Consciousness; Unity; Mereology; Philosophy of Mind; History of Philosophy; Franz Brentano (1838-1917); William James (1842-1910)
Résumé :
[en] This paper offers a reconstruction of Franz Brentano’s mereological solution to the problem of the unity of consciousness and explores some implications of this solution for the ontology of the mind. In section 1 I sketch Brentano’s ontological distinctions between things, collectives, and divisives. In section 2 I present Brentano’s mereological solution and in section 3 I review his main pro-arguments. Eventually, in section 4 I consider some Jamesian objections to the mereological approach. I argue the notion of ‘mental parts’ can be given a rather innocuous meaning by being conceived of as the expression of conceptual distinctions grounded in similarity and contrast relations between total mental phenomena.
Centre/Unité de recherche :
Phénoménologies - ULiège Traverses - ULiège
Disciplines :
Philosophie & éthique
Auteur, co-auteur :
Dewalque, Arnaud ; Université de Liège > Département de philosophie > Phénoménologies
Langue du document :
Anglais
Titre :
Brentano's Mind: Unity Without Simplicity
Date de publication/diffusion :
décembre 2017
Titre du périodique :
Rivista di Filosofia
ISSN :
0035-6239
Maison d'édition :
Il Mulino, Bologna, Italie
Volume/Tome :
108
Fascicule/Saison :
3
Pagination :
349-364
Peer reviewed :
Peer reviewed
Intitulé du projet de recherche :
Phenomenology of thinking past and present (Crédit classique, PhéCog).
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F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, cit., pp. 18-19.
G. Fréchette, Brentano's Soul and the Unity of Consciousness, «Argumentos», VII, 2015, p. 71.
F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, cit., p. 155 (transl. modified).
A. Dewalque, Brentano and the Parts of the Mental: A Mereological Approach to Phenomenal Intentionality, «Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences», XII, 2013, pp. 447-64.
T. Bayne - D. Chalmers, What Is the Unity of Consciousness?, in The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, Dissociation, ed. by A. Cleeremans, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 23-58;
T. Bayne, The Unity of Consciousness, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 20-21.
K. Mulligan - B. Smith, Franz Brentano on the Ontology of the Mind, «Philosophy and Phenomenological Research», XLV, 1985, pp. 627-44;
B. Smith, Austrian Philosophy. The Legacy of Franz Brentano, Chicago-LaSalle, Open Court, 1995, pp. 44 f.
F. Brentano, Religion und Philosophie. Ihr Verhältnis zueinander und ihre gemeinsamen Aufgaben, ed. by F. Mayer-Hillebrand, Bern, Francke, 1954, p. 225: «A collective is a plurality of parts, each of which being an independent thing, gathered together from one unitary point of view».
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B. Smith, Austrian Philosophy, cit., p. 45.
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F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, cit., pp. 407-408;
(cf. D. Seron, La conscience a-t-elle des parties?, in Esthétique de la complexité, ed. by L.-J. Lestocart, Paris, Hermann, 2017, pp. 23-49).
F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, cit., p. 157;
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F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, cit., p. 96.
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A. Marty, Deskriptive Psychologie, cit., p. 31.
A. Marty, William James: The Principles of Psychology, «Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane», III, 1892, p. 323.
K. Mulligan - B. Smith, Franz Brentano on the Ontology of the Mind, cit., pp. 632-33;
M. Textor, Unity Without Self: Brentano on the Unity of Consciousness, in Themes from Brentano, ed. by D. Fisette and G. Fréchette, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2013, p. 73.
D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. A Critical Edition, vol. I, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2007, p. 165 (= Treatise 1.4.6.4).
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F. Brentano, Descriptive Psychology, cit., p. 15.
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F. Brentano, Descriptive Psychology, cit., p. 15.
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B. Dainton, Brentano on the Unity of Consciousness, cit., pp. 66 f.
F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, cit., p. 160.
F. Brentano, Descriptive Psychology, cit., pp. 14-15.
F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, cit., p. 165, my emphasis.
F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, cit., p. 157.
A. Marty, Deskriptive Psychologie, cit., p. 31.
W. James, Principles of Psychology, London, McMillan, 1890, p. 145.
W. James, Principles of Psychology, cit., p. 160.
W. James, Principles of Psychology, cit., p. 162 fn.
J. Searle, Consciousness, in Id., Consciousness and Language, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 56.
M. Tye, Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press, 2003, p. 28.
D. Seron, La conscience a-t-elle des parties?, cit.
F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, cit., p. 96, my emphasis.
A. Marty, William James: The Principles of Psychology, cit., pp. 320 f.
T. Bayne, The Unity of Consciousness, cit., p. 23, my emphasis.
D. Seron, Ce que voir veut dire: Essai sur la perception, Paris, Le Cerf, 2012, pp. 166 f.
C. Stumpf, Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung, Leipzig, Hirzel, 1873, p. 139.
