Reference : « Objet et contenu – L’intentionnalité husserlienne face à son héritage psychologiste »
Scientific journals : Article
Arts & humanities : Philosophy & ethics
http://hdl.handle.net/2268/113518
« Objet et contenu – L’intentionnalité husserlienne face à son héritage psychologiste »
French
[en] "Object and Content. Husserlian Intentionality confronted to its Psychologist Heritage."
Gyemant, Maria [Université de Liège - ULiège > Département de philosophie > Phénoménologies >]
2010
Studia Phaenomenologica
Humanitas
Vol. X
Phenomenology and Psychology
59-72
Yes
International
Bucarest
Roumanie
[fr] objets intentionnels, Husserl, Twardowski
[en] This paper aims to show how Husserl’s concept of intentionality detaches itself from the background of a thorough and recurrent argument against psychologism. Noting that, primarily, the concept of intentionality was recovered by Brentano’s psychology, it seemed to us important to show how Husserl’s intentionality, as it is conceived in the Logical investigations, distinguishes itself from the “intentional inexistence” that Brentano describes in his Psychology from an empirical standpoint. Showing what parts of this psychology were rejected and what was maintained in Husserl’s theory should be the first concern of those who intend to study the phenomenological concept of intentionality.
Researchers ; Professionals ; Students
http://hdl.handle.net/2268/113518

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