Article (Scientific journals)
Price competition under universal service obligations
Gautier, Axel; Wauthy, Xavier
2010In International Journal of Economic Theory, 6 (3), p. 311-326
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Keywords :
Universal service; uniform price; universal coverage
Abstract :
[en] In industries like telecom, postal services or energy provision, universal service obligations (uniform price and universal coverage) are often imposed on one market participant. Universal service obligations are likely to alter firms' strategic behavior in such competitive markets. In this paper we show that, depending on the entrant's market coverage and the degree of product differentiation, the Nash equilibrium in prices involves either pure or mixed strategies. We show that the pure strategy market sharing equilibrium, as identified by Valletti et al. (2002) defines a lower bound on the level of equilibrium prices.
Research center :
CREPP - Centre de Recherche en Économie Publique et de la Population - ULiège
Disciplines :
Microeconomics
Author, co-author :
Gautier, Axel  ;  Université de Liège - ULiège > HEC-Ecole de gestion : UER > Economie industrielle
Wauthy, Xavier
Language :
English
Title :
Price competition under universal service obligations
Publication date :
September 2010
Journal title :
International Journal of Economic Theory
ISSN :
1742-7355
eISSN :
1742-7363
Publisher :
Blackwell Publishing
Volume :
6
Issue :
3
Pages :
311-326
Peer reviewed :
Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi
Available on ORBi :
since 15 September 2010

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