From the particular soul to the World Soul: Some puzzles in Philoponus

For Platonists after Proclus, the World Soul has become evidence. No need to deepen its examination further, and philosophers as Damascius or Simplicius remain almost silent on the topic. However, the case of John Philoponus appears to be a little different. In facing Proclus regarding the eternity of the World, he addresses the questions of the relation between World Soul and particular souls, but also of the necessity of a World Soul. First, in his Commentary on the De anima, we notice that he (as his contemporaries) feels no urge to defend the notion of a World Soul: he comments on it not because it appears to be a crucial notion within the platonic system, but only because the issue is found in Aristotle’s text. Then, in his Contra Proclum, particularly in the seventh essay, he tackles Proclus argument in favour of a World Soul, especially the idea that from the existence of a World Soul would result the eternity of the World (Body). Whether the World Soul exists does not seem to be Philoponus’ main concern. He rather shows that if something as a World Soul exists, it cannot be as Proclus holds it by showing, first, that Proclus is mistaken in his reading of Plato, then that his alleged proves are in disagreement with sensible experience.