George F. Stout; Analytic Philosophy; Philosophy of Perception; Intentionality; Sensory Qualities; Cambridge Philosophy
Abstract :
[en] G.F. Stout argues that secondary qualities—color, sound, taste, odor, heat, cold, and the likes—are physically real: “There is no reason,” he writes, “why the physical world, should not be pervaded through and through by secondary qualities” (Stout 1931, 281). I reconstruct his argument for this thesis and argue that it rests on a distinctively Brentanian premise, namely the claim that our sensory experiences, however basic, typically exhibit some internal complexity (the so-called act-content-object structure). I explicate how this claim is employed to support the physical reality of secondary qualities, and how it puts Stout in a position to reconcile common sense and science by accommodating two sets of apparently conflicting data in his theory.
Research Center/Unit :
Phénoménologies - ULiège Traverses - ULiège
Disciplines :
Philosophy & ethics
Author, co-author :
Dewalque, Arnaud ; Université de Liège - ULiège > Département de philosophie > Phénoménologies
Language :
English
Title :
G.F. Stout on Secondary Qualities
Publication date :
23 April 2022
Event name :
Secondary Qualities in the Austro-German Tradition and Beyond, Opening conference of the DFG Emmy Noether Project ‘A Sensible World’
Event organizer :
Humboldt University Berlin (H. Taïeb org.)
Event place :
Berlin, Germany
Event date :
21-23 April 2022
By request :
Yes
Audience :
International
Name of the research project :
MIND — The British Sources of Philosophy of Mind 1888-1949