Franz Brentano; Philosophy of Mind; Psychology Without a Soul; Phenomenology; Descriptive Psychology; Metaphysics; Substance
Abstract :
[en] Brentano is usually considered, in F.A. Lange's well-known phrase, a "psychologist without a soul." Yet, in a letter to Carl Stumpf dated 10 February 1876, he writes: “I certainly do not want to be counted among (the psychologists without a soul)“ (Brentano and Stumpf 2014, 162). This paper argues that this statement should be taken seriously. Mental phenomena, for Brentano, are best conceived of as accidents of a mental substance. The paper presents Brentano's phenomenological arguments to that effect and draws some implications for a correct understanding of Brentano's theory of mind.
Research Center/Unit :
Phénoménologies - ULiège
Disciplines :
Philosophy & ethics
Author, co-author :
Dewalque, Arnaud ; Université de Liège - ULiège > Département de philosophie > Phénoménologies
Language :
English
Title :
Are Mental Phenomena Accidents of a Mental Substance?
