Abstract :
[en] We offer a new outlook on the vexed question of the reference of natural-kind terms. Since Kripke and Putnam, there is a widespread assumption that natural-kind terms function just like proper names: they designate their referents directly (not via the satisfaction of a descriptive condition) and they are rigid designators: their reference is unchanged even in worlds in which the referent lacks some or all the properties associated with it in the actual world, and which are useful to us in identifying that referent.
There have, however, been heated debates about what should be taken as a natural-kind term. Some challenge the very existence of a separate category of natural-kind terms (Wikforss 2010); some their being directly referential (Marconi 1997; Moravcsik 2016; Häggqvist & Wikforss 2014); some raise the possibility that direct reference extends to terms beyond those usually assumed to fall under the category (Mallon et al. 2009), e.g. to ‘polemical’ terms (Schroeter & Schroeter 2014).
When these debates turn on the question of what natural kinds are, they take on a strong epistemological or metaphysical dimension. We think the issues can be clarified within the limits of the philosophy of language: by looking into what ranges of general terms are perceived by speakers as rigid designators of natural kinds. The first step to take is to ground the various kinds of semantic externalism in distinct brands of semantic deference. This we define as speakers’ being disposed to use words in line with the norms of their linguistic community and as consenting to being corrected when it is manifest that their use and understanding of a word does not match common practice (and agreeing that previous statements they made that contained a word they misused were false). When those dispositions are present, speakers defer semantically to something beyond themselves.
Here, our focus is on spotting the words for which speakers would defer not (just) to the current usage of the word in the linguistic community, nor to the current experts of the field to which the word pertains, but ultimately to the very nature of the referent of the term. When speakers’ deference conforms to that pattern, we argue, that is evidence that indexical externalism (à la Kripke or Putnam) provides the right metasemantic account of how the meaning of the word is determined. In other words, one can say that the word is treated like a natural-kind term.
But how can patterns of deference be measured? In an ongoing survey, participants are
confronted with conditions that may prompt them to revise certain classificatory statements, e.g. An emu is a bird. Each condition makes salient one of the targets we have identified for deference: the community usage, the experts, the ‘world as it is’. In the condition that seeks to tap into the latter kind of deference, participants are presented with a scenario in which future scientific discoveries result in excluding from the extension of a term certain members currently thought to fall under that extension, e.g. discoveries that require excluding certain species now thought to be birds from the Aves class. The scenario is such that it is clear that the ‘discoveries’ bring us closer to the actual essence, if there is one, of birds. Our reasoning is that, if participants significantly modify their statements in the light of that scenario, they can be taken to ‘defer’ to the nature of the referent, thus vindicating indexical externalism. We test if words not normally assumed to be natural-kind terms – for instance summer, contract or rape – exhibit patterns of deference similar to those for bird. If so, then there’s a case for
an extension of indexical externalism beyond the usual set of terms. What would be shown in this way is that speakers have something like realist intuitions with respect to words whose meaning is usually taken to be purely conventional or polemical.
We are at the pre-test stage for the survey. We cannot yet report on our results. We should,
however, have initial results by March, which, we believe, will enrich the observations made by
previous empirical studies (Braisby et al. 1996, Jylkkä et al. 2009, Genone & Lombrozo 2012).
References: Braisby, N., Franks, B. & Hampton, J. 1996. Essentialism, word use, and concepts. Cognition 59, 247-74./Genone, J. & Lombrozo, T. 2012. Concept possession, experimental semantics, and hybrid theories of reference. Philosophical Psychology 25, 717-742./Häggqvist, S. & Wikforss, Å. 2015. Experimental semantics: the case of natural kind terms, in J. Haukioja (ed), Experimental Philosophy of Language, London, Bloomsbury./Jylkkä, J., Railo, H. & Haukioja, J. 2009. Psychological essentialism and semantic externalism: Evidence for externalism in lay speakers’ language use. Philosophical Psychology 22, 37-60./Mallon, R., Machery, E., Nichols, S. & Stich, S. 2009. Against arguments from reference, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79, 332-356./ Marconi, D. 1997. Language, Speech, and Communication. Lexical Competence. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press./Moravcsik, J. 2016. Meaning,
Creativity, and the Partial Inscrutability of the Human Mind, 2nd ed. Stanford: CSLI./Schroeter, L. &
Schroeter, F. 2014. Normative concepts: a connectedness model, Philosophers’ Imprint 14, 1-26./
Wikforss, Å. 2010. Are natural kind terms special?, in H. Beebee and N. Sabbarton-Leary (eds), The
Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds, New York, Routledge, 64-83.
