université de Liège > Département de droit > Droit européen de la concurrence >]
2018
European Journal of Law and Economics
Kluwer Academic Publishers
45
2
195-224
Yes (verified by ORBi)
International
0929-1261
1572-9990
Netherlands
[en] Competition Policy ; European Commission ; Commitments ; Law enforcement
[en] The introduction of a commitments procedure in EU antitrust policy
(Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003) has entitled the the European Commission
to extensively settle cases of alleged anticompetitive conduct. In this paper, we use a
formal model of law enforcement to identify the optimal procedure to remedy cases
in a context of partial legal uncertainty (Katsoulacos and Ulph in Eur J Law Econ
41(2):255–282, 2016). We discuss in particular the merits of a policy of selective
commitments where firms either take strong commitments or are investigated under
the standard infringement procedure.
Liège Competition and Innovation Institute - LCII
ARC
ARC "Competition and Innovation"
Researchers ; Professionals
http://hdl.handle.net/2268/180742
10.1007/s10657-018-9578-7

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