[en] Iranian nuclear program has been an important topic on the international agenda since at least 2002 due to the concerns about its possible military dimension. Preoccupied with the issue have been many governments and international organizations. The UN Security Council had addressed it with measures under chapter VII of United Nations Charter providing for actions with respect to threats to the peace and international security. For the European Union the prevention of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon remains up until now a “key security priority”, which necessitates diplomatic and political investments.
In 2015, after 12 years of intense diplomatic negotiations, but also among threats of a military intervention, the crisis had been averted – or so it seemed. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was concluded, an agreement in which Iran committed to limiting its nuclear program and putting it under international verification in exchange for the lifting of sanctions.
The conclusion of the Nuclear Deal in 2015 exhibited a radical change in Iranian foreign policy, proved by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei labeling it a “heroic flexibility”. However, to the disappointment of many who believed that it would bring a breakthrough in Iranian relations with the US and the EU, the decision to sign the JCPOA did not result in an overall reconciliation with the West . Moreover, the deal was shattered in 2018 when President D. Trump withdrew the United States’ participation in it. Currently Iranian nuclear program is beyond international control and Tehran is capable of acquiring a nuclear weapon, which constitutes a renewed concern for international peace and security.
That Iran decided to sign the JCPOA, the inconsistency in its behavior afterwards and its reluctance to revitalize the deal after 2018 needs explanation. Comprehensive understanding of Iranian rationale behind its nuclear policy which could be applicable in further diplomatic negotiations will provide useful lessons.
The JCPOA was a shift in Iranian strategy towards a reconciliation with the US aimed at preserving the expediency of the political system through sanctions relief and enhanced economic cooperation with the world. The preliminary assumptions answering the question “Why Iran signed the JCPOA?” is that around 2012-2013, the Iranian authorities were in unfavorable international and internal situation, afraid that they could no longer assure societal support and thus decided to sign JCPOA for the sake of an economic relief and most importantly securing expediency. The policy of confrontation with the US and the nuclear program itself were too expansive, aggressive, costly and putting strain on the economy. In these circumstances a particular faction of the governing elites (moderates) gained prevailing power and used public support for a more moderate policy, and convinced the Supreme Leader to modify the course in the nuclear area. An election of a Democratic president in the US wishing to find reconciliation with Iran helped to open the window of opportunity on the American side. The opposition against the JCPOA resulted from the changes in a relative distribution of power among elite factions caused by an opening to the West. It was jeopardizing economic and political interests of the conservatives and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. They recognized that in the long run they would lose economically from the lifting of sanctions and politically due to an increased popularity of the moderate faction favoring cooperation with the West. Reconciliation with the West was also in contradiction to their revolutionary ideological beliefs.
Disciplines :
Political science, public administration & international relations
WHY IRAN ENDORSED THE NUCLEAR DEAL? FACTORS SHAPING IRANIAN SECURITY POLICY AND ITS DECISION-MAKING ON THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION.
Defense date :
13 December 2024
Institution :
ULiège - Université de Liège [Faculté de Droit, de Science Politique et de Criminologie], Belgium
Degree :
Doctor of doctoral political and social sciences
Promotor :
Michel, Quentin ; Université de Liège - ULiège > Département de science politique ; Université de Liège - ULiège > Département de science politique > Politique européenne