[en] This paper proposes to use a game-theoretic framework in analyzing
complex corporate networks, notably in measuring the ``amount of
control'' of both direct and indirect shareholders. The values of
the indices are defined by complex voting games, composed by
interlocked weighted majority games. This paper proposes a
characterization of corporate networks in which the notion of
``control'' can be well defined, as well as an algorithm that
consistently estimates the power indices when it is the case.
Research Center/Unit :
QuantOM
Disciplines :
Quantitative methods in economics & management
Author, co-author :
Crama, Yves ; Université de Liège - ULiège > HEC-Ecole de gestion : UER > Recherche opérationnelle et gestion de la production
Leruth, Luc ; Université de Liège - ULiège > HEC-Ecole de gestion : UER > UER Economie
Wang, Su
Language :
English
Title :
A Markov chain model of power indices in corporate structures
