· Social interactions ·; Tax evasion ·; Experiments
Abstract :
[en] We experimentally study how receiving information about tax compliance
of others affects individuals’ occupational choices and subsequent evading decisions.
In one treatment individuals receive information about the highest tax evasion rates of others in past experimental sessions with no such social information; in another treatment
they receive information about the lowest tax evasion rates observed in the past
sessions with no such social information. We observe an asymmetric effect of social
information on tax compliance. Whereas examples of high compliance do not have any
disciplining effect, we find evidence that examples of low compliance significantly
increase tax evasion for certain audit probabilities. No major differences are found
across countries
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