2020 • In Fisette, Denis; Fréchette, Guillaume; Janoušek, Hynek (Eds.) Franz Brentano's Philosophy after One Hundred Years - From History of Philosophy to Reism
[en] In this chapter, the author raises new objections to the self-representational reading of Brentano. This reading, he argues, is untenable simply because Brentano regards a representational perception as conceptually impossible. He then provides a new construal of Brentano’s theory of intentionality, based on a phenomenological approach to intentionality and consciousness. In his view, the main purpose of Brentano’s theory of intentionality is to account for mental acts that are not (inner) perceptions, that is, for acts in which something appears without existing.
Research Center/Unit :
Phénoménologies - ULiège Traverses - ULiège
Disciplines :
Philosophy & ethics
Author, co-author :
Seron, Denis ; Université de Liège - ULiège > Département de philosophie > Phénoménologies
Language :
English
Title :
Consciousness and representation
Publication date :
2020
Main work title :
Franz Brentano's Philosophy after One Hundred Years - From History of Philosophy to Reism