1. For a general overview of the platform economy and the law, see Cordier, “L’économie de plateforme: description d’un phénomène d’intermédiation” in Kéfer and Clesse (Eds.), Enjeux et défis juridiques de l’économie de plateforme (Anthemis, 2019), pp. 8–33.
2. The European Commission confirms this in its Communication, “Online platforms and the digital single market – Opportunities and challenges for Europe”, COM(2016)288 final, at pp. 2–3.
3. The Court retains a wide definition of the notion of service. See Case C-281/06, Jundt, EU:C:2007:816, paras. 29–32.
4. Case C-434/15, Asociacion Profesional Elite Taxi, EU:C:2017:981; Case C-320/16, Uber France, EU:C:2018:221. See also Hatzopoulos, “After Uber Spain: The EU’s approach on the sharing economy in need of review?”, 44 EL Rev. (2019), 89–99; Finck, “Distinguishing internet platforms from transport services: Elite Taxi v. Uber Spain”, 55 CML Rev. (2018), 1619–1640.
5. Case C-194/94, CIA Security International, EU:C:1996:172, para 54 and Case C-443/98, Unilever Italia, EU:C:2000:496, paras. 49–51; see also more recently, Case C-613/14, James Elliott Construction, EU:C:2016:821, para 64.
6. The elaboration of such an Act has been contemplated in the Von der Leyen Commission’s political guidelines, available at (all websites last visited 29 May 2020).
7. See .
8. See also the terms and conditions of Airbnb, available at .
9. See in that regard .
10. Judgment, para 18.
11. Ibid., para 19.
12. Loi n° 70-9 du 2 janvier 1970 réglementant les conditions d’exercice des activités relatives à certaines opérations portant sur les immeubles et les fonds de commerce, Journal Officiel de la République française 4 Jan. 1970, p. 142. The Act has been modified; the most recent consolidated version can be consulted at .
13. Judgment, para 14.
14. Ibid., paras. 16–17.
15. Ibid., para 22.
16. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce), O.J. 2000, L 178/1.
17. Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA, EU:C:2011:474, para 109 and Case C-108/09, Ker-Optika bt v. ÀNTSZ Dél-dunántúli Regionális Intézete, EU:C:2010:725, para 28.
18. Art. 2(a) Directive 2000/31 refers to Art. 1(2) of Directive 98/34/EC as amended by Directive 98/48/EC; the 1998 Directive was repealed and replaced by Directive 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and the Council of 9 Sept. 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services, O.J. 2015, L 241/1. Art. 1(b) of that Directive now contains the definition of an information society service; the definition has not changed compared to the previous Directive.
19. See also Annex I to Directive 2015/1535.
20. Case C-108/09, Ker-Optika, paras. 37–38.
21. On the problems associated with the independent status of Deliveroo couriers, see Aloisi, “‘A worker is a worker is a worker’: Collective bargaining and platform work, the case of Deliveroo couriers”, 5 International Labor Rights Case Law (2019), 23–40.
22. Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 Sept. 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications, O.J. 2005, L 255/22; this Directive only applies when a service provider effectively moves to the territory of another Member State to provide occasional or temporary services, which is not the case when a platform offers online services, as was confirmed in Case C-342/14, X-Steuerberatungsgesellschaft v. Finanzamt Hannover-Nord, EU:C:2015:827, para 35.
23. Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 Dec. 2006 on services in the internal market, O.J. 2006, L 376/36. This instrument differs from Directive 2000/31 both in scope and in justifications that can be offered. Within the framework of online platform uses, see Joined Cases C-724 & 727/18, Cali Apartments (C-724/18), HX (C-727/18) v. Procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris, pending, involving the attempts of the City of Paris to restrict owners from renting their apartments without authorization.
24. E.g. Directive 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 Nov. 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC, O.J. 2015, L 337/35.
25. As confirmed in Case C-434/15, Elite Taxi, paras. 44–46.
26. Case C-108/09, Ker-Optika, paras. 33–34.
27. Case C-434/15, Elite Taxi, para 16. See also Finck, op. cit. supra note 4, 1621.
28. Case C-434/15, Elite Taxi, para 38; Case C-320/16, Uber France, para 21.
29. Case C-434/15, Elite Taxi, para 40; Case C-320/16, Uber France, para 22.
30. Judgment, para 27.
31. Art. 5 of Directive 2015/1535 cited supra note 18.
32. Art. 1(f) juncto 1(e)(i) Directive 2015/1535. See e.g. by way of example, Case C-336/14, Ince, EU:C:2016:72, para 84.
33. Case C-194/94, CIA Security International, para 54.
34. See Case C-267/03, Lindberg, EU:C:2005:246, para 87; Case C-255/16, Falbert and Others, EU:C:2017:983, para 16; and Opinion in Case C-390/18, Airbnb Ireland, EU:C: 2019:336, para 141, footnote 64.
35. Judgment, para 93.
36. Opinion, paras. 36–40. For a comment on that Opinion, see Busch, “The sharing economy at the CJEU: Does Airbnb pass the ‘Uber test’? Some observations on the pending Case C-390/18 – Airbnb Ireland”, (2019) Journal of European Consumer and Markets Law, 172–174; and also Menegus, “Uber test revised? Remarks on Opinion of AG in Case Airbnb Ireland”, 4 European Papers (2019), 603–614.
37. Opinion, para 41.
38. Ibid., para 85.
39. Ibid., paras. 51–52 and 60.
40. Ibid., para 63.
41. Ibid., para 67.
42. Ibid., para 72.
43. Ibid., para 78.
44. Ibid., paras. 73–74.
45. Ibid., para 75.
46. Ibid., para 77.
47. Ibid., para 81.
48. Ibid., para 96.
49. According to the A.G., only substantive ad hoc measures would be permitted under Art. 3(4) Directive 2000/31. See Opinion, para 135. In para 136, he doubts whether the Hoguet law would meet the proportionality test required under that same provision of the Directive.
50. The A.G. particularly refers to A.G. Jacobs’ Opinion in Case 380/87, Enichem Base and Others, EU:C:1989:135, para 14, the judgment in that Case in para 20 (EU:C:1989:318), Case C-443/98, Unilever Italia, para 43, and Case C-122/17, Smith, EU:C:2018:631, paras. 52–53. In contrast with the ECJ, the A.G. did not refer explicitly to Case C-194/94, CIA Security International, to which the Court referred abundantly. The A.G. only refers to his Opinion in Case C-320/16, Uber France, where a reference to that case had been added.
51. Ibid., paras. 150–151.
52. The ECJ only answered the questions from that perspective, despite the Commission and AHTOP having argued that Directive 2005/36 on the recognition of professional qualifications (O.J. 2005, L 255/22) and Directive 2007/64 on payment services in the internal market (O.J. 2007, L 319/1) had to be interpreted too. Since those instruments were not mentioned in the reference for a preliminary ruling, the Court did not consider them here; see para 38. The 2007 payment services had in the meantime been replaced by Directive 2015/2366.
53. Judgment, para 98.
54. Ibid., para 40.
55. Ibid., para 49.
56. Ibid., para 54.
57. Ibid., para 50.
58. In para 53 of the judgment, the English version incorrectly states that intermediation cannot be separated from the property transaction itself. That is an incorrect translation, as the ECJ stated that intermediation in this context can be separated. In the French version, the ECJ confirms that “un tel service d’intermédiation présente un caractère dissociable de l’opération immobilière proprement dite”. The German translation confirms that “[e]in solcher Vermittlungsdienst ist vom eigentlichen Immobiliengeschäft trennbar”, as do the Dutch (“staat immers los van”) and Spanish (“es disociable”) translations.
59. Ibid., para 55.
60. Ibid., para 56.
61. Case C-434/15, Elite Taxi, para 39.
62. Judgment, para 68.
63. Ibid., para 58.
64. Ibid., paras. 59–63.
65. Ibid., para 64.
66. Ibid., para 78.
67. Ibid., para 84.
68. Ibid., para 86.
69. For a more substantive analysis, see Opinion, paras. 123–137 and Busch, op. cit. supra note 36, 174.
70. Judgment, para 90.
71. Ibid., para 92.
72. Ibid., para 96, referring to Case C-194/94, CIA Security International, para 54.
73. Ibid., para 97; the ECJ referred to Case C-613/14, James Elliott Construction, para 64 to affirm that point.
74. See Commission Communication, “A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe”, COM(2015)192 final, pp. 11–12. See for background as well, Adamski, “Lost on the digital platform. Europe’s legal travails with the digital single market”, 55 CML Rev. (2018), 719–752.
75. Commission Communication cited supra note 2, p. 5.
76. On the fragmentation resulting from this, see Delimatsis, “From Sacchi to Uber: 60 years of services liberalization, ten years of the Services Directive in the EU”, 37 YEL (2018), 188–250.
77. Case C-434/15, Elite Taxi, para 35.
78. Opinion of A.G. Szpunar in Case C-434/15, Elite Taxi, EU:C:2017:364, para 33.
79. Judgment, para 52.
80. Ibid., paras. 54–55.
81. Ibid., para 55.
82. Opinion, para 65.
83. Judgment, para 68.
84. See also already Finck, op. cit. supra note 4, 1631.
85. Judgment, para 53.
86. Judgment, para 65; see also Case C-434/15, Elite Taxi, para 38.
87. Judgment, para 64.
88. Ibid., para 58.
89. Ibid. The Court refers to the following cases in that regard: Case C-425/06, Part Service, EU:C:2008:108, para 52; Case C-432/15, Baštová, EU:C:2016:855, para 71; Case C-71/18, KPC Herning, EU:C:2019:660, para 38. According to that case law, “a supply must be regarded as ancillary to a principal supply if it does not constitute, for customers, an end in itself but a means of better enjoying the principal service supplied”.
90. Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 Nov. 2006 on the common system of value added tax, O.J. 2006, L 347/1.
91. See Joined Cases C-308/96 & C-94/97, Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Madgett and Baldwin, EU:C:1998:496, paras. 24–25 and Case C-349/96, Card Protection Plan, EU:C:1999:93, paras. 30–31. Case C-278/18, Sequeira Mesquita, EU:C:2019:160, para 30, confirmed that a supply must be regarded as a single supply where two or more elements or acts supplied by the taxable person are so closely linked that they form, objectively, a single, indivisible economic supply, which it would be artificial to split. See also Henkow, “Defining the tax object in composite supplies in European VAT in European VAT”, 2 World Journal of VAT/GST Law (2013), 182–202.
92. Art. 2(h)(i) Directive 2000/31; see also Busch, op. cit. supra note 36, 174.
93. At least implicitly; see Case, C-108/09, Ker Optika, paras. 33 and 38.
94. Art. 3(6) of Directive 2019/770 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services, O.J. 2019, L 137/1.
95. Art. 2(11) of Regulation 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services, O.J. 2019, L 186/57.
96. Art. 6 of Regulation 2019/1150.
97. Art. 3 of Directive 2019/789 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 laying down rules on the exercise of copyright and related rights applicable to certain online transmissions of broadcasting organizations and retransmissions of television and radio programmes, and amending Council Directive 93/83/EEC, O.J. 2019, L 130/82.
98. Art. 1(5) Directive 2000/31.
99. Annex to Art. 3(3) Directive 2000/31.
100. Art. 4 Directive 2000/31. See also Waelde, “Article 3, ECD: Internal market clause” in Edwards (Ed.), The New Legal Framework for E-commerce in Europe (Hart, 2005), pp. 3–30.
101. See Arts. 5–14 Directive 2000/31. On the scope of those obligations and the liability exemption, see Lodder, “Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market” in Lodder and Murray (Eds.), EU Regulation of E-commerce: A Commentary (Elgar, 2016), pp. 15–58.
102. As confirmed in Joined Cases C-509/09 & C-161/10, eDate Advertising, EU:C: 2011:685, para 67.
103. That position is also confirmed by Tapia Hermida, “The second payment services Directive”, 35 Banco de España -Financial Stability Review (2017), 59, at 62.
104. See pending Case C-723/19, AIRBNB Ireland UC, Airbnb Payments UK Ltd v. Agenzia delle Entrate, a preliminary reference from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy).
105. See e.g. Case C-443/06, Hollman, EU:C:2007:600, para 18.
106. It is submitted that the ECJ would not have touched on the horizontal direct effect problem had the preliminary reference been phrased as a question of interpretation of Directive 2000/31. For an example of where the Court avoided the direct effect question in that context, see Case C-129/94, Ruiz Bernaldez, EU:C:1996:143. See also Squintani and Lindeboom, “The normative impact of invoking directives: Casting light on direct effect and the elusive distinction between obligations and mere adverse repercussions”, 38 YEL (2019), 40.
107. See among others, Case 152/84, Marshall, EU:C:1986:84, para 48; Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori, EU:C:1994:292, paras. 20–24; Case C-194/92, El Corte Ingles, EU:C:1996:88, para 15; Joined Cases C-397-403/01, Pfeiffer and Others, EU:C:2004:584, para 108; Case C-282/10, Dominguez, EU:C:2012:33, para 37; Case C-176/12, Association de médiation sociale, EU:C:2014:2, para 36; Case C-122/17, Smith, paras. 42–43.
108. See Case 152/84, Marshall, para 49; Case C-188/89, Foster and Others, EU:C:1990:313, para 17; and Case C-343/98, Collino and Chiappero, EU:C:2000:441, para 22; Case C-157/02, Rieser Internationale Transporte, EU:C:2004:76, para 24; Case C-356/06, Farrell, EU:C:2007:229, para 40; Case C-282/10, Dominguez, para 39. State authorities can even do so against other State authorities, see Case C-425/12, Portgas, EU:C:2013:829, para 38; Albors-Llorens, “The direct effect of EU directives: Fresh controversy or a storm in a teacup?” 39 EL Rev. (2014), 850–862.
109. Case C-122/17, Smith, para 55.
110. Case 14/83, Von Colson and Kamann, EU:C:1984:153, para 26; Case C-106/89, Marleasing, EU:C:1990:395, para 8; Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori, para 26; Case C-403/01, Pfeiffer and Others, para 113; Case C-282/10, Dominguez, para 25; see also Betlem, “The doctrine of consistent interpretation – Managing legal uncertainty”, 22 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2003), 397–418.
111. Opinion, paras. 129–135.
112. Case C-282/10, Dominguez, paras. 40–43; Case C-122/17, Smith, para 55.
113. As had been contemplated by A.G. Jacobs in his Opinion in Case C-443/98, Unilever Italia, EU:C:2000:57, paras. 69 and 79–80.
114. Judgment, paras. 96–97.
115. See among many others on the incidental horizontal effect of Directives, Arnull, “Editorial: The incidental effect of directives”, 24 EL Rev. (1999), 1; Hilson and Downes, “Making sense of rights: Community rights in EC Law”, 24 EL Rev. (1999), 121, at 125; and Dougan, “The ‘disguised’ vertical direct effect of directives?”, 59 CLJ (2000), 586; and Squintani and Lindeboom, op. cit. supra note 106, 9–10.
116. Case C-194/94, CIA Security International, para 54, as confirmed more recently in Case C-613/14, James Elliott Construction, para 64.
117. Judgment, para 94; see also Case 380/87, Enichem Base, para 20.
118. Case C-443/98, Unilever Italia, para 51.
119. Case C-122/17, Smith, para 53, which also refers to Case C-194/94, CIA Security International, para 48, although the ECJ did not formally make that point there.
120. E.g. Art. 15(7) of Services Directive 2006/123.
121. Art. 3(2) Directive 2000/31 grants the subjective right of free movement; exemptions from liability in Arts. 12–14 also grant subjective rights in that context.
122. See Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, Francovich, EU:C:1991:428; see also, Lock, “Is private enforcement of EU law through State liability a myth? An assessment 20 years after Francovich”, 49 CML Rev. (2012), 1675–1702.
