The article aims to offer a cross-sectoral perspective—hence, the decision to use the term ‘national competent authorities’, which goes beyond the conventional distinction among sectoral economic regulators supervising network industries, defined as ‘national regulatory authorities’ (NRAs), competition authorities, and other supervisory authorities, such as data protection authorities. M Dabbah, ‘The Relationship between Competition Authorities and Sector Regulators’ (2011) 70 The Cambridge Law Journal 113
S Lavrijssen and A Ottow, ‘Independent Supervisory Authorities: A Fragile Concept’ (2012) 39 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 419, 422-423.
Literature employs additional connotations, S De Somer, Autonomous Public Bodies and the Law (Edward Elgar, 2017) 5-8.
The analysis in this article will concentrate on these policy fields, as they are the areas where the attribution of quasi-judicial tasks most prominently comes to light.
By adopting the term ‘quasi-judicial’, this article intends to refer to a de iure administrative body which does not belong to the judicial system of the Member States but still performs functions commonly conferred on judicial actors, hence providing an additional mechanism for the effective judicial protection of individuals’ rights.
G Majone, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe’ (1994) 17 West European Politics 77
G Majone, ‘From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance’ (1997) 17 Journal of Public Policy 139
M Lodge, ‘Regulation, the Regulatory State and European Politics (2008) 31 West European Politics 280; and De Somer (n 1) 30-33.
M Pollack, ‘Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community’ (1997) 52 International Organization 99
M Thatcher, ‘Regulation after delegation: independent regulatory agencies in Europe’ (2002) 9 Journal of European Public Policy 954
M Thatcher, ‘Independent Regulatory Agencies and Elected Politicians in Europe’ in D Geradin, R Muñoz and N Petit (eds), Regulation through agencies in the EU: a new paradigm of European governance (Edward Elgar 2005) 48-50.
Majone (n 4).
Thatcher (n 5) 51-52.
L Hancher and P Larouche, ‘The coming of age of EU regulation of network industries and services of general economic interest’ in P Craig en G de de Búrca (eds), The evolution of EU law (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2011) 743-781
D Geradin and C Humpe, ‘The Liberalisation of Postal Services in the European Union: An Analysis of Directive 97/67’ in D Geradin (eds), The liberalisation of postal services in the European Union (Kluwer Law International 2002), 95.
De Somer (n 1) 23. The author uses the term ‘EU impulse’ to refer to how EU law has progressively required Member States to entrust the implementation of EU legislation to national authorities.
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31, art 28(1).
JH Jans, R de Lange, A Prechal and R Widdershoven, Europeanisation of Public Law (Europa Law Publishing 2007) 18. The authors employ the concept of ‘paradox of institutional autonomy’ to describe the traditional tendency of EU law of not interfering with questions of administrative organisation of the Member States, despite depending on them for the implementation of EU law and policies.
H Hofmann, GC Rowe, and A Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (Oxford University Press 2011)
S De Somer, ‘The Europeanisation of the Law on National Independent Regulatory Authorities from a Vertical and Horizontal Perspective’ (2012) 5 Review of European Administrative Law 93
P Van Cleynenbreugel, Market Supervision in the European Union: Integrated Administration in Constitutional Context (Brill Nijhoff 2015)
P Craig, EU Administrative Law (3rd ed, Oxford University Press 2019).
LS Bressman and RB Thompson, ‘The Future of Agency Independence’ (2010) 63 Vanderbilt Law Review 672.
Literature also adopts the term ‘organisational depoliticitisation’ to refer to the independence of non-majoritarian institutions originating from political delegations. In that sense, see M Flinders and J Buller, ‘Depoliticization, Democracy and Arena Shifting’ in T Christensen and P Lægreid (eds), Autonomy and Regulation: Coping with Agencies in the Modern State (Elgar Publishing, 2006) 58-59.
In relation to national competent authorities’ independence, literature distinguishes two sides of that independence – formal and de facto. Whereas the former refers to the independence as prescribed in the text of the law, the latter measures the independence that an authority enjoys in practice. M Maggetti, ‘De facto independence after delegation: A fuzzy-set analysis’ (2007) 4 Regulation & Governance 271
F Gilardi and M Maggetti, ‘The independence of regulatory authorities’ in D Levi-Faur (ed), Handbook of Regulation (Edward Elgar 2010).
C Koop and C Hanretty, ‘Political Independence, Accountability, and the Quality of Regulatory Decision-Making’ (2018) 51 Comparative Political Studies 38
M Cappello, ‘The independence of media regulatory authorities in Europe’ (European Audiovisual Observatory 2019) IRIS Special 2019/1, 4.
Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC – Statements made with regard to decommissioning and waste management activities [2003] OJ L176/37, art 23.
Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 establishing a single European railway area [2012] OJ L343/32, art 55(3).
D Szescilo, ‘Challenging Administrative Sovereignty: Dimensions of Independence of National Regulatory Authorities Under the EU Law’ (2021) 27 European Public Law 191, 194.
Thatcher (n 5) 48-49.
A Ottow, ‘The Different Levels of Protection of National Supervisors’ Independence in the European Landscape’ in S Comtois and KJ de Graaf (eds), On Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Independence (Eleven International Publishing 2013) 140-142
De Somer (n 1) 38-39.
Literature also discusses the impact of interdependence on national authorities’ design. For instance, Maggetti (n 14)
G Monti, ‘Independence, Interdependence, and Legitimacy: The EU Commission, National Competition Authorities, and the European Competition Network’ in D Ritleng (eds), Independence and Legitimacy in the Institutional System of the European Union (Oxford University Press 2016) 194.
Case C-518/07 European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:125, paras 14-16.
Case C-518/07 European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:125, para 25.
Case C-614/10 European Commission v Republic of Austria [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:631.
Case C-614/10 European Commission v Republic of Austria [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:631, paras 41-43.
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1.
Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation)’ COM/2012/011 final – 2012/0011 (COD), pt 3.4.6.
Moreover, for a discussion on the CJEU’s broad interpretation of the conditions of independence for regulatory authorities in network industries, S Lavrijssen, ‘Towards a European Principle of Independence: The Ongoing Constitutionalisation of an Independent Energy Regulator’ (2022) 16 Carbon & Climate Law Review 25, 33-34.
In the energy sector, quite influential is also the Commission, ‘Interpretative note on Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas’ (Commission Staff Working Ppaer, 22 January 2010). This document extensively clarifies how to interpret the provisions of the 2009 electricity and gas Directives.
Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU [2019] OJ L158/125, art 57(4) and (5).
Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code [2018] OJ L321/36.
Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code [2018] OJ L321/36, art 6(1) and (3).
Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code [2018] OJ L321/36, art 8(2).
Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code [2018] OJ L321/36, art 9(1) and (2).
Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market [2019] OJ L11/3, arts 4 and 5. Regulation 2003/1 does not contain similar guarantees.
Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market [2019] OJ L11/3, arts 4 and 5. Regulation 2003/1 does not contain similar guarantees, art 4(1) and (2).
Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market [2019] OJ L11/3, arts 4 and 5. Regulation 2003/1 does not contain similar guarantees, art 4(3) and (4).
Literature distinguishes different dimensions of independence, K Verhoest, G Peters, G Bouckaert and B Verschuere, ‘The study of organisational autonomy: a conceptual review’ (2004) 24 Public Administration and Development 101; Szescilo (n 18)
O Batura and M Kozak, ‘Study on the NRA independence: Final Report’ (2022) BoR (22) 189 accessed 6 May 2024, 24.
In this perspective, the alignment of judicial independence and independence of national competent authorities can be justified by the necessity of building mutual trust among authorities called to perform judicial activities. B Van Rompuy, ‘Independence as a Prerequisite for Mutual Trust between EU Competition Enforcers: Case T-791/19, Sped-Pro v Commission’ (2022) 13 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 413.
The CJEU emphasises how the condition of independence is inherent in the tasks of adjudication. As a result, a national body to be judicial must be independent. Case C-896/19 Repubblika v Il-Prim Ministru [2021] ECLI:EU:C:2021:311, 51
C Reyns, ‘Saving Judicial Independence: A Threat to the Preliminary Ruling Mechanism?’ (2021) 17 European Constitutional Law Review 26.
Over the past years, the CJEU has developed a standard of judicial independence, which is an expression of the rule of law and the principle of effective judicial protection and thereby, rooted in Articles 2 and 19 TEU, and Article 47 CFR.
For instance, C-216/18 PPU – Minister for Justice and Equality [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:586, paras 48-50
Case C-619/18 Commission v Poland [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:615, paras 50-57
Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, paras 35-38.
Case C-506/04 Graham J. Wilson v Ordre des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:587, paras 49-52
C-216/18 PPU – Minister for Justice and Equality [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:586, para 63.
Case C-274/14, Banco de Santander SA [2020] ECLI:EU:C:2020:17, para 57.
Case C-274/14, Banco de Santander SA [2020] ECLI:EU:C:2020:17, para 61.
Case C-274/14, Banco de Santander SA [2020] ECLI:EU:C:2020:17, para 63.
Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) [2022] OJ L277/1, art 50(2).
Directive (EU) 2019/1 (n 33) art 4(2)(a) and (b).
Directive (EU) 2019/944 (n 28), art 57(4)(a) and (b).
In addition, Case C-378/19 Prezident Slovenskej republiky [2020] ECLI:EU:C:2020:462, para 35.
Directive (EU) 2018/1972 (n 29) arts 6(1) and 8.
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (n 25), art 52(1) and (2); Case C-518/07 (n 21); and Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 (n 44), art 50(2).
Directive 2012/34/EU (n 17), art 55(1).
Directive 2012/34/EU (n 17), Article 53(3)(4).
Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 (n 44), art 50(1).
Directive (EU) 2019/1 (n 33), art 4(1).
Directive (EU) 2019/944 (n 28), art 57(4).
Directive (EU) 2018/1972 (n 29), recital 34 and art 6(2).
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (n 25), recital 129.
Directive 2012/34/EU (n 17), art 55(1).
Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 (n 44), art 50(1).
Directive (EU) 2019/1 (n 33), recital 17 and art 4(3) and (4).
Directive (EU) 2019/944 (n 28), art 57(4) and (5).
Directive (EU) 2018/1972 (n 29), recital 37.
Directive (EU) 2018/1972 (n 29), art 7.
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (n 25), arts 53 and 54.
Directive 2012/34/EU (n 17), art 55(3).
There are also some distinctions between sector regulation of regulatory authorities and competition authorities’ intervention. The former operates ex ante and focuses on a single sector, whereas competition authorities operate ex post and horizontally across all economic sectors. A de Streel, ‘The Relationship between Competition Law and Sector Specific Regulation: The case of electronic communications’ [2008] Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique 55; and OECD, ‘Interactions between competition authorities and sector regulators – Contribution from the European Union’ (2022) DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2022)13, 2.
S De Somer, ‘The powers of national regulatory authorities as agents of EU law’ (2017) 18 ERA Forum 581.
The author refers to the powers of national regulatory authorities as a combination of normative, adjudicatory and enforcement powers. For a debate on the adjudicatory and policy-making powers, M Maggetti, ‘The Role of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Policy-Making: A Comparative Analysis’ (2009) 16 Journal of European Public Policy 445
L Kaschny and S Lavrijssen, ‘The independence of national regulatory authorities and the European Union energy transition’ (2023) 72 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 715.
At present, some—albeit scarce—references alluding to the judicial nature of the functions exercised by national competent authorities can be found in literature, where the powers of enforcement, such as issuing binding decisions in order to resolve disputes and imposing penalties, are labelled as quasi-judicial. In that sense, De Somer (n 65), 586
De Somer (n 1) 123.
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (n 25), art 51(1).
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (n 25), arts 56 (1) and 77.
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (n 25), art 58 (1) and (2).
Proposal General Data Protection Regulation (n 26), para 99.
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (n 25), recital 129.
Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down additional procedural rules relating to the enforcement of Regulation (EU)’ 2016/679 COM/2023/348 final.
Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 (n 44), arts 53 and 54.
Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 (n 44), art 51(1) and (2).
Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 (n 44), art 51(3), (4) and (5).
Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 (n 44), art 51(2) and (b).
Directive (EU) 2018/1972 (n 29), arts 5(1) and (b), 26, and 29.
Directive (EU) 2018/1972 (n 29), recital 35.
Directive (EU) 2018/1972 (n 29), art 25
Commission, ‘Review of the Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework – Executive Summaries’(Commission, 2016) accessed 6 May 2024.
Directive (EU) 2019/944 (n 28), art 26.
Directive (EU) 2019/944 (n 28), art 60(2).
Directive (EU) 2019/944 (n 28), art 60.
Directive 2012/34/EU (n 17), art 56.
Directive 2012/34/EU (n 17), art 56(1) and (9).
Directive 2012/34/EU (n 17), art 57(5).
Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market’ COM/2017/0142 final – 2017/063 (COD); and Directive (EU) 2019/1 (n 33), ch 4.
This list is not exhaustive but is limited to the policy sectors analysed above.
F Gilardi, Delegation in the Regulatory State (Edward Elgar Publishing 2008).
C Scott, ‘Regulatory Governance and the Challenge of Constitutionalism’ in D Oliver, T Prosser and R Rawlings (eds), The Regulatory State: Constitutional Implications (Oxford University Press 2010) 18
S Lavrijssen, ‘What Role for Administrative Courts in Granting Effective Legal Protection in the Energy Sector?’ (2014) 23 European Energy and Environmental Law Review 219, 220.
M Broberg and N Fenger, ‘The European Court of Justice’s Transformation of Its Approach Towards Preliminary References from Member State Administrative Bodies’ (2022) 24 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 169.
Case C-53/03 Syfait [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:333
Case C-517/09 RTL Belgium SA [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:821
Case C-394/11 Valeri Hariev Belov v CHEZ Elektro Balgaria AD and Others [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:48
Case C-462/19 Asociación Nacional de Empresas Estibadoras y Consignatarios de Buques (Anesco) and Others [2020] ECLI:EU:C:2020:715.
Case C-136/11 Westbahn Management GmbH v ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:740, para 27
C-246/05 Armin Häupl v Lidl Stiftung & Co. KG. [2007] ECLI:EU:C:2007:340, para 16.
Case C-453/20 CityRail a.s. v Správa železnic, státní organizace [2022] ECLI:EU:2022:341.
Case C-453/20 CityRail a.s. v Správa železnic, státní organizace [2022] ECLI:EU:2022:341, paras 67-70.
Case C-453/20 CityRail a.s. v Správa železnic, státní organizace [2022] ECLI:EU:2022:341, para 70.
Case C-453/20 CityRail a.s. v Správa železnic, státní organizace [2022] ECLI:EU:2022:341, para 45.
Case C-453/20 CityRail a.s. v Správa železnic, státní organizace [2022] ECLI:EU:2022:341, para 48.
Case C-453/20 CityRail a.s. v Správa železnic, státní organizace [2022] ECLI:EU:2022:341, para 52.
Article 47(1) CFR ‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article.’ In addition, Case C-279/09 DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:811, paras 31-33.
Case C-222/84 Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECLI:EU:C:1986:206.
M Bonelli, ‘Effective Judicial Protection in EU Law: an Evolving Principle of a Constitutional Nature’ (2019) 12 Review of European Administrative Law 35; Case C-64/16 (n 39), para 35.
Effective judicial protection has been largely employed by the CJEU. For instance, the Court relies on Article 47 CFR to evaluate whether the procedures and remedies available before national courts correspond to the guarantees laid down by that article. At the same time, the Court makes use of Article 19 TEU. Most recently, following the Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses’ judgment, the very deep existence of Article 19 TEU has been linked to Article 2 TEU, giving concrete expression to the rule of law. For more details, K Lenaerts, ‘The Rule of Law and the Coherence of the Judicial System of the European Union’ (2006) 44 Common Market Law Review 1625
S Prechal, ‘The Court of Justice and Effective Judicial Protection: What Has the Charter Changed?’ in C Paulussen, T Takacs, V Lazić and B Van Rompuy (eds), Fundamental Rights in International and European Law (Asser Press 2016)
L Pech and S Platon, ‘Judicial independence under threat: The Court of Justice to the rescue in the ASJP case’ (2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 1827
M Bonelli and M Claes, ‘Judicial Serendipity: How Portuguese Judges Came to the Rescue of the Polish Judiciary: ECJ 27 February 2018, Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical Dos Juízes Portugueses’ (2018) 14 European Constitutional Law Review 622, 632.
Case C-432/05 Unibet [2007] ECLI:EU:C:2007:163, para 38
A Arnull, ‘The Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in EU Law: An Unruly Horse?’ (2011) 36 European Law Review 51, 51-52.
K Gutman, ‘The Essence of the Fundamental Right to an Effective Remedy and to a Fair Trial in the Case-Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union: The Best Is Yet to Come?’ (2019) 20 German Law Journal 884.
In addition, Case T-791/19 Sped-Pro S.A. v European Commission [2022] ECLI:EU:T:2022:67, 75. In this case, Poland contests the application of a fundamental right to a fair trial as enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 47 CFR before the Polish competition authority, given the administrative nature of that body.
For instance, as part of the right to fair trial, the parties have the right to be heard. Case C-530/12 P – OHIM v National Lottery Commission [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:186, paras 53-54.
Additionally, the Court helds that the parties have a right to examine all documents or observations, Case C-300/11 ZZ v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:363, para 55.
Moreover, Case C-358/16 UBS Europe SE and Alain Hondequin and Others v DV and Others [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:606, Opinion of AG Kokott, paras 78-79
Case C-348/16 Moussa Sacko v Commissione Territoriale per il riconoscimento della Protezione internazionale di Milano [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:591, para 32.
A specific body of literature foresees a connection between the right to effective judicial protection and preliminary references. Building on Lacchi’s argument that Member States have an obligation originating in the principle of effective judicial protection to not obstruct the right of courts to submit preliminary rulings to the Court of Justice, Gentile sustains that national authorities should have a role of facilitator in the dialogue between the EU and national courts through the procedure of Article 267 TFEU. For more details, C Lacchi, ‘Multilevel Judicial Protection in the EU and Preliminary References’ (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review 679, 686
G Gentile, ‘Effective judicial protection: enforcement, judicial federalism and the politics of EU law’ (2022) 2 European Law Open 128.
In that sense, Case C-53/03 Syfait [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:673, Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 45. AG Jacobs argues that ‘a specialised competition authority having judicial characteristics might be better placed to identify the relevant issues of Community competition law than a generalist court charged with reviewing the decisions of the former body’.
Generally, the scope of Article 41 CFR is limited to EU institutions, bodies, and agencies, excluding Member States. In that sense, L Tobias, ‘Article 41 CFR Right to good administration’ in M Kellerbauer, M Klamert and J Tomkin (eds), The EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Oxford Academic 2019), 3
Prechal (n 105) 149-150.
At the same time, a body of literature argues for a broader application of good administration. For instance, H Hofmann and C Mihaescu. ‘The Relation between the Charter’s Fundamental Rights and the Unwritten General Principles of EU Law: Good Administration as the Test Case’ (2013) 9 European Constitutional Law Review 73
MV Kristjánsdóttir, ‘Good Administration as a Fundamental Right’ (2013) 9 Icelandic Review of Politics and Administration 237
De Somer (n 65), 588-589.
P Larouche and X Taton, ‘Enforcement and Judicial Review of Decisions of National Regulatory Authorities’ (2011) accessed 6 May 2024
M Szydło, ‘Judicial review of decisions made by national regulatory authorities: Towards a more coherent application of EU sector-specific regulation’ (2014) 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law 930.
Lavrijssen (n 92).
The author highlights how the administrative court for energy cases in the Netherlands (the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal) does not fully respect the requirements for effective legal protection. Moreover, Case T-791/19 Sped-Pro S.A. v European Commission [2022] ECLI:EU:T:2022:67, paras 67 and 91.
K Lenaert, ‘Upholding the Rule of Law through Judicial Dialogue’ (2019) 38 Yearbook of European Law 3
K Gutman, ‘The Essence of the Fundamental Right to an Effective Remedy and to a Fair Trial in the Case-Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union: The Best Is Yet to Come?’ (2019) 20 German Law Journal 884, 897
S Prechal, ‘Article 19 TEU and national courts: A new role for the principle of effective judicial protection?’ (REALaw Blog, 22 November 2022) accessed 6 May 2024.
