[en] We argue for an intimate relation between semantic externalism and semantic deference and propose a typology of speakers’ metasemantic views as revealed by their deferential attitudes. Building on this typology, we then offer a classification of metasemantic disagreements understood as verbal disputes between speakers who (consciously or unconsciously) hold divergent metasemantic views about the same word. In particular, we distinguish lower-order metasemantic disagreements between speakers who disagree on the exact source of meaning determination for a word yet agree on the kind of deferential attitude this word is liable to, from higher-order metasemantic disagreements between speakers who do not even agree on the suitable kind of deferential attitude. We demonstrate the fruitfulness of our classification through the concrete implications it has for conceptual engineering.
Research Center/Unit :
MéThéor - Métaphysique et Théorie de la Connaissance - ULiège Traverses - ULiège
Disciplines :
Philosophy & ethics Languages & linguistics
Author, co-author :
De Brabanter, Philippe ; Université libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium
Leclercq, Bruno ; Université de Liège - ULiège > Département de philosophie > Philosophie analytique et de la logique
Language :
English
Title :
From Semantic Deference to Semantic Externalism to Metasemantic Disagreement
Alternative titles :
[fr] De la déférence sémantique à l'externalisme sémantique et au désaccord sémantique
The present research was conducted with the financial support of the F.R.S.-FNRS research project T.0184.16, 2016–2021, Cognitive Transparency of Semantic Contents and Pragmatic Determination of Reference ( https://doi.org/10.13039/501100002661 ).
Belleri D (2017) Verbalism and metalinguistic negotiation in ontological disputes. Philos Stud 174:2211–2226. 10.1007/s11098-016-0795-z
Belleri D (2018) Two species of merely verbal disputes. Metaphilosophy 49(5):691–710. 10.1111/meta.12335 DOI: 10.1111/meta.12335
Burge T (1979) Individualism and the mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4:73–121. Reprinted in: Foundations of Mind. Philosophical Essays, vol 2. Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 100–150
Cappelen H (2018) Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 10.1093/oso/9780198814719.001.0001
Cappelen H, Plunkett D (2020) Introduction: A guided tour of conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics. In: Burgess A, Cappelen H, Plunkett D (eds) Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 1–34. 10.1093/oso/9780198801856.003.0001
Cappelen H (2020) Conceptual engineering: the Master Argument. In: Cappelen H, Plunkett D, Burgess A (eds) Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 132–151. 10.1093/oso/9780198801856.003.0007 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198801856.003.0007
De Brabanter P, Nicolas D, Stojanovic I, Villanueva N (2007) Les usages déférentiels. In: Bouvier A, Conein B (eds) L’épistémologie sociale. Une théorie sociale de la connaissance. Editions de l’EHESS, Paris, pp 139–162. 10.4000/books.editionsehess.11311 DOI: 10.4000/books.editionsehess.11311
Deutsch M (2020) Speaker’s reference, stipulation, and a dilemma for conceptual engineers. Philos Stud 177(12):3935–3957. 10.1007/s11098-020-01416-z DOI: 10.1007/s11098-020-01416-z
Jackman H (2005) Temporal externalism, deference, and our ordinary linguistic practice. Pac Philos Q 86:365–380. 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00232.x DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00232.x
Jorem S (2021) Conceptual engineering and the implementation problem. Inquiry Interdiscip J Philos 64(1–2):186–211. 10.1080/0020174X.2020.1809514 DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2020.1809514
Gertler B (2012) Understanding the internalism-externalism debate: what is the boundary of the thinker? Philos Perspect 26(1):51–75. 10.1111/phpe.12001 DOI: 10.1111/phpe.12001
Kripke S (1972) Naming and Necessity. Blackwell, Oxford DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_9
Leclercq B, De Brabanter P (2019) Proposition d’une enquête empirique sur les intuitions « externalistes » des locuteurs à travers le mode de déférence sémantique. Travaux du Cercle Belge de Linguistique-Studies van de Belgische Kring voor Linguïstiek 13 (Online at http://www.bkl-cbl.be)
Liu JL (2002) Physical externalism and social externalism: are they really compatible? J Philos Res 27:381–404. 10.5840/jpr_2002_7 DOI: 10.5840/jpr_2002_7
Machery E (2016) Experimental philosophy of science. In: Sytsma J, Buckwalter W (eds) Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Wiley, Chichester
Machery, E (2022) Should we really engineer confused, unclear, or otherwise deficient concepts? The case of scientific concepts. Paper presented at the Applied Conceptual Engineering online talks (Arché), 10 March 2022.
Peirce CS (1868) Some consequences of four incapacities. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2:140–157, quoted from: Hartshorne C, Weiss P (eds) The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol.5: Pragmatism and Pragmaticism (1934). Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Peirce CS (1878) The probability of induction. Popular Science Monthly 12:705–718, quoted from: Hartshorne C, Weiss P (eds) The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol. II: Elements of Logic (1931). Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Plunkett D, Sundell T (2013) Disagreement and the semantics of normative and evaluative terms. Philosophers’ Imprint 13(23):1–37
Plunkett D, Sundell T (2021) Metasemantic negotiation and speaker error. Inquiry 64(1–2):142–167. 10.1080/0020174X.2019.1610055 DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2019.1610055
Putnam H (1975a) The meaning of ‘meaning.’ In: Putnam Hilary (ed) Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 215–271 DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511625251.014
Putnam H (1975b) Language and reality. In: Putnam Hilary (ed) Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, vol 2. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 272–290 DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511625251.015
Putnam H (1994) Aristotle after Wittgenstein. In: Conant J (ed) Words and Life. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp 62–81
Recanati F (1997) Can we believe what we do not understand? Mind Lang 12:84–100. 10.1111/1468-0017.00037 DOI: 10.1111/1468-0017.00037
Sawyer S (2003) Conceptual errors and social externalism. Philos Q 53(211):265–273. 10.1111/1467-9213.00311 DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00311
Vermeulen I (2018) Verbal disputes and the varieties of verbalness. Erkenntnis 83(2):331–348. 10.1007/s10670-017-9892-4
Wikforss A (2001) Social externalism and conceptual errors. Philos Q 51(203):217–231. 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2001.00225.x DOI: 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2001.00225.x
Wikforss A (2017) Incomplete understanding of concepts. Oxford Handbooks Online https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/42642/chapter/358147130. (10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.013.49)
Wittgenstein L (1953) Philosophical Investigations. In: Anscombe GEM, Rhees R (eds) Translated by GEM Anscombe. Blackwell, Oxford
