Compare the well-known analysis of Henry Sumner Maine at the end of the nineteenth century with that of Wolfgang Gaston Friedmann a hundred years on. A selection of illustrative texts of both authors is included in R. Feenstra / M. Ahsmann, ontract, Aspecten van de begrippen contract en contractsvrijheid in historisch perspectief, [Rechtshistorische Cahiers, 2], Deventer 1988 2, p. 61-66, num. 43-45.
An obvious exponent is G. Gilmore, The death of contract, Columbus 1974. Interesting refections are also contained in P. S. Atiyah, The rise and fall of freedom of contract, Oxford 1979.
J. Gordley, Foundations of private law: property, tort, contract, unjust enrichment, Oxford 2006.
See C. Fried, Contract as promise, A theory of contractual obligation, Cambridge Mass. 1981,
and R. Posner, Economic analysis of law, Boston 1972, respectively.
Thus the diagnosis of James Gordley in his groundbreaking Philosophical origins of modern contract doctrine, Oxford 1991, p. 230-248.
See the diverging appreciations of the Philosophical origins, which range from Italo Birocchi's sceptical review in Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, 61 (1993), p. 132-137, to David Ibbetson's most enthusiastic reading in The Journal of Legal History, 17 (1996), p. 188-191.
Prior to Gordley, the relevance of the scholastics' treatment of contract law had been underligned by H. Tieme, Natürliches Privatrecht und Spätscholastik, in: H. Tieme (ed.), Ideengeschichte und Rechtsgeschichte, Gesammelte Schriften, Band II, [Forschungen zur neueren Privatrechtsgeschichte, 25], Köln-Wien 1986 [1953], p. 871-908;
M. Diesselhorst, Die Lehre des Hugo Grotius vom Versprechen, [Forschungen zur neueren Privatrechtsgeschichte, 6], Köln-Graz 1959, passim;
F. Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutschen Entwicklung, Göttingen 1967, p. 293-297;
R. Feenstra, L'influence de la Scolastique espagnole sur Grotius en droit privé: quelques expériences dans des questions de fond et de forme, concernant notamment les doctrines de l'erreur et de l'enrichissement sans cause, in: P. Grossi (ed.), La seconda scolastica nella formazione del diritto privato moderno, [Per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno, 1], Milano 1973, p. 377-402, reprinted in his Fata iuris romani, Leiden 1974, p. 338-363;
P. Cappellini, Sulla formazione del moderno concetto di 'dottrina generale del diritto', Quaderni forentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno, 10 (1981), p. 323-354,
and I. Birocchi, Saggi sulla formazione storica della categoria generale del contratto, Cagliari 1988, p. 36-41.
Of late, A. Somma paid some attention to Molina and Lessius in his Autonomia privata e struttura del consenso contrattuale, Aspetti storico-comparativi di una vicenda concettuale, [Problemi di diritto comparato, 4], Milano 2000, p. 71-73.
Another recent contribution on Jesuit contract doctrine is A. Guzmán Brito, La doctrina de Luis de Molina sobra la causa contractual, in: A. Guzmán Brito, Negocio, contrato y causa en la tradición del derecho europeo e iberoamericano, Navarra 2005, p. 407-439.
Of interest, too, is Tomas Duve's Kanonisches Recht und die Ausbildung allgemeiner Vertragslehren in der Spanischen Spätscholastik, in: O. Condorelli / F. Roumy / M. Schmoeckel (eds.), Der Einfluss der Kanonistik auf die europäische Rechtskultur, [Norm und Struktur], Köln 2009 [forthcoming]; I am grateful to Professor Duve for his willingness to provide me with a draft version of his paper. In the last two decades early modern scholastic legal thought has also been the subject of several monographs.
See, amongst others, M.F. Renoux-Zagamé, Origines théologiques du concept moderne de propriété, [Travaux de droit, d'économie, de sciences politiques, de sociologie et d'anthropologie, 153], Genève 1987;
J. Hallebeek, The concept of unjust enrichment in late scholasticism, [Rechtshistorische reeks van het Gerard Noodt Instituut, 35], Nijmegen, 1996;
F. Grunert / K. Seelmann (eds.), Die Ordnung der Praxis, Neue Studien zur Spanischen Spätscholastik, [Frühe Neuzeit, 68], Tübingen 2001;
M.I. Zorroza / H. Rodríguez-Penelas (eds.), Francisco García, Tratado utilísimo y muy general de todos los contratos (1583), [Colección de pensamiento medieval y renacentista, 46], Pamplona 2003;
H. Maihold, Strafe für fremde Schuld?, Die Systematisierung des Strafbegriffs in der Spanischen Spätscholastik und Naturrechtslehre, [Konflikt, Verbrechen und Sanktion in der Gesellschaft Alteuropas, Symposien und Synthesen, 9], Köln 2005;
and J.Q. Whitman, The origins of reasonable doubt, Teological roots of the criminal trial, New Haven-London 2008.
With regard to particular issues in contract law like the vices of the will, Robert Feenstra has convincingly argued in his De oorsprong van Hugo de Groot's leer over de dwaling, in: L. Jacob (ed.), Met eerbiedigende werking, Opstellen aangeboden aan Prof. Mr. L.J. Hijmans van den Bergh, Deventer 1971, p. 87-101, that Grotius is still more heavily indebted to Lessius and the early modern theologians than Malte Diesselhorst (supra, n. 7)., had suggested. Martin Josef Schermaier claims that the present doctrine of error in the ABGB is closer to Lessius than to Grotius and the protestant natural lawyers; cf. Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums von den Glossatoren bis zum BGB, [Forschungen zur neueren Privatrechtsgeschichte, 29], Wien- Köln-Weimar 2000, p. 143. From a more general philosophical point of view, there is no over-stressing Franco Todescan's warning that natural lawyers like Pufendorf were more inspired by the early modern, Catholic theologians than they were willing to acknowledge themselves;
see Le radici teologiche del giusnaturalismo laico, III: Il problema della secolarizzazione nel pensiero giuridico di Samuel Pufendorf, [Per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno, 57], Milano 2001, p. 5-6.
An expression literally fguring in Lessius, De iustitia et iure ceterisque virtutibus cardinalibus, Antverpiae 1621, lib. 2, cap. 17, dubit. 6, num. 43, p. 203.
The need to study the Jesuits as a distinct branch within the vast corpus of early modern scholasticism has been stressed by Sven Knebel, Wille, Würfel und Wahrscheinlichkeit: Das System der moralischen Notwendigkeit in der Jesuitenscholastik, [Paradeigmata, 21], Hamburg 2000. This is not to say, however, that the Jesuits' doctrines are a monolithic bloc.
On the life and times of Lenaert Leys (Leonardus Lessius), born near Antwerp and professor of moral theology at the Jesuit College of Leuven from 1585 to 1600, see T. Van Houdt / W. Decock, Leonardus Lessius: traditie en vernieuwing, Antwerpen 2005.
Less recent and somewhat biased is the hagiographic account provided by C. Van Sull, Léonard Lessius de la Compagnie de Jésus (1554-1623), [Museum Lessianum, Section Téologique, 21], Louvain-Paris-Bruxelles 1930.
From a methodological point of view, his compelling role as a bridge-figure between the renaissance of theological and legal thought on the sixteenth century Iberian peninsula, and the northern natural law traditions of the seventeenth century is sufficiently known from the various contributions by Robert Feenstra. His treatise De iustitia et iure was first published in Leuven by Masius in 1605, but the Plantin-Moretus printing house was eager to get Lessius publish subsequent editions with them. In this paper, the ffth edition (1621) is taken as a starting point, given that it was the last edition Lessius could revise during his life. An overview of all the Antwerp, Lyon, Paris, Douai, Milan, Brescia and Venice editions of Lessius's De iustitia et iure up till the 19th century is included in T. Van Houdt, Leonardus Lessius over lening, intrest en woeker, De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 20: editie, vertaling en commentaar, [Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, 60], Brussel 1998, p. XVIII-XXV.
Francisco Suárez, De legibus ac Deo legislatore, in: Opera omnia, editio nova a Carolo Berton, Parisiis (apud Vives) 1856, tom. 5, Prooemium, p. IX-X;
and De defensione fidei catholicae, in: Opera omnia, editio nova a Carolo Berton, Parisiis (apud Vives) 1859, tom. 24, lib. 3, cap. 2, num. 1, p. 206.
See, for example, Suárez, De legibus ac Deo legislatore, lib. 3, cap. 21, num. 6, p. 258.
The concept of a 'state of nature' already fgures in scholastic writings prior to Suárez to refect upon the question what man would be like if there were no grace and divine revelation. Yet, as a method of considering the bases and necessity of political power, it first emerges in Suárez and Hobbes, as Harro Höpf points out in his Scholasticism in Quentin Skinner's 'Foundations', in: A. Brett / J. Tully / H. Hamilton-Bleakley (eds.), Rethinking the foundations of modern political thought, Cambridge 2006, p. 127-128.
Thus a basic principle of Suárez's political theory as it was directed against lutheranism and the absolutist tendencies of James I Stuart. See, for instance, De defensione fidei catholicae, lib. 3, cap. 1, num. 5, p. 207. In interpreting the famous 'lex regia' (Dig. 1,4,1 and Inst. 1,2), Suárez insists on the contractual origins of political power, cf. De defensione fidei catholicae, lib. 3, cap. 1, num. 12, p. 210. Drawing on his master's political thought, Lessius would describe the relationship between the governor and the governed in terms of an employment contract in De iustitia et iure, 2,1,3,13, p. 17: 'Tota respublica se habet ad principem sicut particularis persona ad custodem, quem stipendio ad se tuendum et custodiendum conduxit; et ob hanc causam maxime procuratio boni communis pertinet ad illum. Lessius had taken lessons with Suárez during his stay at the Collegio Romano from May 1583 till April 1584.
Cf. Suárez, De legibus ac Deo legislatore, lib. 3, cap. 24, num. 2, p. 269.
On the hierchical relationship between natural and positive law, see Suárez, De legibus ac Deo legislatore, lib. 3, cap. 21, num. 10, p. 259-260. Compare with Tomas Aquinas, Summa Teologiae, IaIIae, quaest. 96, art. 4.
We have elaborated on this in Counter-Reformation diplomacy behind Suárez's constitutionalist theory, in: A. Botero Bernal / R. Narvaez (eds.), Actas del Primer encuentro latinoamericano de historia del derecho y la justicia [forthcoming].
As to liability, see De iustitia et iure, 2,7,7,33-34, and 2,13,10,77-78. In De iustitia et iure 2,35,13,79, Lessius has it that certainly in contractual matters, just like a professional lawyer a confessor can demand a price for his advice.
Although Archduke Albert is said to have always carried Lessius's De iustitia et iure enthusiastically with him, his rejection of Lessius's Defensio potestatis summi pontificis (in which political views similar to those of Suárez are espoused) is known to have been equally strong; see T. Van Houdt, Leonardus Lessius over lening, intrest en woeker, De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 20, Editie, vertaling en studie, Leuven 1995 [PhD], vol. 2, p. 305-306.
See J.W. O'Malley, The first Jesuits, Cambridge Mass.-London 1994, p. 249.
Compare J. Belda Plans, La escuela de Salamanca y la renovación de la teología en el siglo XVI, [Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos Maior, 63], Madrid 2000, p. 858-860.
A similar observation is made by Paolo Grossi in La proprietà nel sistema privatistico della Seconda Scolastica, in: P. Grossi (ed.), La seconda scolastica nella formazione del diritto privato moderno, [Per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno, 1], Milano 1973, p. 117-222.
MHSI, Constitutiones 3, p. 191 (= pt. VI, c. 3, s. 7).
Scant biographical details on Ignaz Schwarz, who served as a history professor at the University of Ingolstadt, are provided by C. Sommervogel, Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus, tom. 7, Bruxelles-Paris 1896, col. 946-949.
Unfortunately, no further information on Schwarz can be gained from the standard survey of early modern German political and administrative thought by M. Stolleis, Geschichte des öfentlichen Rechts in Deutschland, Band I: 1600-1800, München 1988, although it does contain a fundamental introduction to German experiments with ius publicum universale in the seventeenth and eigteenth centuries which will prove indispensable for anyone with an interest in exploring Schwarz's political thought in its proper intellectual context; cf. p. 291-297.
On Sánchez, see J.M. Viejo-Himénez, s.v. Sánchez, in: M.J. Peláez (ed.), Diccionario crítico de juristas españoles, portugueses y latinoamericanos (hispánicos, brasileños, quebequenses y restantes francófonos), 2.1, Zaragoza-Barcelona 2006, p. 480-481.
The full title of the Lyon-edition (1663) is even more emblematic of the fusion of the entire legal and theological tradition into a single legal science: 'De universa rerum humanarum negotiatione tractatio scientifica, utrique foro perutilis. Ex iure naturali, ecclesiastico, civili, romano, et gallico. In qua negotiorum humanorum aequitas per omnes negotiationis causas, materias, formas universales ac singulares contractuum, commerciorum, atque sunallagmatoon diversa genera, ex iisque ortas obligationes, scientifice et solide explicatur, humanarum scientiarum et artium rectus ac pravus usus demonstratur, singulorum statuum, oficiorum ac munerum rationes, atque adeo universa oeconomica et politica traduntur'.
Again, the full title as taken from the Lyon-edition (1670) is even more telling: 'Scientia canonica et hieropolitica. Opus novum, in tres tomos partitum, in quo singula, quae toto corpore iuris Pontificii sparsa sunt, ad certa, et indubitata principia reducuntur; et ex illis innumerae quaestiones, ad forum tum internum, tum externum pertinentes, facile et solide, quamvis non semper ex vulgi sensu, explicantur. Privati Galliae mores, ac iura cum Romanis conciliantur: universa denique moralis Teologia, ex certis, et constantibus scholasticae principiis, Patrum sensu, et ecclesiasticis legibus docetur'. It should be noted that C. Sommervogel, Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus, Bruxelles-Paris 1892, tom. 3, col. 1401, num. 7 wrongfully made reference to the title of this work as being 'Sententia canonica et hieropolitica, etc.' - a mistake copied by P. Duclos, s.v. Gibalin, in: C. O'Neill - J. Domínguez (eds.), Diccionario histórico de la Compañía de Jesús biográfico-temático, vol. 2, Roma-Madrid 2001, p. 1727,
and by B. Basdevant-Gaudemet, s.v. Gibalin, in: P. Arabeyre / J.L. Halpérin / J. Krynen (eds.), Dictionnaire historique des juristes français XIIe-XXe siècle, Paris 2007, p. 365.
See P. Legendre, L'inscription du droit canon dans la théologie, Remarques sur la Seconde Scolastique, in S. Kuttner / K. Pennington (eds.), Proceedings of the fifth international congress of medieval canon law, Salamanca, 21-25 September 1976, [Monumenta iuris canonici, Series C: subsidia, 6], Città del Vaticano 1980, p. 443-454.
Pedro de Oñate, a student of Suárez at Alcalá de Henares, became provincial of the Jesuit order in Paraguay in 1615. By the end of his term, he had co-founded the University of Córdoba (Argentina) and eleven colleges. In 1624 he was designated professor of moral theology at the Colegio San Pablo in Lima (Peru). His monumental treatise on both general and particular contract doctrine, in part published after his death, amounts to a synthesis of the early modern scholastic doctrine of contract, see E. Holthöfer, Die Literatur zum gemeinen und partikularen Recht in Italien, Frankreich, Spanien und Portugal, in: H. Coing (ed.), Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren europäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte, 2.1, München 1977, p. 368 and p. 491;
and E. Fernández, s.v. Oñate, in: C. O'Neill / J. Domínguez (eds.), Diccionario histórico de la Compañí a de Jesús biográfico-temático, vol. 3, Roma-Madrid 2001, p. 2870- 2871.
Against the background of their direct influence on Grotius's development of the idea of subjective rights, the Jesuits Molina, Suárez, and Lessius are discussed by P. Haggenmacher, Droits subjectifs et système juridique chez Grotius, in: L. Foisneau (éd.), Politique, droit et théologie chez Bodin, Grotius et Hobbes, Paris 1997, p. 73-130. Another indispensable study on the Iberian and scholastic roots of the concept of subjective rights is A. Folgado, Evolución histórica del concepto del derecho subjetivo, Estudio especial en los teòlogos-juristas españoles del siglo XVI, [Pax juris, Escurialensium Utriusque Studiorum Scerpta, 4], Madrid 1960.
More recent publications on the subject include A. Brett, Liberty, right and nature: individual rights in later scholastic thought, [Ideas in Context, 44], Cambridge 1997,
F. Carpintero Benítez's El derecho subjetivo en su historia, Cádiz 2003, and the contributions by Hartung, Kaufmann, Pessoa, Schüssler, Seelmann, and Tosi in: M. Kaufmann / R. Schnepf (eds.), Politische Metaphysik, Die Entstehung moderner Rechtskonzeptionen in der Spanischen Scholastik, [Treffpunkt Philosophie, 8], Frankfurt am Main et al. 2007.
On Avendaño, see A. Muñoz García, Diego de Avendaño (1594-1688), filosofía, moralidad, derecho y política en el Perú colonial, [Fondo editorial Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Serie Humanidades], Lima 2003.
Cf. M.W.F. Stone / T. Van Houdt, Probabilism and its methods: Leonardus Lessius and his contribution to the development of Jesuit casuistry, Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses, 75 (1999), p. 363-364. In preparing these practical courses, Lessius made extensive use of the canonist Martín de Azpilcueta's (Dr. Navarrus) Manuale confessariorum et poenitentium, on which he also wrote an unpublished commentary.
See the analysis made by Paolo Prodi in Una storia della giustizia, Dal pluralismo dei fori al moderno dualismo tra coscienza e diritto, Bologna 2000.
See the various contributions, particularly the one by R.H. Helmholz on Contracts and the canon law, included in: J. Barton (ed.), Towards a general law of contract, [Comparative studies in continental and Anglo-American legal history, 8], Berlin 1990.
On the use of the term 'confessional Catholicism', see J.W. O'Malley, Trent and all that, Renaming Catholicism in the early modern era, Cambridge Mass. 2002, p. 119-145.
J. Valero, Differentiae inter utrumque forum, iudiciale videlicet et conscientiae, Cartusiae Maioricarum 1616, s.v. sententia, num. 1, p. 323: 'Iudex ferens sententiam extra locum consuetum et territorium proprium nulliter agit. [...] At parochus ubicumque locorum et terrarum potest audire confessiones suorum parochianorum et eos absolvere. [...]'. A graduate from the universities of Valencia and Salamanca, Juan de Valero was the head of the Carthusian monastery of Palma de Mallorca from 1613 till 1621, where he was closely connected to the Jesuits as can be seen from a letter Michael Julian (1557-1621), the rector of the Jesuit college at Mallorca, wrote to Valero and which was conceived as a dedication to the Diferentiae. It is no coincidence either that Valero heavily draws on Leonardus Lessius all along his treatise. More biographical details can be found in A. Gruys, Cartusiana, 1: Bibliographie générale et auteurs cartusiens, Paris 1976, p. 169.
Cf. T. Van Houdt, De economische ethiek van de Zuid-Nederlandse jezuïet Leonardus Lessius (1554-1623): een geval van jezuïtisme?, De zeventiende eeuw, 14 (1998), p. 27-37.
Valero, Differentiae, praeludia, rubr. ad num. 2, p.1: 'Forus interior et conscientiae est duplex, alter spectans ad sacramentum poenitentiae, alter ad sedandam animam ab scrupulis et eius obligationibus extra sacramentum'.
Cf. M.W.F. Stone, Scrupulosity, probabilism and conscience, The origins of the debate in early modern scholasticism, in: H. Braun / E. Vallance (eds.), Contexts of conscience in early modern Europe, 1500-1700, London 2004, p. 4.
On the thirteenth century roots of this distinction, see D. Witschen, Zur Bestimmung supererogatorischer Handlungen, Der Beitrag des Tomas von Aquin, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Teologie, 51 (2004), p. 27-40.
The praeceptum-consilium pair already played a vital role in the Franciscan Pierre Jean d'Olivi's (1248-1298) treatise on contracts, see S. Piron, Le devoir de gratitude: émergence et vogue de la notion d'antidora au XIIIe siècle, in: D. Quaglioni / G. Todeschini / M. Varanini (eds.), Credito e usura fra teologia, diritto e amministrazione (sec. XII-XVI), [Collection de l'École française de Rome, 346], Rome 2005, p. 73-101.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,2,9, p. 20: 'Ius naturale dicitur quod ex ipsis rerum naturis oritur, scilicet ex natura rationali et naturali conditione operum de quibus hoc ius disponit. Unde eius rectitudo, supposita existentia naturae humanae, non pendet ex aliqua libera ordinatione Dei vel hominis, sed ex ipsa rerum natura'.
On the late scholastic origins of Grotius's 'impious hypothesis', see A. Dufour, Les Magni Hispani dans l'œuvre de Grotius, in: F. Grunert / K. Seelmann (eds.), Die Ordnung der Praxis, Neue Studien zur Spanischen Spätscholastik, [Frühe Neuzeit, 68], Tübingen 2001, p. 351-380.
Valero, Differentiae, praeludia, num. 24-25, p. 3: 'Naturalis tantum obligatio est duplex, ut constat ex D. Toma 2.2., quaest. 106, art. 4, 5, 6. Una, quae est vera et propria, ex iure et lege naturae producta, quae in re gravi obligat in conscientia sub poena peccati mortalis. [...] Altera est naturalis obligatio, quae ab honestate morali deducitur, insurgitque ex honestate et debito morali. Ut est illa recipientis beneficium qua quis tenetur ad antidora et ad gratam remunerationem loco et tempore convenienti'.
Valero, Differentiae, praeludia, num. 4-5, p. 1: 'Observa quod lex civilis seu forus contentiosus solum intendit conservationem patrimonii, et non curat de salute animae, ut docet Innocentius in c. sicut dignum, num. 5 de homicidio [X 5,12,6]. Et ideo non mirum si multis differentiis (de quibus infra late agetur) differat forus contentiosus a foro animae et interiori, cum contentiosus, ut praediximus, non curet nisi de reservando patrimonio. Forus vero animae solum et principaliter intendat servare animam a peccato. Et etiam curat de restitutione alieni patrimonii, si casus talis sit, quod ad liberandum animam a peccato, sit ei necessarium restituere aliquid, cum dimitti nequeat peccatum, nisi restituatur ablatum, cap. si res aliena, 15 [sic], q. 6 [C. 14, q. 6, c. 1]'.
Cf. Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,7,10 and Augustinus, Epistula 153, num. 20 [PL 33]: 'Si enim res aliena, propter quam peccatum est, cum reddi possit, non redditur, non agitur poenitentia, sed fingitur: si autem veraciter agitur, non remittetur peccatum, nisi restituatur ablatum; sed, ut dixi, cum restitui potest'.
Valero, Differentiae, praeludia, num. 15, p. 2: 'Ubicumque quis est ligatus et tenetur aliquid restituere vel facere in foro conscientiae, si id non faciat vel restituat - licet ad id non teneatur in foro iudiciali nec compelli in eo possit - remedium esse adire Ecclesiam per denunciationem evangelicam seu iudicialem. Ut deducitur ex Abba [Panormitano] in c. quia plerique, num. 17 ante secundum casum, de immunitate ecclesiarum [X 3,49,8]. Ad iudicem quippe ecclesiasticum spectat impedire peccatum vel ab eo liberare, cap. novit, de iudiciis [X 2,1,13], Abbas [Panor-mitanus] in cap. 1, num. 2 de pactis [X 1,35,1].
Valero, Differentiae, praeludia, num. 16, p. 2: 'Et ad istam denunciationem tradit regulam notabile Petrus de Ancharano consilio 5, incip. Pro parte, ubi dicit quod ubi quis potest conveniri in foro ecclesiastico per dictam viam denunciationis, multo magis poterit excludi exceptione malae fidei in foro civili. Quia exceptiones descendentes ex aequitate canonica debet secularis iudex admittere, cap. licet de iureriurando, lib. 6 [VI 2,11,2], cap. 2 de exceptionibus eodem libro [VI 2,12,2]. Quod commendat Felinus [Sandaeus] d. cap. fin. num. 3 in fin. de praescriptionibus [X 2,26,20]'.
See Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,3,1,1-4.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,3,2,7, p. 22: 'Dominium est ius in re extendens se ad omnem eius usum seu dispositionem nisi lege prohibeatur'.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,4,10,57, p. 40: 'Dominium non est nisi in res eas quas nostra industria nobis possumus adsciscere. Has enim sicuti possumus acquirere, ita etiam relinquere. Atqui vitam nemo sua industria potest acquirere'.
Cf. Domingo de Soto, De iustitia et iure, Salmanticae 1562 [editio princeps: Salmanticae 1553-4], lib. 4, quaest. 2, art. 3, p. 284: 'Opinio ergo nostrae contraria [sc. Caietani] collocat honorem et famam in ordine vitae, nos autem in ordine bonorum exteriorum. (...) Homo vere ac legitime est suorum bonorum omnium dominus, ut citra cuiuspiam iniuriam, quae proprie sit contra iustitiam, possit illa dispendere ac negligere, illisque uti. Honor et fama sunt propria hominis bona, ei iure naturali concessa, atque ab ipso acquisita et aucta. Neque ulla iusticiae lege, si est privata persona, prohibetur illa dispendere'. Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,4,11,59-60.
See J. Gordley, Reconceptualizing the protection of dignity in early modern Europe: Greek philosophy meets Roman law, in: M. Ascheri e.a. (eds.), Ins Wasser geworfen und Ozeane durchquert, Festschrift für Knut Wolfgang Nörr, Köln-Weimar-Wien 2003, p. 281-305.
This case has already been made, incidentally, by H.M. Robertson in his Aspects of the rise of economic individualism: a criticism of Max Weber and his school, [Cambridge studies in economic history, 1], Cambridge 1933.
Compare F. Carpintero Benítez, Los escolasticos españoles en los inicios del liberalismo político y jurídico, Revista de estudios histórico-jurídicos, 25 (2003), p. 341-373,
and W. Decock, Lessius and the breakdown of the scholastic paradigm, Journal of the history of economic thought, 31 (2009), p. 57-78.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,21,21,151, p. 296: 'Nec refert quod hac ratione inducta sit caritas, quia etiam multitudo emptorum inducit caritatem, non tamen ideo illi emendo peccant contra iustitiam, quia actio illa ex qua provenit caritas non est contra iustitiam. Neque etiam supprimendo seu non vendendo, quia non tenetur ex iustitia tunc vendere, cum nullo pacto se ad hoc obligarint. Poterant enim eas in aliud tempus servare vel in alia loca deferre vel etiam vastare absque iniuria cuiusquam, quia perfectum dominium earum habebant. Neque cives habebant ius iustitiae ad eas emendas, nisi ipsis vendere volentibus, alioquin dicendum esset ipsos peccaturos fuisse contra iustitiam, si res suas in flumen proiecissent'.
Cf. Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,3,2,8, p. 22: 'Proprium est perfecti dominii ut possis re tua uti pro tuo arbitratu eam vel tibi servando vel vendendo vel donando vel vastando'. And o.c., 2,4,10,58, p. 40: 'Proprium veri dominii est rem pro arbitratu suo posse perimere etiam voluptatis causa'.
Juan de Lugo, Disputationes de iustitia et iure, Lugduni 1652, tom. 2, disp. 26, par. 2, num. 143, p. 303.
Gregorio de Valentia, Commentaria theologica in Secundam Secundae D. Tomae, Ingolstadii 1603, tom. 3, disp. 5, quaest. 10, punct. 5, litt. a-c, p. 1315.
Cf. Valero, Differentiae, s.v. peccatum, dif. 15;
s.v. obligatio, diff. 7;
s.v. venditio, diff. 5.
See Lessius, De gratia efficaci, decretis divinis, libertate arbitrii et praescientia Dei conditionata disputatio apologetica, Antverpiae 1610, cap. 5, num. 11, p. 53.
See W. Decock, The early modern scholarly debate on divine grace and justice in economic exchange, in K. Härter (ed.), Gnade, Vergebung und Gerechtigkeit in der frühen Neuzeit, [Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für europäische Rechtsgeschichte] [forthcoming].
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,6,3,11, p. 56.
Antonio Perez, De iustitia et iure et de poenitentia opus posthumum, Romae 1668, tract. 2, disp. 2, cap. 4, num. 78, p. 174. Perez, who studied arts and theology in Medina del Campo and Salamanca, succeeded Juan de Lugo in 1642 as a theology professor at the Collegio Romano; cf. J. Escalera, s.v. Perez, in C. O'Neill / J. Domínguez (eds.), Diccionario histórico de la Compañía de Jesús biográfico-temático, vol. 3, Roma-Madrid 2001, p. 3089-3090.
Dig. 43,33,1,1, and VI, reg. iur. 65.
Cf. Martín de Azpilcueta (Dr. Navarrus), De ablatorum restitutione, tom. 2, lib. 3, cap. 4: 'in dubiis, maxime in materia iustitiae, melior est conditio possidentis'. Also with regard to lying and mental reservation, Dr. Navarrus laid the foundations of much of the Jesuits' doctrines, certainly with Lessius.
Cf. B. de Medina, Expositiones in Primam secundae divi Tomae, quaest. 19, art. 6.
On the vicissitudes of probabilism as a moral problem solving method from Antiquity till modern times, see Rudolf Schüssler's magnum opus Moral im Zweifel, [Perspektiven der analytischen Philosophie, Neue Folge], Paderborn, Band I: Die scholastische Theorie des Entscheidens unter moralischer Unsicherheit, 2003,
and Band II: Die Herausforderung des Probabilismus, 2006.
On Soto's tutiorism, see T. Deman, Probabilisme, in Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, tom. 13, part. 1, Paris 1936, col. 460-461,
and M.W.F. Stone, The origins of probabilism in late scholastic moral thought, A prolegomenon to further study, Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales (Forschungen zur Theologie und Philosophie des Mittelalters), 67.1 (2000), p. 149-154.
Cf. R. Schüssler, Moral self-ownership and ius possessionis in late scholastics, in: V. Mäkinen / P. Korkman (eds.), Transformations in medieval and early modern rights discourse, [The new synthese historical library, Texts and studies in the history of philosophy, 59], Dordrecht 2006, p. 160.
For an in-depth study of this principle in both Suárez and Lessius, see M.W.F. Stone / T. Van Houdt, Probabilism and its methods: Leonardus Lessius and his contribution to the development of Jesuit casuistry, Ephemerides Teologicae Lovanienses, 75 (1999), p. 359-394.
Cf. T. Sanchez, Opus morale in praecepta Decalogi, Antverpiae 1614, tom. 1, lib. 1, cap. 10, num. 11, p. 41: 'Quae ratio aeque militat in cuiuscunque virtutis materia. Nam ex altera parte est aequale obligationis ius dubium, ex parte voluntatis, et ex parte illius virtutis; ex altera autem est ius certum possessionis libertatis pro voluntate, dum non probatur eius libertatis privatio obligatione aliqua contracta. Ergo idem dicendum est in cuiuscunque virtutis materia'.
ARSI, Censurae, tom. 3, 1603-1631, 654.
Juan de Salas, Disputationes in primam secundae, Barcinonae 1607, tom. 1, tract. 8, disp. 1, sect. 6, num. 67, p. 1205: 'ut in dubiis melior est conditio possidentis rem aliquam externam aut ius percipiendi aliquem fructum (...), ita etiam melior est conditio possidentis libertatem suam et ius efficiendi quod sibi utile fuerit'. A graduate from Salamanca and a theology proffessor at the Collegio Romano, he and his colleague Suárez were accused by Miguel Marcos of deviating too much from Tomas Aquinas's standard teaching; cf. V. Ordóñez, s.v. Salas, in C. O'Neill / J. Domínguez (eds.), Diccionario histórico de la Compañí a de Jesús biográfico-temático, vol. 4, Roma-Madrid 2001, p. 3467.
Ignaz Schwarz, Institutiones iuris universalis naturae et gentium, Venetiis 1760, part. 1, tit. 1, instruct. 5, par. 4, resp. 2, p. 126: 'Ista regula, quod melior sit conditio possidentis non tantum valet in materia
Perez, De iustitia et iure, tract. 2, disp. 2, cap. 4, num. 78, p. 174.
For example, Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,21,5,47.
Perez, De iustitia et iure, tract. 2, disp. 2, cap. 4, num. 100, p. 182: 'Ultimo idem probari potest, quia pars obligationi favens, est quasi actor, petit enim debitum; altera est quasi reus, defendit enim suam libertatem. At semper actoris est probatio, non vero rei: actor enim dicit sibi deberi; reus solum negat: negatio autem per rerum naturam probari non potest, ut passim iuris periti dicunt'.
Perez, De iustitia et iure, tract. 2, disp. 3, cap. 7, num. 122, p. 236: 'Quaritur primo, utrum qui non impedit damnum alterius, cum posset facile impedire, teneatur semper ad restitutionem? Caietanus verbo restitutio, et alii affirmant. Contraria sententia est communis, et vera, teste Lessio lib. 2, cap. 13, dubit. 10. Et ratio est, quia quando meam operam in alterius commodum non impendo, si ad id ex officio, aut contractu non tenear, nihil proprium illius, nihil ipsi ex iustitia debitum aufero: alioquin, si quando alius mea opera indiget, tenerer ex iustitia eam non omittere, non possem pro opera petita pretium exigere, quod est absurdum. Secundo, quia durissimum esset, omnes homines esse obligatos ex iustitia, et cum obligatione restitutionis ad praestandam mutuam operam, quando damnum timetur, cum ad finem societatis humanae sufficiat obligatio misericordiae et charitatis'.
On the Roman and medieval origins of the notion that a contract takes the place of law for the parties who make it, as well as Domat's programmatic restatement of it, see I. Birocchi, Notazioni sul contratto, Quaderni fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno, 19 (1990), p. 637-659.
Dig. 50,16,19.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,17,1,2, p. 195: 'Itaque contractus est signum externum practicum, ultrocitroque obligationem ex consensu contrahentium pariens, quod nomine Graeco [sc. synallagmati] clarius indicatur'.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,17,1,5, p. 196: 'Nos nomine contractus utimur hîc ample, ut idem sit quod pactum et comprehendat contractus gratuitos, qui sunt veluti semicontractus'.
Dig. 2,14,1.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,17,1,5, p. 196: 'Unde donatio et promissio, etiamsi a duobus communi consensu fant, antequam sint acceptatae et accedat consensus reciprocus eius in quem diriguntur, non habent rationem pacti: sed per acceptationem transeunt in pactum'.
Cf. J. Gordley, Philosophical origins, p. 79-82,
and R. Zimmermann, Ius commune, Europäische Rechtswissenschaft in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, in D. Heirbaut / G. Martyn (eds.), Napoleons nalatenschap: tweehonderd jaar Burgerlijk Wetboek in België / Un héritage napoléonien: bicentenaire du Code Civil en Belgique, Mechelen 2005, p. 408, n. 182.
An excellent overview of the development of the theory of the vestimenta pactorum from Piacentino up till André d'Exea is provided in I. Birocchi, Saggi sulla formazione storica della categoria generale del contratto, Cagliari 1988, p. 104-128, and, even more extensively, I. Birocchi, Causa e categoria generale del contratto, Un problema dogmatico nella cultura privatistica dell'età moderna, I: Il cinquecento, [Il Diritto nella Storia, 5], Torino 1997, p. 31-94. A thoroughgoing analysis of Medieval contract law has been made by R. Volante, Il sistema contrattuale del diritto comune classico, Struttura dei patti e individuazione del tipo, Glossatori e ultramontani, [Per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno, 60], Milano 2001.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,17,3,14.
A discussion of Lessius's view on dolus and contractus bonae fidei is included in M.F. Cursi, L'eredità dell'actio de dolo e il problema del danno meramente patrimoniale, Napoli 2008, p. 187-191.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,17,5,31, p. 199.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 17, dubit. 5, num. 31, p. 199: 'Itaque [C. 8,38,5] insinuat contractum bonae fidei non esse omnino nullum, sed posse rescindi'.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,17,5,31, p. 199: 'Notandum est contractus stricti iuris, quibus dolus causam dedit, iure civili dici validos, quia mero iure civili (ut distinguitur a iure praetorio) non datur actio ad talis contractus rescissionem (...). Iure tamen praetorio (quod est moderatio quaedam iuris civilis) etiam datur actio ad rescissionem contractus stricti iuris, cui dolus causam dedit, et ita iure praetorio etiam hic contractus est simili modo invalidus. Aequitas enim postulat ut possit rescindi'.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,26,2,11.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,17,4,21, and 2,19,3,26.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,19,4,49, p. 242: 'Nam in variis locis sunt variae leges et consuetudines, nec ubique servatur ius codicis vel digestorum'.
Suárez, De legibus ac Deo legislatore, lib. 3, cap. 8, num. 1-5.
Cf. M. Bellomo, L'Europa del diritto comune, Roma 1989, p. 235-236.
Pedro de Oñate, De contractibus, Romae 1646, tom. 1, disp. 2, sect. 5, num. 166, p. 40 [italics are mine]. I. Birocchi, Saggi, p. 54 rightly remarks that Oñate expresses a view which runs counter to the traditional explanation of the rationale behind the non-enforceability of naked pacts in Roman law (ne lites multiplicarentur).
See X 1,35,1. A most interesting contribution on the medieval canon law doctrine of contract is P. Landau's Pacta sunt servanda, Zu den kanonistischen Grundlagen der Privatautonomie, in: M. Ascheri e.a. (eds.), Ins Wasser geworfen und Ozeane durchquert, Festschrift für Knut Wolfgang Nörr, Köln-Weimar-Wien 2003, p. 457-474.
In addition to I. Birocchi's reference work Causa e categoria generale del contratto, a lot of interesting contributions on the history of the doctrine of 'causa' from Antiquity to present day law are collected in L. Vacca (ed.), Causa e contratto nella prospettiva storico-comparatistica, [Atti del Congresso Internazionale ARISTEC, Palermo, 7-8 giugno 1995], Torino 1997. A fresh outlook on the meaning of causa in Roman law is offered in L. Waelkens, Causa in D. 44,4,2,3, TR 75 (2007), p. 199-212.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,17,4,22-23, p. 198: 'Ius canonicum, cum sit conditum ad salutem animarum, respicit obligationem conscientiae, eamque iubet impleri, nisi forte praesumat errorem vel fraudem. Quam ob causam non concedit actionem ad exigendum promissum, nisi exprimatur causa cur sit promissum. (...) Alioquin non praesumit serio et libere promissum'.
Compare Valero, Differentiae, s.v. lex, diff. 11, num. 1, with Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,7,6,30, p. 79: 'nos loquimur in foro interiori, ubi praesumptio non habet locum'.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,17,4,19, p. 197: 'Omnis contractus, etiam nudus, sponte libereque factus, si contrahentes sint habiles, parit obligationem naturalem seu in foro conscientiae, ita ut parte invita non possis rescindere, nisi iure positivo sit irritus vel detur irritandi potestas'.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,17,4,20, p. 197: 'Ratio est, quia sicut duo homines privati seposito omni iure positivo possunt inter se statuere certas formulas et conditiones, sine quibus contractus eorum in posterum non censeantur validi, nec obligationem naturalem possint inducere, ita respublica, quae naturaliter est superior singulorum seu cui naturaliter competit potestas in singulos potest constituere huiusmodi conditiones, et consequenter principes saeculares, in quos suam potestatem respublica transtulit, multoque magis principes Ecclesiae, in iis quae ipsorum gubernationi subsunt, id possunt quatenus necesse est vel expedit ad bonum spirituale subditorum; hanc enim potestatem habent a Christo qui naturaliter supremus est omnium dominus'. We cannot afford to discuss the conditions the parties themselves are allowed to add to their agreement - there was a most interesting and heated debate about this issue in early modern scholasticism, which is apparent from the mere observation that Lessius's text of De iustitia et iure, 2,18,15 ('utrum promissio vel donatio conditionalis sit valida, et quam vim habeant conditiones appositae') considerably difers from one edition to another.
Suárez, De legibus, lib. 3, cap. 22, num. 9, p. 264: 'Nam qui fecit contractum jure humano irritum, ipso facto conscientia tenetur vel rem apud se non retinere, vel alium non obligare, vel denique non uti illo contractu ad alios effectus quos haberet si irritus non fuisset'.
As Lessius notes, this is a very tricky question, however, if only because it is difficult to determine whether a condition has been imposed for the sake of a particular group of persons ('droit impératif') or for the political community as a whole ('droit impératif d'ordre public'), see Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,17,7, 55-59.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,19,2 4.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,19,3,21.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,19,3,26.
Plinius Minor, Ep. 2.16 (ad Annianum);
Ep. 5.7 (ad Calvisium).
Nevertheless, he had made a convincing case for a general principle of consensualism before expressing the more safer view. What is more, he calls it justifiable (probabilis), attributes it to a vague set of authorities (quidam), and supports it by reference to custom (usus) - a strategy Lessius often follows for introducing his novel viewpoints. In addition, one of those indeterminate authorities Lessius refers to should be Bañez, but the very precise reference he gives to the latter's De iustitia et iure appears to be entirely false.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,19,3,35, p. 240: 'Nihilominus contrarium est iuri conformius et verius, nimirum huiusmodi actus et contractus, quibus deest solemnitas, sine qua lex illos absolute irritos decernit, non inducere obligationem naturalem, nisi forte alibi explicetur in iure, illam solemnitatem solum requiri ad probationem in iudicio, sicut in testamentis'.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,24,11,66, p. 333: 'Cum forma illa sit iure positivo humano introducta, potest contraria consuetudine aboleri, etsi aliqui canonistae contrarium sentire videantur (...) quia in foro animae sufficit contractum tenere secundum limites iuris naturalis seu gentium: ad quod sufficit adesse praedictum consensum'.
Cf. Suárez, De legibus, lib. 3, cap. 9, num. 4, and Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,1,3,13.
Pedro de Oñate, De contractibus, tom. 2, tract. 9, disput. 29, sect. 7, num. 85, p. 112. Lessius rules that the promisor who consents fictitiously is bound to perform his contractual obligation; cf. De iustitia et iure 2,18,8,59-61. It is likely, though, that Lessius is assuming here the intention of deceit on the part of the fictitious promisor, since he considers a contract based on fictitious consent to be invalid until fictitious consent is replaced by real inner consent, cf. 2,17,11,72. In this manner there is no confict between his thought and Oñate's, given that Oñate also rules that performance is due in a fictitious contract, in which someone expresses the intention to bind himself (animo obligandi) with the inner intention to default on it (animo non implendi); cf. o.c., tom. 2, tract. 9, disput. 29, sect. 1, num. 11, p. 88. This is a good counter-example to the thesis which holds that a will theory of contract has difficulties in denying the lawfulness of reservatio mentalis in contract law; cf. R. Zimmermann, The law of obligations, Roman foundations of the civilian tradition, Oxford 1996, p. 644-646.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,17,5,29, p. 199: 'Unde omnis contractus solubilis iure gentium videtur habere hanc tacitam conditionem, quod contrahens stabit contractui nisi deprehenderit se graviter deceptum, id est, tali errore qui sit causa contractus'.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,17,11,74, p. 214: 'voluntas non fertur in incognitum'.
Hence their unwillingness to grant relief to the party who had consented to a highly disadvantageous sale purchase contract because of his ignorance about the future market conditions - a case known as 'the merchant of Rhodes' and discussed by W. Decock and J. Hallebeek in their forthcoming article Pre-contractual duties to inform in early modern scholasticism, Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, 78 (2010).
Manuel de Sá, Aphorismi confessariorum ex doctorum sententiis collecti, Antverpiae 1599 [Editio princeps: Venetiae 1595], s.v. obligatio, num. 2, p. 239-240: 'In obligatione generali, etiam cum iuramento, non veniunt ea quae non intendebas. Talia autem videntur esse quae si tunc cogitasses ad ea te non obligasses'. For biographical details on Sá, who taught theology at Alcalà and at the Collegio Romano, see A. Leite, s.v. Sá; in C. O'Neill / J. Domínguez (eds.), Diccionario histórico de la Compañía de Jesús biográfico-temático, vol. 4, Roma-Madrid 2001, p. 3454.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,18,10 72, p. 227: 'Confirmatur quia lex quae absolute lata est, non obligat in illis casibus, quos legislator expresse vel interpretative voluit exceptos. Atqui promissio est lex quaedam particularis, quam sibi suis sponte imponit, ergo non obligabit in illis casibus, quos expresse vel tacite ex prudentum interpretatione censetur excepisse'.
Sánchez, Disputationum de sancto matrimonio sacramento libri tres, Antverpiae 1617, tom. 1, lib. 1, disput. 67, num. 2, p. 112: 'Sponsalia autem habent tacitam conditionem, si res in eodem statu permanserint, id est, si causa non superveniat aut praecedens nove cognoscatur legitima ad ea dissolvenda'. It remains to be seen, however, whether or not Sánchez was willing to recognize the doctrine of changed circumstances as a general principle applicable to all contracts, cf. o.c., lib. 1, disput. 62, num. 3.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,17,5,33, p. 200: 'Quia si tale quid post contractum eveniret, non teneretur illum implere, eo quod status rerum sit notabiliter mutatus, ergo etiam non tenebitur, si id quod ab initio latebat, postea se aperiat. Nam paria sunt, supervenire de novo, et proferri in lucem seu incipere cognosci'. Medina had brought forward precisely this argument to condemn the merchant of Rhodes. Nevertheless, Lessius did not accept it in his solution of that case; cf. 2,21,5,41-42.
Oñate, De contractibus, tom. 2, tract. 9, disput. 29, sect. 11, num. 152, p. 128: '(...) sicut in simili in legibus et constitutionibus principum epikeia locum habet, ita eam in promissionibus privatorum locum habere aequum est, cum promissiones sint quaedam leges, quas sibi ipsis privati imponunt'.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,21,2,14, p. 276: 'Adverte tamen, si mutatis circumstantiis copiae, inopiae et similibus magistratus esset notabiliter negligens in pretio legitimo mutando, posset res vendi pretio vulgari, nam lex censeretur iniqua (...)'.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,27,5,19, p. 350: 'Debet enim commodatarius ab initio, quando illud acceptat, cogitare, posse talem eventum supervenire, ac proinde paratus esse tunc ea re privari cum suo incommodo et damno, vel pacisci expresse, ut quidquid evenerit, non teneatur ante certum tempus restituere'.
Cf. Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,24,7,34, p. 329: 'Secunda est, casus improvisus, per quem domus, quam elocasti, tibi incipit esse necessaria ad habitandum, ut si prior quam inhabitabas corruat vel comburatur, vel cogaris migrare propter hostes'.
As Robert Feenstra has shown, Grotius's treatment of the principle of changed circumstances heavily draws on Lessius's practical applications of it, cf. R. Feenstra, Impossibilitas and clausula rebus sic stantibus, Some aspects of frustration of contract in continental legal history up to Grotius, in: A. Watson (ed.), Daube noster, Essays in legal history for David Daube, Edinburgh-London 1974, p. 77-104, reprinted in his Fata iuris romani, Leiden 1974, p. 364-391.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,18,6,39, p. 220: 'Sicut promissio vel oblatio onerosa, qua quis se obligat, habet tacitam conditionem, nempe, si alter vicissim se velit obligare, ita etiam promissio et donatio habent tacitam conditionem, si acceptentur'.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,18,6,41.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 18, dubit. 6, num. 40, p. 220: 'Respondeo, ius civile non efficere ut pollicitatio facta civitati vim habeat absolutam ante acceptationem (nihil enim tale colligi potest ex ulla lege toto titulo de pollicitationibus) sed ne possit revocari pro libito, sicut ex natura rei posset, ut patet ex l. 3 eodem tit. (...) Itaque ex pollicitatione omni nascitur quaedam obligatio veluti conditionata et suspensa, donec acceptetur vel revocetur, quam revocationem ius positivum potest impedire'.
Cf. Sánchez, De matrimonio, lib. 1, disp. 3, num. 6, p. 6: 'Fateor totam obligationis radicem esse promittentis voluntatem, desideratur tamen acceptatio alterius ut conditio sine qua non'.
Cf. Sánchez, o.c., lib. 1, disp. 3, num. 5, p. 6: 'Quicunque superior absolutus et independens ab alio inducens obligationem per aliquam legem potest pro libito valide revocare, ita ut iam non obliget. Sed homo libere inducit in seipso obligationem promissionis, ergo quamdiu superior absolutus est, quia alter nondum acceptavit, poterit libere revocare'.
The most salient example being his refusal to accept the obligating force of ecclesiastical legislation in Antwerp regarding census, amongst other things: cf. Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,22,13.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,18,5,33, p. 219: 'Non tantum ideo requiruntur externa signa, ut alteri significetur voluntas donandi, sed etiam ut ipsa donatio et promissio per illa fiat'.
Cf. Sánchez, De matrimonio, lib. 1, disp. 3, num. 5, p. 7: 'Unus non obligatur alteri, nisi per modum sibi connaturalem et humanum, qui est verbis vel signis externis'.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,18,8,55, p. 224.
Lessius, De iustitia et iure, 2,18,8,52, p. 223-224: 'Quia promittere non tantum est affirmare se daturum vel facturum, sed ulterius est se obligare alteri, et consequenter ius illi tribuere ad exigendum. Unde dici solet, promissionem parere debitum'.
Oñate, De contractibus, tom. 2, tract. 9, disput. 29, sect. 6, num. 93, p. 114.
See C. 4,35,21, and C. 4,38,14: 'quisque in rebus suis est moderator et arbiter'.
Oñate, De contractibus, tom. 2, tract. 9, disput. 29, sect. 7, num. 86, p. 112: 'Quia in hoc casu promissio est quasi quaedam donatio, non quidem ipsius rei promissae quae tunc non traditur neque est praesens, sed obligationis loco illius quae tantumdem valet ac ipsa res promissa; quae obligatio ex tunc donata et tradita per acceptationem alterius est substituta rei promissae et quasi vicaria illius. (....) Quia ergo unusquisque suae rei est moderator et arbiter, sicut rem suam donare posset si ad manum haberet, ita loco rei istam obligationem de qua loquimur, donat'.
Oñate, De contractibus, tom. 2, tract. 9, disput. 29, sect. 6, num. 74, p. 108: 'Reliquit Deus hominem in manu consilii sui Eccles. 15,14 sine dubio inter alia, quia reliquit Deus in voluntate eius ut se obligaret, quando vellet, et sicut actiones agentium non operantur ultra voluntatem et intentionem eorum, ita operantur iuxta voluntatem et intentionem eorum'.
Oñate, l.c., num. 76, p. 108: 'Quia alias non esset homo vere et perfecte dominus rerum suarum si non posset eas dare quando, et cui vult, et quomodo vult, et obligationem etiam contrahere, quando et quomodo vult'.
Compare R. Kruithof, Leven en dood van het contract, Antwerpen-Apeldoorn 1987, p. 9-14
and I. Birocchi, Alla ricerca dell'ordine, p. 560-570.
M. Villey, Bible et philosophie gréco-romaine de saint Tomas au droit moderne, in: Dimensions religieuses du droit et notamment sur l'apport de Saint Tomas D'Aquin, [Archives de Philosophie du Droit, 18], Paris 1973, p. 56.
