Power indices and the measurement of control in corporate structures

[en] This paper proposes a brief review of the use of power indices in the corporate governance literature. Without losing sight of the field of application, it places the emphasis on the game-theoretic aspects of this research and on the issues that arise in this framework.

Research Center/Unit :

QuantOM

Disciplines :

Quantitative methods in economics & management

Author, co-author :

Crama, Yves ; Université de Liège - ULiège > HEC-Ecole de gestion : UER > Recherche opérationnelle et gestion de la production

Leruth, Luc ; Université de Liège - ULiège > HEC-Ecole de gestion : UER > UER Economie

Language :

English

Title :

Power indices and the measurement of control in corporate structures

Publication date :

2013

Journal title :

International Game Theory Review

ISSN :

0219-1989

eISSN :

1793-6675

Publisher :

World Scientific Publishing Company

Volume :

Pages :

1340017

Peer reviewed :

Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi

Available on ORBi :

since 07 September 2011

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