[en] Brentano’s metaphysical position in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint is usually assumed to be metaphysical realism. I propose an alternative interpretation, according to which Brentano was at that time, as well as later, a full-fledged phenomenalist. However, his phenomenalism is markedly different from standard phenomenalism in that it does not deny that the physicist’s judgments are really about the objective world. The aim of the theory of intentionality, I argue, is to allow for extra-phenomenal aboutness within a phenomenalist framework.
Research Center/Unit :
Phénoménologies - ULiège
Disciplines :
Philosophy & ethics
Author, co-author :
Seron, Denis ; Université de Liège - ULiège > Département de philosophie > Phénoménologies
Language :
English
Title :
Brentano's "Descriptive" Realism
Publication date :
2014
Journal title :
Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique
ISSN :
1782-2041
Publisher :
Université de Liège. Département de philosophie, Liège, Belgium