The Transparency of Attitudes: An Experiential Account

It is sometimes pointed out that one typically comes to distinguish between attitude types (supposing, wishing, hoping, and the like) by directing one’s attention at intentional objects. Call this the Transparency of Attitudes (TA). Assuming this is correct, how is TA possible? This paper aims to create a presumption in favor of an experiential account of attitude-type discrimination. To begin, the following argument by elimination is offered, and briefly discussed: (1) there are only three ways of explaining TA, namely in terms of (i) inference, (ii) rationality, or (iii) awareness; (2) (i) does not work; (3) (ii) does not work; therefore, (4) the only way of explaining TA is in terms of awareness. Drawing on insights from Brentano, I then proceed to sketch an experiential account of attitude awareness. The account has two main elements. First, attitudes are experienced ‘on the side’ (side awareness). Next, they are experienced more or less confusedly (confusedness). Each element is briefly presented and motivated.