Experience; Mind; Mentality; Consciousness; Stout, G.F.; Moore, G.E.; Russell, B.; History of Analytic Philosophy
Abstract :
[en] Call experientialism about mentality the view that being in a mental state is tantamount to having an experience, while having a mind is tantamount to being capable of having experiences. In short, experience is a mark of the mental. Although experientialism has largely fallen out of favor, it was once the predominant view in the Cambridge School of analysis, explicitly endorsed by G.F. Stout, G.E. Moore and the early Russell, among others. Drawing on their views, I briefly discuss three challenges to experientialism and argue that they can all be successfully addressed. My conclusion is that experientialism is a respectable view of mentality.
Research Center/Unit :
Phénoménologies - ULiège
Disciplines :
Philosophy & ethics
Author, co-author :
Dewalque, Arnaud ; Université de Liège - ULiège > Département de philosophie > Phénoménologies
Language :
English
Title :
Cambridge Experientialism Revisited
Publication date :
In press
Main work title :
Marking the Mark of the Mental
Author, co-author :
Voltolini, Alberto; UNITO - Università degli Studi di Torino [IT]
Publisher :
Springer, New York, United States - New York
Collection name :
Synthese Library
Peer reviewed :
Peer reviewed
Name of the research project :
MIND — The British Sources of Philosophy of Mind 1888-1949
