A stochastic Petri net model of jamming attacks on remote-controlled switches during service restoration

Cyber-attackers can take the advantage of accessibility to field devices to disrupt distribution system (DS) operation. Among field devices, remote-controlled switches (RCSs) play a key role in the fault detection, isolation, and restoration (FDIR) process. Jamming attacks do not require intrusion into the cyber-network of DSs. Thus, RCSs can be easily targeted by jammers. To address this concern, this paper proposes a novel model for simulating jamming attacks against RCSs during an FDIR process. To this end, a novel stochastic Petri net model is proposed that includes two sub-models: jamming-strategy model and trip-issuing model. Using this model, the probability of successful jamming attacks on a target RCS is calculated. In the hypothesized scenario, the attackers create man-made faults on some distribution lines, prompting the distribution system operator (DSO) to initiate an FDIR process. At the same time, they start launching jamming attacks on RCSs. This model can be used by the DSO for performing risk assessment analysis. To show how the jamming attacks could impact DSs, a distribution feeder is studied under the jamming attacks during the FDIR process. Then, the probability of successful jamming attacks, load restoration times, and expected energy not served (EENS) are analyzed in different situations.