Defending (perceptual) attitudes

Martinis, Valentina

doi:10.1111/ejop.12933

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Defending (perceptual) attitudes

Martinis, Valentina

2024 • In European Journal of Philosophy, 32 (2), p. 560 - 576

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https://hdl.handle.net/2268/335787

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10.1111/ejop.12933

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Keywords :

philosophy; intentionality

Abstract :

[en] In this paper, I defend a tripartite metaphysics of intentional mental states, according to which mental states are divided into subject, content, and attitude, against recent attempts at eliminating the attitude component (e.g., Montague, Oxford studies in philosophy of mind, 2022, 2, Oxford University Press). I suggest that a metaphysics composed of only subject and content cannot account for (a) multisensory perceptual experiences and (b) phenomenological differences between episodes of perception and imagination. Finally, I suggest that some of the motivations behind the rejection of the attitude component can be accommodated within the tripartite framework.

Disciplines :

Philosophy & ethics

Author, co-author :

Martinis, Valentina ; Université de Liège - ULiège > Traverses

Language :

English

Title :

Defending (perceptual) attitudes

Publication date :

June 2024

Journal title :

European Journal of Philosophy

ISSN :

0966-8373

Publisher :

John Wiley and Sons Inc

Volume :

Issue :

Pages :

560 - 576

Peer reviewed :

Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi

Additional URL :

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/ejop.12933

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since 11 September 2025

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