[en] By claiming, against Bolzano, that all presentations have an object on top of their content, even when this object does not actually exist, Twardowski notoriously paved the way for Meinong's "Gegenstandstheorie", which will make place for inexistent objects and their properties. And this provides a very interesting counter-model to the standard account of meaning and reference which is linked to extensional semantics. However, by equating inexistent objects with the sets of their descriptive features, Meinongian formal systems tend to jeopardise the content-object distinction. The universal validity of such a distinction will here be assessed by having a closer look at different kinds of “inexistent objects”.
Research Center/Unit :
Phénoménologies - ULiège MéThéor - Métaphysique et Théorie de la Connaissance - ULiège Traverses - ULiège
Disciplines :
Philosophy & ethics
Author, co-author :
Leclercq, Bruno ; Université de Liège - ULiège > Département de philosophie > Philosophie analytique et de la logique
Language :
English
Title :
Is the content-object distinction universally valid ? Meaning and reference in Twardowski and Meinong
Alternative titles :
[fr] La distinction contenu-objet est-elle universellement valide ? Signification et référence chez Twardowski et Meinong
Publication date :
2020
Main work title :
Philosophy of Language in the Brentano School
Main work alternative title :
[fr] Philosophie du langage dans l'école de Brentano
