Algis Mickunas, “Landgrebe’s school of phenomenology,” Analecta Husserliana 36 (1991): 243, points out that metaphysics is one of the three “basic concerns” of Landgrebe and his school, besides transcendental experience and history. The most important source here is Ludwig Landgrebe, Phänomenologie und Metaphysik (Hamburg: Marion von Schröder, 1949). This book contains six chapters, the first five of which are lectures or journal articles from 1932 to 1945. I will here focus on the only original contribution of the book, namely the sixth and final chapter entitled “Phänomenologische Bewusstseinsanalyse und Metaphysik.” This chapter was reprinted in 1963 as chapter 4 of Der Weg der Phänomenologie (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1963), 75–110.
Ludwig Landgrebe, “Die Methode der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls,” Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung 9/5 (1933), 385.
Herbert Spiegelberg, with the collaboration of Karl Schuhmann, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982), 244.
Ludwig Landgrebe, Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, 155–156; Ludwig Landgrebe, “Phenomenology and Metaphysics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10/2 (1949): 201.
Ludwig Landgrebe, Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, 154; Ludwig Landgrebe, “Phenomenology and Metaphysics,” 200.
Ludwig Landgrebe, Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, 156.
Ludwig Landgrebe, “Phenomenology and Metaphysics,” 198, 201. Ludwig Landgrebe, Faktizität und Individuation: Studien zu den Grundfragen der Phänomenologie (Hamburg: Meiner, 1982), 11ff.
Ludwig Landgrebe, “Phenomenology and Metaphysics,” 158.
Ludwig Landgrebe, Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, 9, 157.
Denis Seron, “Landgrebe et Fink sur l’universalité de la philosophie phénoménologique,” Les Études philosophiques, July-September 2002, 281–292. Dan Zahavi, “Phenomenology and Metaphysics,” in Metaphysics, Facticity, Interpretation: Phenomenology in the Nordic Countries, ed. Dan Zahavi, Sara Heinämaa, Hans Ruin (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), 3–22. Nam-In Lee, “Husserl’s View of Metaphysics: The Role of Genuine Metaphysics in Phenomenological Philosophy,” in Phenomenology 2005, Vol. 1: Selected Essays from Asia, Part 2, ed. Cheung Chan-Fai and Yu Chung-Chi (Bucharest: Zeta Books, 2007), 441–462. See also Emilio Trizio, “Husserl’s Concept of Metaphysics as the Ultimate Science of Reality,” Phainomenon, 26 (2017), 37–68, for Husserl’s earlier works.
Ludwig Landgrebe, Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, 152.
Ibid., 156ff.; Ludwig Landgrebe, “Phenomenology and Metaphysics,” 199ff.
Ludwig Landgrebe, Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, 157.
Similarly, Heidegger explains in Being and Time that he uses “transcendental” in reference to both Dasein’s “outstanding transcendence” (ausgezeichnete Transzendenz) and being taken as the “transcendens pure and simple.” See Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1967), 38; Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 62.
Ludwig Landgrebe, Was bedeutet uns heute Philosophie? (Hamburg: Marion von Schröder, 1954), 44ff.
Ludwig Landgrebe, Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, 149.
Ibid., 184–185. See also Ludwig Landgrebe, “Phenomenology and Metaphysics,” 197, and Nam-In Lee, “Husserl’s View of Metaphysics,” for a comparison with Husserl.
Ludwig Landgrebe, Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, 173.
Landgrebe does not explicitly refer to Gestalt theory in the mentioned text, but he uses the word “Gestaltung” (Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, 174). In his “Prinzipien der Lehre vom Empfinden,” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 8/2 (1954), 195–209, he regards the Berlin Gestalt theory as a first crucial step towards the overcoming of the old atomic psychology, to which he thinks Husserl is still indebted. Among other things, he refers to Koffka’s claim that so-called “expressive qualities” (Ausdrucksqualitäten) must be given in experience prior to the division of the phenomenal field into “internal” and “external” elements (Ibid., 203–204). See, for example, Kurt Koffka, Principles of Gestalt Psychology (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co, 1936), 407, on “emotions that are not experienced in the ego.” Koffka rejects both the theory of empathy and the theory of analogical inference, claiming that emotions are as directly experienced in ourselves as in other human beings, animals, and even non-living objects, for example a sad landscape.
Ludwig Landgrebe, Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, 174.
Diego Sinha, Studies in Phenomenology (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969), 126–127. See P. F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London New York: Routledge, 1959).
Ludwig Landgrebe, “Phenomenology and Metaphysics,” 199.
Ibid., 205. See Ludwig Landgrebe, Faktizität und Individuation, 26.
