Perception; Phenomenology; Mereology; Franz Brentano (1859-1938); Unity of Consciousness; Carl Stumpf (1848-1936)
Abstract :
[en] What is the phenomenal structure of our perceptual experiences? In this talk, I suggest that perceptual experiences – like consciousness in general – have a mereological structure, that is, a structure in which the most basic relation is that of parthood. I do not provide any definitive argument for this view. I just want to suggest (i) that the mereological approach is untouched by the usual objections coming from the proponents of the Unified Field Theory (James, Searle, Tye), (ii) that the Unified Field Theory faces some important difficulties of its own.
Research center :
Phénoménologies - ULiège
Disciplines :
Philosophy & ethics
Author, co-author :
Dewalque, Arnaud ; Université de Liège - ULiège > Département de philosophie > Phénoménologies
Language :
English
Title :
Perceptual Experiences and their Parts
Publication date :
22 November 2014
Number of pages :
10
Event name :
Perception in Phenomenology
Event organizer :
Gianfranco Soldati (Uni. Fribourg), Andrea Giananti (Uni. Fribourg/King's College London), Virginie Palette (Archives Husserl de Paris / Uni. Diego Portales Chili).
Event place :
Fribourg, Switzerland
Event date :
21-22 novembre 2014
Audience :
International
Name of the research project :
Renaissance de la Philosophie au tournant du XXe siècle: L'école de Franz Brentano (1866-1955)
