[en] The European Union plays an ever increasing role in the institutional organisation of market supervision, by either creating new supranational supervisory bodies or by circumscribing Member States autonomy in designing national supervisory authorities. European Union law draws particularly volatile legal boundaries that create a playing field between supranational policymaking and national institutional choices. This dissertation aims to identify those legal boundaries. In doing so, it additionally seeks to analyse the role of European Union law in the determination and delineation of such boundaries as part of the EU s larger federalism project. The dissertation comprises two main parts.
The first part structures the key characteristics of supranationally structured market supervision in the European Union. To that extent, the dissertation studies whether and to what extent supervisory powers are being shared betweensupranational and national actors, the institutional actors responsibleand cooperative mechanisms created by supranational law across different sectors of market regulation. The part particularly focuses on two differently structured market supervision regimes: competition law supervision and financial market supervision.
The second part builds upon the key characteristics identified by structuring them into a constitutional framework of competence attribution and competence exercise engaged upon by EU institutions. In particular, this part seeks to assess to what extent the key characteristics reflect a translation of EU constitutional principles in accordance with a particular model of European federalism. Identifying that model allows to better explain and predict institutional evolutions across differently regulated market segments.
