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• 1. Regulation (EC) 715/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2007 on type approval of motor vehicles with respect to emissions from light passenger and commercial vehicles (Euro 5 and Euro 6) and on access to vehicle repair and maintenance information, O.J. 2007, L 171/1, Art. 5(2).
• 2. UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.
• 3. See further, on that topic, Milieu Consulting, “Study on EU implementation of the Aarhus Convention in the area of access to justice in environmental matters” (2019), available at (la st visited 23 Sept. 2023). That issue was subsequently addressed, somewhat cautiously, by the European Commission following the adoption of a non-binding (interpretative) notice on access to environmental justice at Member State level; see European Commission, “Commission Notice on access to justice in environmental matters”, C(2017)2616 final.
• 4. This case note does not discuss the issue of locus standi of NGOs before the ECJ, especially in the context of the action for annulment governed by Art. 263(4) TFEU. See on that topic e.g. De Schutter, “Public interest litigation before the European Court of Justice”, 13 MJ (2006), 9-34; Van Wolferen, “Access to justice in environmental matters in the EU: The EU’s diff icult road towards non-compliance with the Aarhus Convention” in Peeters and Eliantonio (Eds.), Research Handbook on EU Environmental Law (Elgar, 2020), pp. 150-151; Winter, “Plaumann withering: Standing before the EU General Court underway from distinctive to substantial concern”, 15 European Journal of Legal Studies (2023), 85-123.
• 5. The Schutznorm doctrine originates from German administrative law. Other Member States also subscribe to that doctrine, or a slightly different conception of it (e.g. Austria, Croatia, Poland and Slovakia). See Warin, Individual Rights under European Union Law -A Study on the Relationship Between Rights, Obligations and Interests in the Case Law of the Court of Justice (Nomos, 2019), pp. 63-64.
• 6. Case C-664/15, Protect Natur-, Arten- und Landschaftsschutz Umweltorganisation v. Bezirkshauptmannschaft Gmünd, EU:C:2017:987, para 44.
• 7. Judgment, para 65.
• 8. Ibid., para 51.
• 9. Ibid., para 64.
• 10. Opinion in Case C-873/19, Deutsche Umwelthilfe (Réception des véhicules à moteur), EU:C:2022:156, para 56.
• 11. Case C-664/15, Protect.
• 12. Ibid., para 46.
• 13. Judgment, para 78.
• 14. Opinion, para 58 (emphasis added).
• 15. Judgment, para 66.
• 16. Ibid., para 83. See also Case C-128/20, GSMB Invest GmbH & Co. KG v. Auto Krainer GesmbH, EU:C:2022:570, paras. 46-47; Case C-134/20, IR v. Volkswagen AG, EU:C:2022:5 71, para 54.
• 17. Judgment, para 90.
• 18. Ibid., para 94.
• 19. Dougan, “Judicial review of Member State action under the general principles and the Charter: Defining the ‘scope of Union law’”, 52 CML Rev. (2015), 1201-1245, at 1213.
• 20. Bonelli, “Effective judicial protection in EU law: An evolving principle of a constitutional nature”, 12 REALaw (2019), 35-62, at 53-54. See, for an account drafted before the entry into force of the Charter (and, hence, focusing on the general principle of effective judicial protection), Wenneras, The Enforcement of EC Environmental Law (OUP, 2007), pp. 84 et seq.
• 21. See e.g. Opinion of A.G. Bobek in Case C-403/16, Soufiane El Hassani v. Minister SprawZagranicznych, EU:C:2017:659, paras. 73 et seq.
• 22. Ibid., para 76.
• 23. See on that topic Ruffert, “Rights and remedies in European Community law: A comparative view”, 34 CML Rev. (1997), 307-336; Warin, op. cit. supra note 5, pp. 42 et seq.
• 24. Eilmansberger, “The relationship between rights and remedies in EC law: In search of the missing link”, 41 CML Rev. (2004), 1199-1246, at 1242.
• 25. See for a recent judgment illustrating that approach Case C-353/20, Skeyes v. Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd., EU:C:2022:423, paras. 38 et seq.
• 26. Unless, of course the (legal or natural) person wishing to bring legal proceedings can rely on other subjective rights (such as e.g. the right to property or other economic rights).
• 27. Eliantonio, “The relationship between EU secondary rules and the principles of effectiveness and effective judicial protection in environmental matters: Towards anew dawn for the ‘language of rights’?”, 12 REALaw (2019), 95-116, at 97.
• 28. See e.g. Opinion of A.G. Wathelet in Case C-682/15, Berlioz Investment Fund SA v. Directeur de l’administration des contributions directes, EU:C:2017:2, paras. 50 et seq; Opinion of A.G. Wahl in Case C-33/17, Cepelnik d.o.o. v. Michael Vavti, EU:C:2018:311. See also Prechal, “The Court of Justice and effective judicial protection: What has the Charter changed?” in Paulussen, Takacs, Lazic and Van Rompuy (Eds.), Fundamental Rights in International and European Law: Public and Private Law Perspectives (TMC Asser Press, 2016), pp. 148 et seq.
• 29. Case C-682/15, Berlioz Investment Fund, EU:C:2017:373. See, on the issue of standing, Ellingsen, Standing to Enforce European Union law Before National Courts (Hart Publishing, 2021); Dougan, “Who exactly benefits from the Treaties? The murky interaction between Union and national competence over the capacity to enforce EU law”, 12 CYELS (2010), 73-120.
• 30. Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 Feb. 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC, O.J. 2011, L 64/1.
• 31. Case C-682/15, Berlioz, paras. 46-47.
• 32. Opinion in Case C-682/15, Berlioz, paras. 51 et seq.
• 33. Ibid., para 51. See also Joined Cases C-245 & 246/19, État luxembourgeois v. B and Etat Luxembourgeois v.B, C, D, F.C., A (Droit de recours contre une demande d’information en matière fiscale), EU:C:2020:795, paras. 56-59.
• 34. Bonelli, op. cit. supra note 20, at 54-55. See also Case C-418/11, Texdata Software GmbH, EU:C:2013:559, paras. 75 et seq.; Case C-562/12, Liivima Lihaveis MTÜ v. Eesti-Läti programmi 2007—2013 Seirekomitee and Eesti Vabariigi Siseministeerium, EU:C:2014:2229, paras. 61 et seq.
• 35. A.G. Wathelet takes the view that the notion of “implementation”, on which the application of the Charter is based, “necessarily implies” the existence of a right guaranteed by Union law; Opinion in Case C-682/15, Berlioz, para 63. On the notion of “implementation” within the meaning of Art. 51 of the Charter, see e.g. Lenaerts, “Exploring the limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights”, 8 EuConst (2012), 375-403, esp. at 378-380; Dougan, op. cit. supra note 19.
• 36. The requirement of specif icity follows from recent judgments dealing with the limits of Charter application. See e.g. Case C-467/19 PPU, QR, Spetsializirana prokuratura, YM, ZK, HD, EU:C:2019:776, para. 41; Joined Cases C-609 & 610/17, Terveys- ja sosiaalialan neuvottelujärjestö (TSN) ry v. Hyvinvointialan liitto ry and Auto- ja Kuljetusalan Työntekijäliitto (AKT) ry v. Satamaoperaattorit ry, EU:C:2019:981, para 53. See, on that topic, Tecqmenne, “Minimum harmonisation and fundamental rights: A test-case for the identification of the scope of EU law in situations mvolvmg national discretion?”, 16 EuConst (2020), 493-512.
• 37. Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, O.J. 1992, L 206/7.
• 38. Case C-240/09, Lesoochranarske zoskupenie VLK v. Ministerstvo zivotného prostredia Slovenskej Republiky (Brown Bears I), para 36.
• 39. Case C-240/09, Brown Bears I, para 37.
• 40. Ibid., paras. 47 et seq.
• 41. Ibid., paras. 48-50.
• 42. Eliantonio, op. cit. supra note 27, at 109. On the relationship between these principles, see e.g. Dougan, “The vicissitudes of life at the coalface: Remedies and procedures for enforcing Union law before the national courts” in Craig and De Burca (Eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, 2011); Prechal and Widdershoven, “Redef ining the relationship between Rewe-effectiveness and effective judicial protection”, 4 REALaw (2011), 31-50; Krommendijk, “Is there light on the horizon? The distinction between ‘Rewe effectiveness’ and the principle of effective judicial protection in Article 47 of the Charter after Orizzonte”, 53 CML Rev. (2016), 1395-1418; Widdershoven, “National procedural autonomy and general EU law limits”, 12 REALaw (2019), 5-34.
• 43. See, amongst others, Wenneras, op. cit. supra note 20, pp. 84 et seq.; Prechal and Widdershoven, op. cit. supra note 42, at 42; Eliantonio, op. cit. supra note 27, at 97.
• 44. Eliantonio, ibid., at 97; Bonelli, op. cit. supra note 20, at 53-54.
• 45. Eliantonio, op. cit. supra note 27, at 112.
• 46. Case C-243/15, Lesoochranarske zoskupenie VLK v. Obvodny urad Trencin and Biely potok a.s. (Brown Bears II), para 52.
• 47. Ibid., para 59.
• 48. Ibid., para 60.
• 49. In doing so, the Grand Chamber reiterated the f indings expressed by a smaller chamber formation in Protect; Case C-664/15, Protect, para 44.
• 50. Judgment, para 57.
• 51. It could be suggested that the objective underpinning the Regulation is intrinsically related to protection of human health and should accordingly give rise to subjective rights for the sake of individuals concerned by the breach of its provisions. That would be consonant with a tendency, in legal scholarship, to consider that secondary provisions intended to protect (at least partially) human-related interests exhibit a normative intention of conferring subjective rights on individuals. However, it is worth pointing out that this line of reasoning did not feature in that judgment (and has also been rejected in a recent judgment dealing with secondary law on air quality, see Case C-61/21, JP v. Ministre de la Transition Ecologique and Premier Ministre (Responsabilité de l’Etat pour la pollution de l’air), EU:C:2022:1015). See, on that topic, Beljin, “Rights in EU law” in Prechal and Van Roermund (Eds.), The Coherence of EU Law: The Search for Unity in Divergent Concepts (OUP, 2008), p. 114; Opinion of A.G. Kokott in Case C-61/21, Ministre de la Transition Ecologique and Premier Ministre (Responsabilité de l’Etat pour la pollution de l’air), EU:C:2022:359, paras. 72 et seq.
• 52. Judgment, para 65.
• 53. Wennerâs, op. cit. supra note 20, at p. 87; Jacobs, “The evolution of the European legal order”, 41 CML Rev. (2004), 303-316, at 308.
• 54. Case C-664/15, Protect, para 39. See also e.g. Case C-115/09, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen, EU:C:2011:289, paras. 48-59; Case C-243/15, Brown Bears II, paras. 59-60. This seems in line with the general approach of the Court, which is to consider that rights arise as a by-product of sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional EU obligations. See, amongst others, Episcopo, “Deconstructing the CJEU’s jurisprudence to enable judicial dialogue” in Mak and Kas (Eds.), Civil Courts and the European Polity: The Constitutional Role of Private Law Adjudication in Europe (Hart Publishing, 2023), p. 84; Hofmann, “Article 47” in Peers, Hervey, Kenner and Ward (Eds.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Hart Publishing, 2021), pp. 1268-1269.
• 55. Bonelli, op. cit. supra note 20, at 43-44.
• 56. Van Gerven, “Of rights, remedies, and procedures”, 37 CML Rev. (2000), 501-536, at 502; Bonelli, op. cit. supra note 20, at 55 et seq. See further, on the distinction between “remedies” and “procedures”, Van Gerven, ibid., at 502.
• 57. Beyond the right to initiate review proceedings, the national judiciary must take “all necessary measures”, including an order or a financial penalty, in order to guarantee that EU environmental provisions are respected. However, the obligation to make other remedies available comes into play only if these remedies are already provided by national law and are not contrary to other fundamental rights provided by the Charter (Case C-237/07, Dieter Janecek v. FreistaatBayern, EU:C:2008:447, paras. 38-39; Case C-404/13, The Queen, on application of ClientEarth v. The Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, EU:C:2014: 2382, paras. 55-58; Case C-723/17, Craeynest and Others, EU:C:2019:533, para 56; Case C-752/18, Deutsche Umwelthilfe eV v. Freistaat Bayern, EU:C:2019:1114, para 30). By contrast, the ECJ has ruled out the possibility that State liability could be established as a matter of EU law in relation to infringements of EU environmental law (Case C-61/21, Ministre de la Transition Ecologique and Premier Ministre, para 62). The ECJ nevertheless left open the possibility that State liability may be established on the basis of national law. That possibility was taken up in two recent judgments delivered by the Administrative Tribunal of Paris (judgments of 16 June 2023, Tribunal administratif de Paris (n°2019924 and 2019925)).
• 58. Joined Cases C-245 & 246/19, État luxembourgeois, para 66.
• 59. A.G. Bobek alluded to a similar idea when he opined that “if the drafters had intended the first paragraph of Article 47 to be a universally applicable provision, triggered by Article 51(1), irrespective of any concrete rights or freedoms, they would have simply provided that ‘everyone has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal’, omitting any further specifications or limits”; Opinion in Case C-403/16, El Hassani, para 76.
• 60. Judgment, para 74.
• 61. Opinion in Case C-33/17, Cepelnik, para 97. See, however, Dougan, op. cit. supra note 29, at 90.
• 62. Opinion in Case C-403/16, El Hassani, para 82; Opinion in Case C-61/21, Ministre de la Transition écologique and Premier Ministre, paras. 95 et seq.
• 63. See e.g. Case C-237/07, Janecek, para 39; Case C-197/18, Wasserleitungsverband Nördliches Burgenland, Robert Prandl and Others, EU:C:2019:824, para 32.
• 64. Case C-243/15, Brown Bears II, para 51.
• 65. Ibid., para 73.
• 66. Ibid., paras. 56-57.
• 67. Ibid., paras. 58-61.
• 68. Case C-664/15, Protect, para 46 (emphasis added).
• 69. Ibid., para 58.
• 70. See e.g. Krämer, “Direct effect in EU environmental law: Towards the end of a doctrine?” in Peeters and Eliantonio, op. cit. supra note 4, pp. 192-195. See in a similar vein Squintani and Perlaviciute, “Access to public participation: Unveiling the mismatch between what law prescribes and what the public wants” in Peeters and Eliantonio, ibid., pp. 136-137; Peeters and Eliantonio, “On regulatory power, compliance and the role of the Court of Justice in EU environmental law” in Peeters and Eliantonio, ibid., p. 487.
• 71. See e.g. Lenaerts and Corthaut, “Of birds and hedges: The role of primacy in invoking norms of EU law”, 31 EL Rev. (2006), 287-315; Dougan, “When worlds collide! Competing visions of the relationship between direct effect and supremacy”, 44 CML Rev. (2007), 931-963.
• 72. Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm, EU:C:2005:709; Case C-555/07, Seda Kücükdeveci v. Swedex Gmbh & Co. KG., EU:C:2010:21.
• 73. That view was rejected in subsequent judgments. The Court confirmed that it is the general principle as such (or, for that matter, the relevant Charter right) that justifies the disapplication of conflicting national provisions. The requirements expressed by secondary law remain relevant to reconstruct the content of the relevant primary law norm (see e.g. Case C-176/12, Association de Médiation Sociale, EU:C:2014:2, paras. 36 and 49; Case C-122/17, David Smith v. Patrick Meade and Others, EU:C:2018:631, paras. 44 et seq.). See on that topic e.g. Lazzerini, “(Some of) the fundamental rights granted by the Charter may be a source of obligations for private parties: AMS ”, 51 CML Rev. (2014), 907-933, esp. at 921-23.
• 74. Lazzerini, “The horizontal application of the general principles of EU law: Nothing less than direct effect” in Ziegler, Neuvonen and Moreno-Lax (Eds.), Research Handbook on General Principles of EU Law: Constructing Legal Orders in Europe (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2022), p. 176.
• 75. Case C-664/15, Protect, para 45 (emphasis added).
• 76. Sobotta, “New cases on Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention”, 15 Journal for European Environmental & Planning Law (2018), 241-258, at 254-255.
• 77. Case C-664/15, Protect, para 52.
• 78. This seems to give credence to the suggestion proffered by Sophie Robin-Olivier, who had opined that the legal effects of EU norms rest on a combination of legal norms; Robin-Olivier, “The evolution of direct effect in the EU: Stocktaking, problems, projections”, 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2014), 165-188, esp. at 168 et seq. As we shall see, it can nevertheless be inferred from subsequent judgments that the duty to set aside conflicting national provisions is ultimately rooted in Art. 47 of the Charter.
• 79. Judgment, para 71.
• 80. Ibid., para 72.
• 81. See, amongst others, Arnull, “The principle of effective judicial protection in EU law: An unruly horse”, 36 EL Rev. (2011), 51-70, at 68; Van Cleynenbreugel, “The confusing constitutional status of positive procedural obligations in EU law”, 5 REALaw (2012), 81-101, at 91.
• 82. Bonelli, “Article 47 of the Charter, effective judicial protection and the (procedural) autonomy of the Member States” in Bonelli, Eliantonio and Gentile (Eds.), Article 47 of the Charter and Effective Judicial Protection. Volume 1: The Court of Justice’s Perspective (Hart Publishing, 2022), pp. 96 et seq.; Bonelli, Eliantonio and Gentile, “Conclusions” in ibid., pp. 274-275.
• 83. See e.g. Case C-240/09, Brown Bears I.
• 84. See also Sobotta, op. cit. supra note 76, at 254-255; Neframi, “La Charte dans l’action extérieure de l’Union Européenne” in Iliopoulou-Penot and Xenou (Eds.), La Charte des Droits Fondamentaux, Source de Renouveau Constitutionnel Européen (Bruylant, 2020), pp. 169-170.
• 85. Eliantonio, op. cit. supra note 27, at 113.
• 86. Widdershoven (2019), op. cit. supra note 42, at 18-19.
• 87. Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, Les Méthodes d’Interprétation de la Cour de Justice de l’Union Européenne (Bruylant, 2021), p. 93.
• 88. Case C-414/16, Vera Egenberger v. Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung eV, EU:C:2018:257, para 78; Case C-556/17, Alekszij Torubarov v. Bevandoriasi és Menekültügyi Hivatal, EU:C:2019:626, para 56.
• 89. See also Schütze, “Direct effects and indirect effects of Union law” in Schütze and Tridimas (Eds.), Oxford Principles of European Union Law, vol. 1 (OUP, 2018), p. 293.
• 90. See, in a similar vein, Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, “The general system of EU environmental law enforcement”, 30 YEL (2011), 3-41, at 36.
• 91. Amalfitano, General Principles of EU Law and the Protection of Fundamental Rights (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018), pp. 30 et seq.
• 92. See e.g. Case C-4/73, Nold KG v. Commission, EU:C:1974:51, paras. 12-13; Case C-44/79, Hauer/Land Rheinland-Pfalz, EU:C:1979:219, para 15.
• 93. The explanations relating to the Charter also make various references to international treaties for the protection of human rights as sources of guidance for the interpretation of Charter provisions.
• 94. There is nothing here that should be taken as meaning that international human rights law may justify a departure from EU primary law. See further Lenaerts and Gutierrez-Fons, op. cit. supra note 87, at pp. 91-93.
• 95. See on that issue e.g. Schoukens, “Access to justice in environmental cases after the rulings of the Court of Justice of 13 January 2015: Kafka revisited?”, 31 Utrecht Journal of International and European Law (2015), 46-67, at 46; De Lucia, “The new Aarhus Regulation and the defensive behaviour of the European legislator”, 15 REALaw (2022), 7-34.
• 96. Lenaerts and Gutierrez-Fons, op. cit supra note 90, at 36.
• 97. See e.g. Darpo and Epstein, “Under fire from all directions: Swedish wolf management hunting scrutinized by Brussels and at home” in Born, Cliquet, Schoukens, Misonne and Van Hoorick (Eds.), The Habitats Directive in its EU Environmental Law Context: European Nature’s Best Hope? (Routledge, 2016), p. 359. They observe that the Swedish courts “revised their attitude towards standing for NGOs in environmental decision making under the pressure of EU law, making public interest litigation possible”.