1 Regulation 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) [2022] OJ L 277/1. See Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel, ‘The Commission’s digital services and markets act proposals: First step towards tougher and more directly enforced EU rules?’ (2021) 28 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 667, 678; Martin Husovec, ‘The DSA as a Mixed Enforcement System’ in Martin Husovec (ed.), Principles of the Digital Services Act (Oxford Academic, 2024), 417–420; and Folkert Wilman et al., ‘Implementation, Cooperation, Penalties and Enforcement’, in Folkert Wilman et al. (eds.), The EU Digital Services Act (Oxford Academic, 2024), 344.
2 DSA (n 1), Art 56.
3 ibid, Art 56(2) and (3).
4 ibid, recital 110; Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC [2020] COM(2020) 825 final, 3; European Commission, ‘Part 1 of the Commission staff working document: impact assessment accompanying the document proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC’ [2020] SWD(2020) 348 final, points 65–59.
5 Berrak Genç-Gelgeç, ‘Regulating Digital Platforms: Would the DSA and the DMA work Coherently?’ (2022) 3 Journal of Law, Market & Innovation, 90, 91.
6 DSA (n 1), ch 3. See Giancarlo Frosio, ‘Reforming Intermediary Liability in the Platform Economy: A European Digital Single Market Strategy’ (2017) 112 Northwestern University Law Review, 19; and Aleksandra Kuczerawy, ‘The Good Samaritan that wasn’t: voluntary monitoring under the (draft) Digital Services Act’ (12 January 2021 Verfassungblog) (last visited 14 October 2024).
7 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market [2000] OJ L 178/1, Arts. 16, 17 and 19.
8 Hybrid systems exist in other policy fields, too. Competition law is a notable example of this. See Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1, Art. 11(1). See also Maciej Bernatt and Laura Zoboli, ‘Competition Law’ in Miroslava Scholten (ed.), Research Handbook on the Enforcement of EU Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2023), 398.
9 DSA (n 1), Art. 49(2).
10 ibid, recital 109 and Art 49(1). There is no obligation to appoint other national competent authorities in addition to the DSC, and Member States have significant flexibility in allocating tasks to these bodies. More details on how Member States have implemented these provisions can be found in Section 5.
11 ibid, Art 49(2) third subparagraph.
12 ibid, recital 110.
13 ibid, Art 55(1).
14 ibid, Art 21(3).
15 ibid, Art 49(2) second subparagraph.
16 ibid, Art 51.
17 ibid, Art 51(6).
18 ibid, Art 49(4) and 50.
19 ibid, Art 50(2) and recital 112. On the meaning of complete independence, see Case C-518/07, European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany [2010] ERC I-01885; and Case C-614/10, European Commission v Republic of Austria [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:631.
20 DSA (n 1), Art 50(1) and (2).
21 ibid, Art 56(1).
22 ibid, Arts 33(1) and 56(2) and (3).
23 ibid, Art 56(2).
24 ibid, Art 56(3) and (4) and recital 124.
25 ibid, recital 127. See Hans Schulte-Nölke et al., ‘The legal framework for e-commerce in the Internal Market - State of play, remaining obstacles to the free movement of digital services and ways to improve the current situation’ (2020) Study for IMCO committee PE 652.707.
26 Conversely, the e-Commerce Directive, while also applying the country-of-origin principle, did not lay down specific mechanisms for cross-border cooperation, opting for a minimum harmonisation approach to facilitate the establishment, exercise of services, and development of information society services within the EU. In more detail see Alexandre de Streel & Martin Husovec, ‘The e-commerce Directive as the cornerstone of the Internal Market’ (2020) Study for the committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection, Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies, European Parliament, 214.
27 European Commission (n 4), point 27; Giorgio Monti & Alexandre de Streel, ‘Improving EU institutional design to better supervise digital platforms’ (2022) Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE) (last visited 9 April 2025), 56.
28 Morten Egeberg et al., ‘The many faces of EU committee governance’ (2003) 26 West European Politics, 19; Sabino Cassese, ‘European Administrative Proceedings’ (2004) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems, 21, 22; and Martino Maggetti, ‘The rewards of cooperation: The effects of membership in European regulatory networks’ (2014) 53 European Journal of Political Research, 480.
29 Pierre Larouche, ‘Coordination of European and member state regulatory policy: Horizontal, vertical and transversal aspects’ (2004) 5 Journal of Network Industries, 277.
30 DSA (n 1), Art 57(2).
31 ibid, Art 57(1). Wilman et al. (n 1), 387.
32 DSA (n 1), Art 58(1) and (2).
33 Wilman et al. (n 1), 395.
34 DSA (n 1), Art 58(3) and (4).
35 ibid, Art 60(1). The second paragraph regulates other cases in which joint investigations may be launched.
36 Wilman (n 1), 409.
37 DSA (n 1), Art 49(1).
38 ibid, Art 65(2).
39 ibid, Art 66(3). In this circumstance, the authorities involved are entitled to exercise their investigative powers, as outlined in Art 51(1) DSA regarding the VLOP or VLOSE in question.
40 ibid, Art 67(5).
41 ibid, Art 69(7).
42 There is an increasing body of literature focusing on transnational networks of national authorities. Notably, Burkard Eberlein & Edgar Grande, ‘Beyond delegation: transnational regulatory regimes and the EU regulatory state’ (2005) 12 Journal of European Public Policy, 89; David Levi-Faur, ‘Regulatory networks and regulatory agencification: towards a Single European Regulatory Space’ (2011) 18 Journal of European Public Policy, 810; Mark Thatcher, ‘The creation of European regulatory agencies and its limits: a comparative analysis of European delegation’ (2011) 18 Journal of European Public Policy, 790.
43 DSA (n 1), Art 62(1).
44 ibid, Art 62.
45 ibid, Art 61(1). The EBDS is described as an ‘independent advisory group’.
46 ibid, Art 61(2).
47 ibid, Art 63(1)(a).
48 ibid, Art 60(1)(b).
49 ibid, Art 63(1)(c) and (d).
50 ibid, Art 63(1)(b).
51 ibid, Art 63(1)(e).
52 Regarding the DSA’s hybrid enforcement system, another example can be found in competition law, where Regulation 1/2003 allocates enforcement powers to both the Commission and national competition authorities; and see Bernatt and Zoboli (n 8), 398. Moreover, other structures similar to the Board can be found in other pieces of EU legislation. For more details, see Wilman et al. (n 1), 415.
53 Stéphanie De Somer, ‘The Europeanisation of the Law on National Independent Regulatory Authorities from a Vertical and Horizontal Perspective’ (2012) 5 Review of European Administrative Law, 93; and Pietro Mattioli, ‘The Quasi-Judicial Role of National Competent Authorities: an Ambiguity that the Principle of Effective Judicial Protection could help address?’ (2024) 17 Review of European Administrative Law, 99, 101–105.
54 Wilman et al. (n 1), 346, 348.
55 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1, Arts 53–54. Other examples of more detailed EU institutional designs for national enforcement systems can be found in Directive 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code [2018] OJ L 321, 17.12.2018/36, Arts 7, 8, and 9; and Regulation 2017/2394 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 [2017] OJ L 345/1.
56 Regulation 2022/2065 (n 1), recital 109.
57 In recent years, Member States have progressively introduced national laws with the intent of updating the e-Commerce Directive’s rules on online hate speech. Most notably, France adopted the Avia law which introduced significant amendments aiming to tackle online hate speech. For more information see Ilaria Buri, ‘The DSA proposal and France’ (12 November 2021, DSA Observatory) (last visited 14 October 2024). Additional examples of anti-hate speech legislation are the German Network Enforcement Act 2017 and the Austria Communication Platforms Act 2020. See Werner Schroeder & Leonard Reider, ‘A Step Forward in Fighting Online Antisemitism: The Contribution of the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA)’ (18 October 2023, Verfassungblog) (last visited 14 October 2024).
58 While the exact nature and scope of the (principle) of institutional autonomy of the Member States, which governs their freedom to organise their administrative system, remain poorly defined compared to the principle of procedural autonomy, increasing reference to the principle of institutional autonomy can be found in the literature. For instance, Jan Jans, et al., Europeanisation of Public Law (Europa Law Publishing, 2007), 18; Maartje Verhoeven, ‘The ‘Costanzo Obligation’ and the Principle of National Institutional Autonomy: Supervision as a Bridge to Close the Gap?’ (2010) 3 Review of European Administrative Law 23, 24. Furthermore, scholars have linked institutional autonomy to procedural autonomy. In this regard, Saskia Lavrijssen and Annetje Ottow, ‘The Legality of Independent Regulatory Authorities’ in Leonard Besselink, Frans Pennings and Sacha Prechal (eds), The Eclipse of the Legality Principle in the European Union (Kluwer 2011) 73, 74; Andrea Biondi & Giulia Gentile, ‘National Procedural Autonomy’ in Hélène Ruiz Fabri (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Procedural Law (Oxford University Press 2019). Reference to institutional autonomy can also be found in the CJEU case law. Most recently, Case C-796/19, European Commission v Republic of Austria [2020] ECLI: EU:C:2020:920, paras 60–61 and case law cited; and in Advocate General Opinions, for instance, Case C-355/19, Asociaţia “Forumul Judecătorilor din România” and Others [2020] ECLI:EU:C:2020:746 Opinion of Advocate General Bobek, para 227. In light of this, this contribution refers to the principle of institutional autonomy (as distinct from procedural autonomy) to emphasise the emerging relationship between EU institutional design obligations and broader institutional aspects related to the internal organisation of the Member States. In more detail, see Section 5.
59 Case C-129/00 Commission v Italy [2003] ECLI:EU:C:2003:319, Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, para 55.
60 Miroslava Scholten & Leander Stähler, ‘Introduction to Research Handbook on the Enforcement of EU Law’ in Mira Scholten (ed.), Research Handbook on the Enforcement of EU Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2023), 1–3.
62 Jans, Europeanisation of Public Law (n 58), 13. For instance, the authors clarify that the transposition of a directive by national law, or the appointment of a national authority to monitor and sanction the application of EU norms belong to this implementation phase. Once the law has been implemented and the relevant actors identified, the enforcement of these norms takes place and is often carried out by the Member States and their specialised agencies. On the role of specialised national bodies for the enforcement of EU law, see Mark Pollack, ‘Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community’ (1997) 52 International Organization, 99; and Mark Thatcher, ‘Regulation after delegation: independent regulatory agencies in Europe’ (2002) 9 Journal of European Public Policy, 954.
63 Biondi & Gentile, ‘National Procedural Autonomy’ (n 58); Michal Bobek, ‘The Effects of EU Law in the National Legal Systems’ in Catherine Barnard & Steve Peers (eds.) European Union Law (Oxford University Press, 2014), 141–142.
64 Dionyssis Dimitrakopoulos, ‘The Transposition of EU Law: “Post-Decisional Politics” and Institutional Autonomy’ (2001) 7 European Law Journal, 442, 444.
65 Jans et al. (n 58), 199–200.
66 Tanja Börzel, Why Noncompliance: The Politics of Law in the European Union (Cornell University Press, 2021).
67 Tanja Börzel, ‘Non-compliance in the European Union: Pathology or Statistical Artefact?’ (2001) 8 Journal of European Public Policy, no. 5, 814; Sacha Prechal, ‘Implementation of directives’ in Sacha Prechal (ed.) Directives in EC Law (Oxford University Press, 2005), 73.
68 Lisa Conant, ‘Compliance and What EU Member States Make of It’, in Marisa Cremona (ed.) Compliance and the Enforcement of EU Law, Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law (Oxford University Press, 2012), 20–29.
69 Ibid; Börzel (n 66), 61.
70 Edoardo Chiti, ‘The Governance of Compliance’, in Marisa Cremona (ed.) Compliance and the Enforcement of EU Law, Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law (Oxford University Press, 2012), 31. As noted by the author, when applied to the EU sphere, the notion of compliance is broadly defined as ‘a process—and in particular the whole of ongoing negotiations, political and legal processes, and institutional change that are involved in the execution of EU law and policies and are functionally orientated to give EU law and policies full effectiveness’.
71 ibid, 36.
72 Ton Duijkersloot & Rob Widdershoven ‘Administrative law enforcement of EU law’ in Miroslava Scholten (ed.) Research Handbook on the Enforcement of EU Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2023), 44–45.
73 Art. 5(2) Treaty on European Union (TEU): ‘Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States’. Koen Lenaerts & José Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘A Constitutional Perspective’ in Robert Schütze & Takis Tridimas (eds.) Oxford Principles Of European Union Law: The European Union Legal Order: Volume I (Oxford University Press, 2018), 112–118; and Koen Lenaerts, ‘Proportionality as a Matrix Principle Promoting the Effectiveness of EU Law and the Legitimacy of EU Action’ (Keynote speech, ECB Legal Conference 2021: Continuity and Change – How the Challenges of Today Prepare the Ground for Tomorrow, 25 November 2021) (last visited 7 November 2024), 3–5.
74 The ‘hidden’ potential of Article 4(2) TEU, which enshrines the principle of respect for the national identities of Member States, is also significant in the debate. Scholars have argued that this provision might have the potential to add an extra layer of scrutiny for EU intervention and limit EU competence. However, in practice, this provision has become a de facto limitation on the absolute primacy of EU law, ensuring that it does not interfere with national constitutional identities. Mary Dobbs, ‘Sovereignty, Article 4(2) TEU and the Respect of National Identities: Swinging the Balance of Power in Favour of the Member States?’ (2014) 33 Yearbook of European Law, 298, 300–301; Barbara Guastaferro, ‘Sincere Cooperation and Respect for National Identities’ in Robert Schütze & Takis Tridimas (eds.) Oxford Principles Of European Union Law: The European Union Legal Order, Volume I (Oxford University Press, 2018), 352–353.
75 Koen Lenaerts, The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in the European Union: Keeping the Balance of Federalism (1993) 17 Fordham International Law Journal, 846, 851–52; and Paul Craig, ‘Subsidiarity, a Political and Legal Analysis’ (2012) 50 Journal of Common Market Studies, 72, 72–73; and Federico Fabbrini, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity’, in Robert Schütze & Takis Tridimas (eds.), Oxford Principles Of European Union Law: The European Union Legal Order, Volume I (Oxford University Press, 2018, 224.
76 Takis Tridimas, ‘The Principle of Proportionality’ in Robert Schütze & Takis Tridimas (eds.), Oxford Principles Of European Union Law: The European Union Legal Order, Volume I (Oxford University Press, 2018), 244.
77 ibid, 243–244.
78 Rob Widdershoven, ‘National Procedural Autonomy and General EU Law Limits’ (2019) 12 Review of European Administrative Law, no. 5, 13–14. Moreover, specifically on the limited use of the principle of subsidiarity, see Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons (n 73), 115–116; and Xavier Groussot & Sanja Bogojević, ‘Subsidiarity as a Procedural Safeguard of Federalism’ in Loïc Azoulai (ed.), The Question of Competence in the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2014), 234.
79 De Somer (n 53).
80 Marcus Klamert, ‘Loyalty and the Constitutionalization of EU Law’ in Marcus Klamert (ed.) The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law (Oxford University Press, 2014), 63–65.
81 Robert Schütze, European Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 334; and Guastaferro (n 74), 351.
82 For an analysis of the codification process of the principle of sincere cooperation, see Marcus Klamert, ‘Introduction’ in Marcus Klamert (ed.) The principle of Loyalty in EU law (Oxford University Press, 2014), 10–13; and Geert De Baere & Timothy Roes, ‘EU loyalty as good faith’ (2015) 64 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 829, 834–836.
83 Article 4(3) last subparagraph: ‘Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives’.
84 John Temple Lang, ‘Developments, Issues, and New Remedies – The Duties of National Authorities and Courts Under Article 10 of the EC Treaty’ (2003) 27 Fordham International Law Journal, 1904, 1906; Guastaferro (n 74), 355–358.
85 Marcus Klamert, ‘Deconstructing Loyalty’, in M Klamert (ed.) The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law (Oxford University Press, 2014), 252; and John Temple Lang, ‘Article 5 of the EEC Treaty: The Emergence of Constitutional Principles in the Case Law of the Court of Justice’ (1987) 10 Fordham International Law Journal 503.
86 Case C-518/11, UPC Nederland BV v Gemeente Hilversum [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:709, 59.
87 ibid.
88 Case C-645/19, Facebook Ireland Ltd and Others v Gegevensbeschermingsautoriteit [2021] ECLI:EU:C:2021:483.
89 ibid 29–41.
90 ibid 53.
91 ibid 75.
92 Case C-252/21, Meta Platforms and others v Bundeskartellamt [2023] ECLI:EU:C:2023:537, 28–30.
93 ibid 36.
94 ibid 53.
95 ibid 54.
96 ibid 62–63.
97 David Halberstam, ‘Of Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality of Federal Systems’ (2004) 90 Virginia Law Review, 731, 764–765.
98 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, The Europeanisation of Administrative Law: Transforming National Decision-Making Procedures (Ashgate/Dartmouth, 2002), 7; Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons (n 73), 118; Schütze (n 81), 218; and Guastaferro (n 74), 374.
99 Regulation 2022/2065 (n 1), Art 49.
100 ibid, recital 109 and Art 49(1).
101 ibid, recital 110 and Arts 49(2), 57, and 58.
102 ibid, Art 51(6). This approach is in keeping with the principle of national procedural autonomy. Wilman et al. (n 1), 360.
103 Regulation 2022/2065 (n 1), Art 49(3) first subparagraph.
104 VLOPs and VLOSEs designated pursuant to Art 33(4) of Regulation 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC [2023] 2023/C 249/02, PUB/2023/821, OJ C 249/2.
105 Commission Recommendation 2023/2425 of 20 October 2023 on coordinating responses to incidents in particular arising from the dissemination of illegal content, ahead of the full entry into application of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council [2023] C/2023/7170, OJ L, 2023/2425, 7, 8 and 9.
106 For instance, the Spanish National Commission for the Markets and Competition openly declared itself to be the Spanish DSC within its 2023 Action Plan. This statement preceded its formal appointment. In addition, the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets published, on 18 January 2024, draft guidelines that explain how it interprets the rules laid down in the DSA, which are available at (last visited 14 October 2024). At that date, however, the process of appointment had not been concluded.
107 For more information see (last visited 14 October 2024). The Commission started a first wave of infringement procedures by sending letters of formal notice to Estonia, Poland, and Slovakia for not having designated their DSCs, and to Cyprus, Czechia, and Portugal for not having fully empowered their DSCs. Since then, Estonia and Slovakia have formally designated and empowered their DSCs.
108 For more information see (last visited 9 April 2025). In July 2024, the Commission sent letters of formal notice to Belgium for failing to designate its DSC and to Spain, Croatia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden for not fully empowering their DSCs. In December 2024, it issued a letter of formal notice to Bulgaria for failing to empower its nominated DSC and sent reasoned opinions to Belgium and Poland for failing to designate and empower their DSCs, as well as to Spain and the Netherlands for failing to empower their DSCs.
109 Decreto-Legge del 15 settembre 2023, n. 123, ‘Misure urgenti di contrasto al disagio giovanile, alla povertà educativa e alla criminalità minorile, nonché’ per la sicurezza dei minori in ambito digitale’, (GU Serie Generale n.216 del 15-09-2023), Art 15; DSA-Begleitgesetz (DSA-BegG) 2023, Art 1(2); and Loi n° 2024–449 du 21 mai 2024 visant à sécuriser et à réguler l’espace numérique, Art 51.
110 Danish Act on the enforcement of the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on an internal market for digital services (2023) ACT no. 1765 of 28/12/2023. In Luxembourg, projet de loi n°8309 portant mise en œuvre du règlement (UE) 2022/2065 sur les services numériques. In Spain, by press release, the National Commission on Markets and Competition announced its appointment as DSC by the Ministry for Digital Transformation and Public Service, see (last visited 30 October 2024). In the Netherlands, Decision of the Minister of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy of 11 February 2024, no. WJZ/45119378, provisionally designating the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets as competent authority and digital services coordinator within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a single market for digital services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Regulation) (OJ EU 2022, L 277).
111 The Digital Services Bill n. 89 of 2023, Amendment of Section 7 of Principal Act.
112 Digitale-Dienste-Gesetz 2024. For more information, (last visited 14 October 2024).
113 The Digital Services Bill n. 89 of 2023 (n 111), part 3.
114 Loi n° 2024–449 (n 109), Art 51.
115 Digitale-Dienste-Gesetz (n 112), Art 12.
116 Willem Halffman, ‘Science-policy boundaries: national styles?’ (2005) 32 Science and Public Policy, no. 6, 457; Evam Heims, ‘Explaining coordination between national Regulators in EU agencies: the role of formal and informal social organization’ (2016) 94 Public Administration, 881.
117 For instance, within the European Competition Network (ECN), competition authorities have established working groups or other informal frameworks. See, (last visited 14 October 2024).
118 For instance, given the limited timeframe, Luxembourg adopted a ‘pragmatic approach’ by selecting an existing national entity. Specifically, it chose the agency already responsible for overseeing the P2B Regulation and Digital Markets Act (DMA) guidelines; Mark Cole, ‘Digital Services Act implementation bill proposed to Parliament’ [2023] IRIS 2023-10:1/24 (last visited 15 October 2024).
119 Temple Lang (n 84), 1924–1931.
120 Article 4(3) TEU.
121 Case C-645/19 (n 88), para 72.
122 European Commission, ‘Part 2 of the Commission staff working document: impact assessment report, annexes accompanying the document proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC’ [2020], 147–149. This document highlights that EU Member States must recognise the necessity of establishing a well-designed, efficient and effective cooperation mechanism for addressing cross-border issues.
123 For instance, the Commission has already taken the leadership to guarantee immediate and effective compliance with the Act. In order to operationalise the DSA framework for vertical cooperation, the Commission has published a Recommendation inviting Member States to coordinate their actions to contrast the dissemination of illegal content. European Commission, ‘Commission recommends Member States to fast-track DSA governance to enhance response to illegal online content’ (18 October 2023) (last visited 14 October 2024). Moreover, the Commission has signed or is in the process of signing specific administrative arrangements with Member States’ DSCs (France, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands) to define the procedural framework for the exchange of information, data, and technical systems and tools to assist in identifying and assessing systemic risks.
124 Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel & Pietro Mattioli, ‘Digital Services Coordinators and other competent authorities in the Digital Services Act: streamlined enforcement coordination lost?’ (30 November 2023, European Law Blog) (last visited 30 October 2024).
125 ibid.
126 DSA (n 1), recital 132.
127 ibid, recital 133 and Art 63(2).
128 The ‘comply or explain’ mechanism, which originates in corporate governance, has now been adopted in EU financial supervision. In this context, the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) require national supervisory authorities to either adhere to established guidelines and recommendations or provide justifications for deviations. In more detail, see Robert Böttner, ‘The comply-or-explain mechanism in the European Supervisory Authorities, or: Does Meroni allow nudging?’ in Petra Lea Láncos et al. (eds.), The Legal Effects of EU Soft Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2023), 176. Furthermore, it has been observed that similar mechanisms are used by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). In this regard, see (A.) Ton van den Brink & Linda Senden, ‘Checks and Balances of Soft EU Rule-Making’ (2012) European Parliament Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 44.
129 Case C-9/56, Meroni v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, EU:C:1958:7, 149–150.
130 Böttner, ‘The comply-or-explain mechanism in the European Supervisory Authorities’ (n 128), 181. The author provides a detailed analysis of how the ‘comply-or-explain’ mechanism exerts pressure on national authorities to align themselves with formally non-binding guidelines and recommendations.
131 DSA (n 1), Arts 60(1)(b) and 63(1)(a).
132 ibid, Art 63(1)(e).
133 Suzanne Vergnolle, ‘Putting collective intelligence to the enforcement of the Digital Services Act’ (2023) (last visited 14 October 2024).
