Optimal enforcement of competition policy: the commitments procedure under uncertainty

Gautier, Axel; Petit, Nicolas

doi:10.1007/s10657-018-9578-7

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Optimal enforcement of competition policy: the commitments procedure under uncertainty

Gautier, Axel; Petit, Nicolas

2018 • In European Journal of Law and Economics, 45 (2), p. 195-224

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https://hdl.handle.net/2268/180742

DOI
10.1007/s10657-018-9578-7

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Keywords :

Competition Policy; European Commission; Commitments; Law enforcement

Abstract :

[en] The introduction of a commitments procedure in EU antitrust policy (Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003) has entitled the the European Commission to extensively settle cases of alleged anticompetitive conduct. In this paper, we use a formal model of law enforcement to identify the optimal procedure to remedy cases in a context of partial legal uncertainty (Katsoulacos and Ulph in Eur J Law Econ 41(2):255–282, 2016). We discuss in particular the merits of a policy of selective commitments where firms either take strong commitments or are investigated under the standard infringement procedure.

Research center :

LCII - Liège Competition and Innovation Institute - ULiège

Disciplines :

Business & economic sciences: Multidisciplinary, general & others

Author, co-author :

Gautier, Axel ; Université de Liège > HEC-Ecole de gestion : UER > Economie industrielle

Petit, Nicolas ; Université de Liège > Département de droit > Droit européen de la concurrence

Language :

English

Title :

Optimal enforcement of competition policy: the commitments procedure under uncertainty

Publication date :

2018

Journal title :

European Journal of Law and Economics

ISSN :

0929-1261

eISSN :

1572-9990

Publisher :

Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands

Volume :

Issue :

Pages :

195-224

Peer reviewed :

Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi

Name of the research project :

ARC "Competition and Innovation"

Funders :

ARC

Available on ORBi :

since 21 April 2015

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