Reference : Emotional Phenomenology: Toward a Nonreductive Analysis
Scientific journals : Article
Arts & humanities : Philosophy & ethics
Emotional Phenomenology: Toward a Nonreductive Analysis
Dewalque, Arnaud mailto [Université de Liège > Département de philosophie > Phénoménologies >]
Midwest Studies in Philosophy
Wiley Blackwell
Philosophy of Affective Life
[en] Emotion ; Philosophy of Mind ; Phenomenology ; Franz Brentano (1859-1938) ; Cognitivism
[en] In this article I want to create a presumption in favor of a nonreductive analysis of emotional phenomenology. The presumption relies on the claim that none of the nonemotional elements which are usually regarded as constitutive of emotional phenomenology may reasonably be considered responsible for the evaluative character of the latter. In section 1 I suggest this is true of cognitive elements, arguing that so-called ‘evaluative’ judgments usually result from emotional, evaluative attitudes, and should not be conflated with them. In section 2 I argue the same holds true for conative attitudes (desires and acts of the will). And in section 3 I briefly mention some salient aspects of the version of nonreductive analysis I lean toward.
Phenomenology of thinking past and present (Crédit classique, PhéCog).
Researchers ; Professionals ; Students

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