Teaching versus research: A multi-tasking approach  to multi-department universities

[en] We study the possible implications of incentive schemes as a tool to promote efﬁciency in the management of universities. In this paper, we show that by designing internal ﬁnancial rules which create yardstick competition for research funds, a multi-department university may induce better teaching quality and research, as compared to the performance of independent departments.

Disciplines :

Microeconomics

Author, co-author :

Gautier, Axel ; Université de Liège - ULiège > HEC - École de gestion de l'ULiège > Economie industrielle

Wauthy, Xavier

Language :

English

Title :

Teaching versus research: A multi-tasking approach to multi-department universities

Publication date :

February 2007

Journal title :

European Economic Review

ISSN :

0014-2921

eISSN :

1873-572X

Publisher :

Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, Netherlands

Volume :

Issue :

Pages :

273-295

Peer reviewed :

Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi

Additional URL :

http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer

Available on ORBi :

since 25 February 2009

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Bibliography

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