Conscience et intentionnalité

Graham, George; Horgan, Terry; Tienson, John

Contribution to collective works (Parts of books)

Graham, George; Horgan, Terry; Tienson, John et al.

2016 • In Dewalque, Arnaud; Gauvry, Charlotte (Eds.) Conscience et Représentation. Introduction aux théories représentationnelles de l'esprit

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Keywords :

Philosophy of Mind; Consciousness

Abstract :

[en] French translation of G. Graham, T. horgan & J. Tienson, "Consciousness and Intentionality". In M. Velmans et S. Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Oxford, Blackwell, 2007, p. 468-484.

Research Center/Unit :

Phénoménologies - ULiège

Disciplines :

Philosophy & ethics

Author, co-author :

Graham, George

Horgan, Terry

Tienson, John

Translator :

Dewalque, Arnaud ; Université de Liège > Département de philosophie > Phénoménologies

Language :

French

Title :

Conscience et intentionnalité

Alternative titles :

[en] Consciousness and Intentionality

Publication date :

June 2016

Main work title :

Conscience et Représentation. Introduction aux théories représentationnelles de l'esprit

Main work alternative title :

[en] Consciousness and Representation. Introduction to the Representational Theories of the Mind

Editor :

Dewalque, Arnaud ; Université de Liège - ULiège > Traverses

Gauvry, Charlotte ; Université de Liège - ULiège > Département de philosophie > Phénoménologies

Publisher :

Vrin, Paris, France

Collection name :

Analyse et philosophie

Pages :

225-250

Peer reviewed :

Peer reviewed

Name of the research project :

La renaissance de la philosophie au tournant du XXe siècle: l'école de Franz Brentano (1866-1955)

Commentary :

Partie d'un ouvrage rassemblant des textes clés de philosophie de l'esprit.

Available on ORBi :

since 16 June 2016

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Bibliography

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