Tagging with leisure needs

Pestieau, Pierre; Racionero, Maria

doi:10.1007/s00355-015-0875-6

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Article (Scientific journals)

Tagging with leisure needs

Pestieau, Pierre; Racionero, Maria

2015 • In Social Choice and Welfare

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https://hdl.handle.net/2268/181072

DOI
10.1007/s00355-015-0875-6

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Keywords :

tagging; needs; responsibility

Abstract :

[en] We study optimal redistributive taxes when individuals differ in two characteristics—earning ability and leisure needs—assumed to be imperfectly correlated. Individuals have private information about their abilities but needs are observable. With different levels of observable needs the population can be separated into groups and needs may be used as a tag.We first assume that the social planner considers individuals should be compensated for their leisure needs and characterize the optimal redistributive policy, and the extent of compensation for needs, with tagging.We also consider an alternative social objective where individuals are deemed responsible for their needs.

Disciplines :

Economic systems & public economics

Author, co-author :

Pestieau, Pierre ; Université de Liège > HEC - École de gestion de l'ULiège > HEC-Ecole de gestion

Racionero, Maria

Language :

English

Title :

Tagging with leisure needs

Publication date :

2015

Journal title :

Social Choice and Welfare

ISSN :

0176-1714

eISSN :

1432-217X

Publisher :

Springer Science & Business Media B.V.

Peer reviewed :

Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi

Available on ORBi :

since 01 May 2015

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