Abstract :
[en] We address the issue of asserting the accuracy
of coordinates advertised by nodes of Internet coordinate systems during distance estimations. Indeed, some nodes may lie
deliberately about their coordinates to mount various attacks
against applications and overlays. Our proposed method consists
in two steps: 1) establish the correctness of a node’s claimed
coordinate (which leverages our previous work on securing the
coordinates embedding phase using a Surveyor infrastructure);
and 2) issue a time limited validity certificate for each verified
coordinate. Validity periods are computed based on an analysis
of coordinate inter-shift times observed on PlanetLab, and shown
to follow a long-tail distribution (lognormal distribution in most
cases, or Weibull distribution otherwise). The effectiveness of the
coordinate certification method is validated by measuring the
impact of a variety of attacks on distance estimates.
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