Article (Scientific journals)
Excessive Pricing: The Flaws of ‘Tea Party Competition’ Policy
Petit, Nicolas
2011In Journal of European Competition Law and Practice, 2 (6), p. 519-520
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Keywords :
EU Competition law; abuse of dominant position; excessive pricing; droit européen de la concurrence; abus de position dominante; prix excessifs
Abstract :
[en] Since the adoption of the Guidance Communication in 2009, the Commission has kept exploitative abuses— and in particular excessive pricing cases—in a state of artificial hibernation, and focused on exclusionary cases as a matter of enforcement priority. The Commission’s small antitrust policy against exploitative abuses is predicated on ‘Tea Party’ competition economics: in the long term, high prices are presumed to deliver efficient outcomes, and competition enforcers risk doing more harm than good in trying to improve market outcomes
Disciplines :
European & international law
Author, co-author :
Petit, Nicolas ;  Université de Liège - ULiège > Département de droit > Droit européen de la concurrence
Language :
English
Title :
Excessive Pricing: The Flaws of ‘Tea Party Competition’ Policy
Alternative titles :
[fr] Prix excessifs: les défauts d'une politique de concurrence à la "Tea Party"
Publication date :
December 2011
Journal title :
Journal of European Competition Law and Practice
ISSN :
2041-7764
eISSN :
2041-7772
Publisher :
Oxford Journals
Volume :
2
Issue :
6
Pages :
519-520
Peer reviewed :
Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi
Available on ORBi :
since 11 June 2012

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