Prodigality and Myopia - Two Rationales for Social  Security

[en] Among the rationales for social security, there is the fact that some people have to be forced to save. To explain undersaving, rational prodigality and hyperbolic preferences are often cited but treated separably. In this paper we study those two particular behaviors that lead to forced saving within an optimal income tax second-best setting.

Research center :

CREPP - Centre de Recherche en Économie Publique et de la Population - ULiège

Disciplines :

Economic systems & public economics

Author, co-author :

Possen, Uri; Cornell University

Pestieau, Pierre ; Université de Liège - ULiège > HEC-Ecole de gestion > HEC-Ecole de gestion

Language :

English

Title :

Prodigality and Myopia - Two Rationales for Social Security

Publication date :

2008

Journal title :

Manchester School

ISSN :

1463-6786

eISSN :

1467-9957

Publisher :

Blackwell Publishing

Volume :

Issue :

Pages :

629-652

Peer reviewed :

Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi

Available on ORBi :

since 21 April 2010

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Bibliography

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