Power indices and the measurement of control in corporate structures

Reference : Power indices and the measurement of control in corporate structures


	Document type :	Scientific journals : Article
	Discipline(s) :	Business & economic sciences : Quantitative methods in economics & management
	To cite this reference:	http://hdl.handle.net/2268/98375

Title :	Power indices and the measurement of control in corporate structures
Language :	English
Author, co-author :	Crama, Yves [Université de Liège - ULiège > HEC-Ecole de gestion : UER > Recherche opérationnelle et gestion de la production >]
	Leruth, Luc [Université de Liège - ULiège > HEC-Ecole de gestion : UER > UER Economie >]
Publication date :	2013
Journal title :	International Game Theory Review
Publisher :	World Scientific Publishing Company
Volume :	15
Pages :	1340017
Peer reviewed :	Yes (verified by ORBi)
Audience :	International
ISSN :	0219-1989
Keywords :	[en] simple games ; voting ; power index ; corporate governance ; ownership structure
Abstract :	[en] This paper proposes a brief review of the use of power indices in the corporate governance literature. Without losing sight of the field of application, it places the emphasis on the game-theoretic aspects of this research and on the issues that arise in this framework.
Research centres :	QuantOM
Target :	Researchers
Permalink :	http://hdl.handle.net/2268/98375
DOI :	10.1142/S0219198913400173

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Open access	SurveyCorporateControl.pdf		Author preprint	193.46 kB	View/Open

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