Degrees of freedom

Auxiliary conditions; Block universe; Free will; Indeterminism; Libertarianism; Nomological determinism; Phase space; Physical theory; Principle of alternative possibilities; Statistical determinism; Philosophy; Social Sciences (all)

Abstract :

[en] Human freedom is in tension with nomological determinism and with statistical determinism. The goal of this paper is to answer both challenges. Four contributions are made to the free-will debate. First, we propose a classification of scientific theories based on how much freedom they allow. We take into account that indeterminism comes in different degrees and that both the laws and the auxiliary conditions can place constraints. A scientific worldview pulls towards one end of this classification, while libertarianism pulls towards the other end of the spectrum. Second, inspired by Hoefer, we argue that an interval of auxiliary conditions corresponds to a region in phase space, and to a bundle of possible block universes. We thus make room for a form of non-nomological indeterminism. Third, we combine crucial elements from the works of Hoefer and List; we attempt to give a libertarian reading of this combination. On our proposal, throughout spacetime, there is a certain amount of freedom (equivalent to setting the initial, intermediate, or final conditions) that can be interpreted as the result of agential choices. Fourth, we focus on the principle of alternative possibilities throughout and propose three ways of strengthening it.

Disciplines :

Philosophy & ethics

Author, co-author :

Thyssen, Pieter ; Université de Liège - ULiège > Département de philosophie > Théorie de la connaissance et philosophie des sciences ; Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

Wenmackers, Sylvia; Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

Language :

English

Title :

Degrees of freedom

Publication date :

November 2021

Journal title :

Synthese

ISSN :

0039-7857

eISSN :

1573-0964

Publisher :

Springer Science and Business Media B.V.

Volume :

198

Issue :

Pages :

10207 - 10235

Peer reviewed :

Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi

Additional URL :

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11229-020-02714-z.pdf

Funders :

FWO - Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek Vlaanderen

Funding text :

This work was supported by the Research Foundation Flan-ders (Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek, FWO), Grant Number G0B8616N “Time, Causality, and Probability in Quantum Mechanics: Assessing Retro-causal Explanations in Light of Recent Experiments”. AcknowledgementsWe are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback on an earlier version of this article, which greatly helped us to improve the presentation, and to Stefaan Cuypers for helpful pointers to the literature. PT thanks Gerard Bodifee for inspiring discussions on the nature of free will. We gratefully acknowledge funding for this research project by FWO (Research Foundation—Flanders) through Grant Number G0B8616N.

Available on ORBi :

since 30 November 2025

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