Reference : Intentionalisme et phénoménologie de l'intentionnalité
Scientific journals : Article
Arts & humanities : Philosophy & ethics
http://hdl.handle.net/2268/205614
Intentionalisme et phénoménologie de l'intentionnalité
French
Seron, Denis mailto [Université de Liège > Département de philosophie > Phénoménologies >]
2017
Etudes Phénoménologiques - Phenomenological Studies
Peeters
1
La phénoménologie et les défis de la Philosophy of Mind / Phenomenology and the Challenges of the Philosophy of Mind
45-63
Yes
International
Leuven
Belgium
[fr] phénoménologie ; intentionnalité
[en] phenomenology ; intentionality
[en] This paper presents an argument in favor of a “phenomenological” approach to intentionality. This approach, as I see it, involves the view that intentional facts are better expressed with the help of appearance words (“seems”, “appears”, “is similar to”, etc.). By contrast, what I call the “intentionalist approach” assumes that intentional facts are better expressed by intentional verbs. The argument is as follows. First, it is well-known that the use of intentional verbs to express typically intentional facts generates anomalies with respect to existential generalization, substitution of identicals, and the principle of excluded middle. Secondly, I argue that the use of appearance words does not generate the same anomalies, which suggests that appearance words are more appropriate to describe intentional facts. This, I conclude, is an argument for preferring the phenomenological to the intentionalist approach to intentionality.
Phénoménologies
http://hdl.handle.net/2268/205614
also: http://hdl.handle.net/2268/207509

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