[en] In the European rail industry, to enable competition in the market, entrants should be granted access to a large set of complementary services, beyond access to the tracks. For an efficient and effective entry, temporary access to quasi-essential complementary assets like rolling stock, mechanical maintenance workshops, data, schedules, etc. is also required. In the liberalized rail sector, several observed anticompetitive practices involve distorted access to these quasi-essential facilities. Therefore, competition agencies must deal with litigation between the incumbent and new entrants. Most cases have been settled, resulting in commitments from the incumbent. We argue that such transitory and case-by-case remedies fail to produce favorable conditions for a secure and efficient entry. Thus, we propose to systematize such remedies through asymmetric and enduring ex-ante regulation.
Research center :
LCII - Liège Competition and Innovation Institute - ULiège
Disciplines :
Microeconomics
Author, co-author :
Bougette, Patrice; Université Côte d’Azur
Gautier, Axel ; Université de Liège - ULiège > HEC Liège : UER > UER Economie : Economie industrielle
Marty, Frederic; Université Côte d’Azur
Language :
English
Title :
Which access to which assets for an effective liberalization of the rail sector
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