Introspective knowledge by acquaintance

Giustina, Anna

doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03578-1

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Introspective knowledge by acquaintance

Giustina, Anna

2022 • In Synthese, 200 (2)

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https://hdl.handle.net/2268/290447

DOI
10.1007/s11229-022-03578-1

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Keywords :

Philosophy

Abstract :

[en] Introspective knowledge by acquaintance is (roughly) knowledge we have by being directly aware of our phenomenally conscious states. In this paper, I argue that introspective knowledge by acquaintance is a sui generis kind of knowledge: it is irreducible to any sort of propositional knowledge and is wholly constituted (rather than merely enabled) by a relationship of introspective acquaintance. My main argument is that this is the best explanation of some epistemic facts about phenomenal consciousness and introspection. In particular, it best explains the epistemic asymmetry between a subject who has never had a certain phenomenal state and one who has. I also consider two theoretical objections to my claim: an objection from disunity and an objection from mysteriousness. I show that these objections can be answered and that introspective knowledge by acquaintance being sui generis remains a live option on the table.

Disciplines :

Philosophy & ethics

Author, co-author :

Giustina, Anna ; Université de Liège - ULiège > Département de philosophie > Phénoménologies

Language :

English

Title :

Introspective knowledge by acquaintance

Publication date :

2022

Journal title :

Synthese

ISSN :

0039-7857

eISSN :

1573-0964

Publisher :

Springer Science and Business Media B.V.

Volume :

200

Issue :

Peer reviewed :

Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi

Additional URL :

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11229-022-03578-1.pdf

Funders :

ANR - Agence Nationale de la Recherche [FR]

Funding text :

This work was supported by the French National Research Agency?s grants ANR-10-IDEX-0001-02 PSL and ANR-17-EURE-0017 FrontCog. For extensive and thorough comments to previous drafts, and for helping me develop this paper?s ideas, I am infinitely grateful to Uriah Kriegel. I am also grateful to Matt Duncan, Andrew Lee, Fran?ois R?canati, and Charles Siewert for their comments on a previous draft, and to two anonymous referees for Synthese. This paper has benefitted from being presented at the Columbia University Graduate Workshop , at the 21st Annual CUNY Graduate Philosophy Conference , at the IUSS NeTS epistemology and philosophy of mind seminar in Pavia, at The 13th SIFA conference ?Philosophical Perspectives? in Novara, at the Knowledge and Science seminar in Hamburg, and at the 6th Diaphora workshop: Self-Knowledge in Paris. I am grateful to the audiences there and particularly to Alberto Barbieri, Silvia Bianchi, Michel Croce, Michele di Francesco, Katalin Farkas, Manuel Garc?a-Carpintero, Marie Guillot, Matthew Heeney, Yarran Hominh, Ethan Jacobs, Matt Jope, Ben Koons, Uriah Kriegel, Thomas Kroedel, Yifan Li, Jorge Morales, Devin Morse, Michael Murez, Peter Pagin, Michele Palmira, David Papineau, Giulia Piredda, Nicolas Porot, Andrew Richmond, Andrea Sereni, Sergiu Spatan, Alfredo Tomasetta, and Helen Zhao.This work was supported by the French National Research Agency’s grants ANR-10-IDEX-0001-02 PSL and ANR-17-EURE-0017 FrontCog. For extensive and thorough comments to previous drafts, and for helping me develop this paper’s ideas, I am infinitely grateful to Uriah Kriegel. I am also grateful to Matt Duncan, Andrew Lee, François Récanati, and Charles Siewert for their comments on a previous draft, and to two anonymous referees for Synthese. This paper has benefitted from being presented at the Columbia University Graduate Workshop, at the 21st Annual CUNY Graduate Philosophy Conference, at the IUSS NeTS epistemology and philosophy of mind seminar in Pavia, at The 13th SIFA conference ‘Philosophical Perspectives’ in Novara, at the Knowledge and Science seminar in Hamburg, and at the 6th Diaphora workshop: Self-Knowledge in Paris. I am grateful to the audiences there and particularly to Alberto Barbieri, Silvia Bianchi, Michel Croce, Michele di Francesco, Katalin Farkas, Manuel García-Carpintero, Marie Guillot, Matthew Heeney, Yarran Hominh, Ethan Jacobs, Matt Jope, Ben Koons, Uriah Kriegel, Thomas Kroedel, Yifan Li, Jorge Morales, Devin Morse, Michael Murez, Peter Pagin, Michele Palmira, David Papineau, Giulia Piredda, Nicolas Porot, Andrew Richmond, Andrea Sereni, Sergiu Spatan, Alfredo Tomasetta, and Helen Zhao.

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