Reference : Brentano's Mind: Unity Without Simplicity
Scientific journals : Article
Arts & humanities : Philosophy & ethics
Brentano's Mind: Unity Without Simplicity
Dewalque, Arnaud mailto [Université de Liège > Département de philosophie > Phénoménologies >]
Rivista di Filosofia
[en] Consciousness ; Unity ; Mereology ; Philosophy of Mind ; History of Philosophy ; Franz Brentano (1838-1917) ; William James (1842-1910)
[en] This paper offers a reconstruction of Franz Brentano’s mereological solution to the problem of the unity of consciousness and explores some implications of this solution for the ontology of the mind. In section 1 I sketch Brentano’s ontological distinctions between things, collectives, and divisives. In section 2 I present Brentano’s mereological solution and in section 3 I review his main pro-arguments. Eventually, in section 4 I consider some Jamesian objections to the mereological approach. I argue the notion of ‘mental parts’ can be given a rather innocuous meaning by being conceived of as the expression of conceptual distinctions grounded in similarity and contrast relations between total mental phenomena.
Phenomenology of thinking past and present (Crédit classique, PhéCog).
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