Philosophy of Mind; G.F. Stout; G.E. Moore; Bertrand Russell; C.D. Burns; Cambridge School
Abstract :
[en] Call Experientialism the view that experience is constitutive of mentality. This view was once prominent in the Cambridge School of analysis. Drawing on considerations offered by Cambridge philosophers, this chapter features three independent arguments for experientialism, to wit: the implication argument, the dependence argument, and the argument from non-objectual awareness. All three arguments, it is suggested, lead to experientialism from a different route: the first rests on logical, the second on metaphysical, and the third on phenomenological considerations. This paper offers a reconstruction and critical assessment of each of them.
Research Center/Unit :
Phénoménologies - ULiège
Disciplines :
Philosophy & ethics
Author, co-author :
Dewalque, Arnaud ; Université de Liège - ULiège > Département de philosophie > Phénoménologies
Language :
English
Title :
Three Cambridge Arguments for Experientialism
Publication date :
31 May 2023
Event name :
Marking the Mark of the Mental
Event organizer :
Alberto Voltolini
Event place :
Turin, Italy
Event date :
29 May - 1 June 2023
Event number :
International Final Conference PRIN Project 2017P9E9NF
By request :
Yes
Audience :
International
Name of the research project :
MIND — The British Sources of Philosophy of Mind 1888-1949
