[en] For Edmund Husserl, intuition is opposed to mere symbolic presentation. Knowledge is only possible when meaning intentions are “fulfiled” by some intuition that provides an object in accordance with those intentions. Now, what does that mean in the case of mathematical knowledge? Husserl himself must admit that most of mathematics - both in arithmetics and in geometry - is made of symbolic presentations. Does that mean that it does not deliver any knowledge? Husserl’s theory of “manifolds” as objectual counterparts of formal systems is an attempt to answer this question.
Research Center/Unit :
MéThéor - Métaphysique et Théorie de la Connaissance - ULiège Phénoménologies - ULiège Traverses - ULiège
Disciplines :
Philosophy & ethics
Author, co-author :
Leclercq, Bruno ; Université de Liège - ULiège > Département de philosophie > Philosophie analytique et de la logique
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